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ABSTRACT 
This report presents the results of research into alternative demographic futures for Europe. Our basic 
hypothesis  is  that  a  number  of  policies  relating  directly  to  health,  to  families  and  to  migration 
incentives and barriers, along with more general social policies linked to the degree of adoption of the 
welfare  state  and  economic  policies  that  affect  regional  economies,  taken  together,  will  have 
significant impacts on demographic behaviour. There is substantial evidence that adoption of specific 
policies can have short-term impacts on particular components of demographic change. Examples 
include  investment  in  medical  and  health  research  which  yields  over  time  better  treatments  and 
preventive  therapies  and  hence  continuing  increases  in  longevity.  However,  the  impact  of  such 
advances is modified by socio-economic variables such as degree of poverty and degree of inequality. 
Poorer people benefit later than richer people from health policies and differences between countries 
and between regions within countries persist because of international and intra-national inequalities. 
There  is  no  way  of  being  precise  about  the  impacts  of  a  given  set  of  policies  on  demographic 
behaviour. History provides a number of natural experiments involving the impact of policies but 
these are both time and place specific. Nevertheless, it is useful to put in place thought experiments 
that reveal the choices that European societies face. What we do in this report is to explore the 
determinants of change for the demographic components, relate those determinants to policies and 
bundle  together  policies (or  the  strength  of those  policies) in  scenarios.  Scenarios  are, in  effect, 
coalitions of policies affecting different demographic components in similar ways. We propose four 
scenarios  (linked  policy  bundles-demographic  effects)  using  two  axes  of  policy  variation:  a 
„Distribution-Fairness „dichotomous axis and an „Economy-Environment‟ dichotomous axis. Crossing 
these  two  axes  produces  four  Policy  Scenarios,  which  we  call  Growing  Social  Europe  (GSE), 
Expanding  Market  Europe  (EME),  Limited  Social  Europe  (LSE)  and  Challenged  Market  Europe 
(CME).  
We then develop models of likely change in the key drivers of each demographic component and vary 
the parameters in each of those models. The models have a variable that drives change across Europe 
or the member states and a distribution function that translates change to  the regional scale. For 
example, in the Mortality Policy Scenario, we use the average annual percentage changes in age-
specific mortality rates for Europe measured in 2001-2006 as the overall drivers (-2.8% for men, -
2.6% for women), which result in life expectancy increasing from 76 (men) and 82 (women) in 2005-
10 to 89 (men) and 92 (women) by 2045-50.  In the GSE and EME Scenarios we assume higher 
percentage changes and in the LSE and CME Scenarios we assume lower percentage changes. The 
regional death rates are modelled using scenarios for regional Standardized Mortality Ratios (SMRs) 
(using Europe as a standard): in the GSE and LSE Scenarios, we assume convergence in regional 
SMRs and in the EME and CME Scenarios we assume divergence. The impact of the Mortality Policy ix 
Scenarios on regional competitiveness is to decrease it because the improvements in mortality increase 
the old age dependency ratio, assuming no other changes in the social and economic system. The 
„Social  scenarios‟  (GSE,  LSE)  increase  regional  cohesion  by  reducing  the  spread  of  mortality 
experiences  across  regions,  while  the  „Market  scenarios‟  decrease  regional  cohesion  because  the 
variation across regions in mortality experience increases. However, much larger than these regional 
changes in cohesion is the convergence of the mortality experience of men and women with the gap in 
life expectancy at birth for Europe shrinking from 6 years now to 3 years by mid-century. 
We develop equivalent models for the other components of demographic change. So, for Fertility, we 
use changes in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) tailored to each scenario and the range of TFR within 
countries to reflect convergence or divergence in regional fertility. For Internal Migration within the 
23 countries that contain two or more NUTS2 regions, we assume no trend in the level of internal 
migration because the historical series (2001-2006) suggests no overall trend but rather fluctuations in 
response  to  economic  conditions.  We  use  Destination  Attractiveness  Ratios  (DARs)  to  alter  the 
direction of out-migration. For the GSE and LSE Scenarios, the range of DARs is shrunk; for the 
EME  and  CME  Scenarios,  it  is  expanded.  A  similar  method  was  used  to  model  Inter-Country 
Migration within the ESPON space. Trends in DARs are adopted which depend on the scenarios. The 
Extra-Europe Migration is governed by assumptions about the total level of immigration to Europe, 
which is then distributed to countries and regions using the current distribution patterns. Each of the 
scenarios has a different level assumption: 3.5 million per year for the GSE Scenario, 4.5 for the EME 
Scenario, 1.5 for the LSE Scenario and 2.5 for the CME Scenario. The hypothesis is that Europe‟s 
success in solving the economic and environmental challenges will raise or lower the number of 
immigrants attracted but that the attractiveness will be modified by the degree of emphasis on social 
welfare or market demand for labour.  Emigration rates are held constant and so emigration responds 
to the rate of growth of the population. 
The body of the report discusses the assumptions and methods used in building the component inputs 
to the DEMIFER Policy Scenario projections (reported on under Deliverable D7). We provide also a 
rich  mix  of  graph  and  map  illustrations  of  selected  input  variables  by  scenario.  The  full  set  of 
variables are contained the DEMIFER cenario Databases. 1 
1.  THE  DESIGN  OF  POLICY  SCENARIOS  OF  DEMOGRAPHIC 
DEVELOPMENT  
1.1  The nature of scenarios 
Scenarios are intellectual devices for thinking about alternative futures. They are hardly ever used as 
predictions of likely futures because there are so many uncertainties involved in their construction. 
However, they are now widely employed  by governments – international, national and local – and by 
firms to help in planning for the future. One of the most influential of current scenario-based reports is 
that  of  the  International  Panel  on  Climate  Change  (IPCC,  2007).  This  fourth  assessment  of  our 
climatic future sets out a number of scenarios for climate change dependent on input assumptions, 
model structure and mitigation strategies adopted. These scenarios have been used by governments to 
motivate programmes of investment, taxation and regulation to slow down and reduce the emission of 
carbon dioxide, one of the most important green house gases, which lead to global warming. The need 
for such mitigation policies rests on the claim, firmly rooted in evidence, that the principal driver of 
rising global carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere is human activity. Industrial, agricultural 
and domestic sectors emit carbon dioxide as a result of burning hydrocarbons (coal, oil, natural gas 
and wood). The international review work of the IPCC has led to a growing number of national 
reports on the consequences of global warming – its economic, social and environmental effects. 
These issues are discussed in Deliverable D8. 
How do the scenarios we have developed in this project fit into this framework? 
(1) They  also  are  not  predictions  of  the  future  but  the  working  out  of  alternative  futures, 
predicated on sets of assumptions. 
(2) The scenarios are narrow in that we concentrate attention only on the demographic sector of 
European human activity but we assess, qualitatively, the impact of different policy bundles 
on demographic behaviour. 
(3) The immediate drivers of the future population are the demographic components of mortality, 
fertility and migration at European, national and regional scales (NUTS2) across Europe. 
Migration occurs at three linked scales. The first scale is inter-regional migration within each 
country which we term internal migration. The second scale is migration between states with 
Europe, which we term inter-country migration. The third scale is migration between the 
countries of Europe and the countries of the rest of the world, which we refer to as extra 
Europe migration. 2 
We  have  called  our  alternative  futures  Policy  Scenarios  because  we  see  a  moderate  connection 
between national and international policies in the economic, social and regional domains on the one 
hand and the direction of demographic trends on the other. 
1.2  Policy scenarios for Europe 
We begin the scenario preparation by defining a framework for classifying policy making in Europe. 
This context consists of two dimensions which are part of informed political and intellectual debate 
throughout  Europe,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  the  world.  These  dimensions  we  call  „Economy-
Environment‟  and  „Distribution-Fairness‟.  Each  dimension  is  represented  in  Figure  1-1  by  a 
dichotomy.  
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Figure  1-1:  The  four  DEMIFER  scenarios  based  on  the  dimensions  “economy-environment”  and 
“distribution-fairness” 
At the top end of the Economy-Environment dimension we envisage a situation where sustainable 
growth has been achieved through technical and social innovation. Problems posed by environmental 
challenges such as climate change and „the end of oil‟ have been solved through a combination of 
renewable technologies and resource conservation made possible by technological breakthroughs and 
governmental planning. At the bottom end of the Economy-Environment dimension we envisage a 
situation where the environmental challenges have not been met and growth as traditionally measured 
has  fallen.  Consumption  has  been  cut  back  because  climate  change  has  affected  production  and 
because  hydrocarbon  depletion  has  occurred  with resulting  increases in energy  prices.  A simpler 
world with many features of the past is a consequence. 3 
On the left hand side of the Distribution-Fairness dimension we imagine in operation a bundle of 
policies designed to achieve social solidarity. There is societal agreement that the difference between 
the poorest and richest people should be moderate. Progressive taxation of income is adopted and tax 
loopholes and offshore havens are shrunk. Public expenditure policies include strong elements that 
favour  more  deprived  places  (countries  and  regions).  Policies  aim  to  reduce  inequalities  and  the 
achievement of greater equality raises the overall welfare of all (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). On the 
right  hand  side  of  the  Distribution-Fairness  dimension,  we  imagine  sets  of  policies  designed  to 
improve the operation of markets and the achievement of greater competitiveness in a global market 
place. Taxation is less progressive than under the Social Europe scenarios and favours enterprise and 
business. Under Market Europe scenarios higher incomes are achieved but at the expense of greater 
inequality and higher risks of economic fluctuations.  We combine the two dimensions to form a 
graph with four quadrants (Figure 1-1). Each quadrant is described using the dimension dichotomies 
and also given a general label for easy recognition. The four scenarios we propose for the DEMIFER 
analysis  are:  Growing  Social  Europe  (GSE),  Expanding  Market  Europe  (EME),  Limited  Social 
Europe (LSE) and Challenged Market Europe (CME). 
Each of these scenarios is associated with a set of policies that we may expect to impact, to a greater 
or lesser degree, the mortality, fertility, migration and labour force drivers that will be input to the 
MULTIPOLES projection model. We combine the impact of these policies with current trends to 
produce trajectories of key driver variables (e.g. the rate of improvement of mortality intensities). For 
example, fairly relaxed policies about extra-European immigration might be adopted under the EME 
scenario because business demands the labour needed to run the economy, while  under the  LSE 
scenario  concern  about  „over-population‟  results  in  more  restrictions.  Under  the  GSE  scenario, 
policies will focus on effecting convergence at regional level within member states in well-being, 
while under CME, divergence in the standards of living of regional populations might occur. 
To the four policy scenarios we have added additional scenarios as comparators: Reference Scenario 
1, Status Quo (STQ) is a scenario in which input rates and flows are held constant over time; a 
Reference Scenario 2, NIM is a scenario in which no migration is allowed (i.e. natural change only) 
and  a  Reference  Scenario  3,  NEM,  allows  no  extra-Europe  migration.  A  Climate  Change  and 
Migration Scenario is also being prepared. The Reference scenarios are discussed in Deliverable D5 
and the Climate Change and Migration Scenario in Deliverable D8. In that report, we use the LSE 
scenario extended to 2100 to match the forecasting horizon of our selected Climate Change scenario. 
1.3  Outline of the report 
Scenarios for the different demographic components are described in the chapters of the report as 
follows. Chapter 2 describes the outcomes of an online survey of experts who are part of the ESPON 4 
network. The survey asked them about the nature of policies in their countries that affect demographic 
developments. The results of the survey inform our design of the scenarios for each component. 
Chapter 3 describes the Mortality Scenarios which were developed by the Leeds team with inputs 
from the CEFMR team. Chapter 4 describes the Fertility Scenarios produced by the NEAA team. 
Chapter 5 covers the Internal Migration Scenarios for inter-regional migration, developed by the 
Leeds team, within 23 out of the 31 ESPON countries. Chapter 6 outlines the Inter-country Migration 
Scenarios which were created by the NEAA and NIDI teams. Chapter 7 discusses the Extra-Europe 
Migration Scenarios developed by the NEAA team. Chapter 8 gives an account of the Labour Force 
Participation Scenarios, developed by the NEAA and CEFMR teams. Chapter 9 provides a short 
description of the DEMIFER Policy Scenario databases, designed to help other researchers exploit 
the  rich  resources  of  information  they  hold.  Chapter  10  summarises  the  results  of  the  scenario 
development and relates them back to the policy drivers outlined above. 
1.4  Linking policies to trends for scenarios and consequences for ageing and the labour 
force 
How  do  we  move  from  the  scenarios  to  trends  and  policies  that  affect  the  future  path  of  the 
demographic  drivers?  Here  we  develop  a  framework  in  four  tables  that  will  enable  us  to  make 
progress on this front. Table 1-1 gathers together the components input to a model for projecting the 
population and labour force. The table sets out what inputs are needed to power the MULTIPOLES 
projection model and what drivers we use in developing the scenarios. Table 1-2 outlines trends and 
policies specific to each demographic component and scenario. Table 1-3 translates the trends and 
policies into specific numbers for the demographic inputs to the MULTIPOLES projection model. 
What the scenario analysis does is to deliver to the population projection files containing the input 
variables for each European state and NUTS2 region. The information set out in Table 1-3 has been 
implemented for each region for each scenario for 2005 to 2050 for five-year intervals. To implement 
the policy scenarios for mortality we introduce the general method shown in Figure 1-2. Table 1-4 
links policies to trends in demographic components and suggests the consequences for the challenges 
of future ageing and of a shrinking labour force. 5 
Table 1-1: Component inputs to the projection model and drivers for the scenarios 
Component  Input to MULTIPOLES  Scenario drivers 
Mortality  Age-specific death rates (ASDRs) 
for each ESPON region and 
projection multipliers 
Assumed rates of decline in 
ASDRs, specific to each scenario 
and varying by cluster, with 
regional convergence or divergence 
Fertility  Total fertility rates for each 
ESPON region (distribution of age 
specific fertility rates, ASFRs, 
assumed constant) and projection 
multipliers 
Assumed changes in TFRs, specific 
to each scenario and varying by 
cluster with regional convergence 
and divergence 
Inter-regional migration (within 
countries) 
Out-migration rates from origin 
regions to destination regions for 
each ESPON country with more 
than one region and projection 
multipliers 
Assumed changes in the level of 
inter-regional migration specific to 
each scenario and varying by 
cluster or country (to be 
determined) with regional 
convergence or divergence in 
destination attractiveness 
Inter-country migration (within 
Europe) 
Out-migration rates from origin 
countries to destination countries 
for ESPON countries and 
projection multipliers 
Assumed changes in the level of 
inter-country migration specific to 
each scenario with convergence or 
divergence by country of 
destination 
Immigration (from the Rest of the 
World outside Europe) 
Total immigration flows to each 
ESPON country from the Rest of 
the World Outside Europe and 
projection multipliers 
Assumed levels of migration 
specific to each scenario with 
convergence or divergence by 
country of destination 
Emigration (to the Rest of the 
World outside Europe) 
Total emigration rates from each 
ESPON country from the Rest of 
the World Outside Europe and 
projection multipliers 
Assumed levels of migration 
specific to each scenario with 
convergence or divergence by 
country of origin 
Labour Force Participation  Age Specific Participation Rates 
(ASPRs) specific to each ESPON 
region and projection multipliers 
Assumed directions of change 
specific to each scenario with 
convergence or divergence by 
region 
Note: For computational convenience rates and flows are input for the base period (either 2003-2006 or 2005-
10)  and  then  time  series  multipliers  are  input  for  the  projection  periods  2005-10  to  2045-2050.  In  the 
MULTIPOLES program the rates or flows for the projection period are computed by multiplying the base 
period values by the multipliers. 6 
Table 1-2: Linkage of scenarios to demographic components via trends and policies 
Demographic 
component 
Trend or Policy  GSE  EME  LSE  CME 
MORTALITY  Lifestyle: Smoking  Prevalence 
falls 
Trend 
continues 
Prevalence 
falls 
Trend 
continues 
  Lifestyle: Diet/Obesity  No epidemic  No epidemic  Epidemic  Epidemic 
  Lifestyle: Drinking  Prevalence 
falls 
Trend 
continues 
Prevalence 
falls 
Trend 
continues 
  Medical advances  Continue  Continue  Slow  Slow 
  National Health Inequalities  Reduced  Persistent  Reduced  Persistent 
  Regional Health Inequalities  Reduced  Persistent  Reduced  Persistent 
FERTILITY  Family versus Individual Goals  Family goals  Individual 
goals 
Family goals  Individual 
goals 
  Family Friendly Policies  Strong  Weak  Strong  Weak 
  Assisted Conception  Socially 
supported 
Privately 
supported 
Socially 
supported 
Privately 
supported 
  Abortion Law  Permissive  Restrictive  Permissive  Restrictive 
  Extra-Europe Effect  High effect  Low effect  Low effect  Low 
  National Fertility Inequalities  Reduced  Persistent  Reduced  Persistent 
  Regional Fertility Inequalities  Reduced  Persistent  Reduced  Persistent 
INTER-
REGION  
Total Level of Inter-Region 
Migration 
High  Moderate 
level 
Moderate 
level 
Low level 
MIGRATION  Origins: Inter-region Out-Migration  Stable  Divergent  Convergent  Divergent 
  Destinations: Inter-region In-
Migration 
Stable  Divergent  Convergent  Divergent 
  Explicit Inter-region Migration 
Policy 
None  None  None  None 
INTER-STATE   Total Level of Inter-State Migration  High  Moderate  Moderate  Low 
MIGRATION  Origins: Inter-State Out-Migration  Stable  Divergent  Convergent  Divergent 
  Destinations: Inter-State In-
Migrations 
Stable  Divergent  Convergent  Divergent 
  Explicit Inter-State Migration 
Policy 
Some 
restrictions 
Free 
migration 
Some 
restrictions 
Free 
migration 
EXTRA-  Total Level of Extra-Europe 
Migration 
High  Moderate  Moderate 
level 
Low level 
EUROPE  Origins: Emigrations  Stable 
origins 
Divergent 
origins 
Stable 
origins 
Divergent 
MIGRATION  Destinations: Immigrations  Stable 
destinations 
Divergent 
destinations 
Stable 
destinations 
Divergent 
  Explicit Extra-Europe Migration 
Policy 
Free entry  Selective 
entry 
Moderate 
entry 
Restricted 
entry 
LABOUR 
FORCE  
Trends in Participation  Increasing  Increasing  Decreasing  Decreasing 
PARTICIPATIO
N 
Pension and Older Worker Policies  Favourable  Stressful  Favourable  Stressful 
  Female Participation Policies  Friendly 
policies 
Unfriendly 
policies 
Friendly 
policies 
Unfriendly 
policies 
  FT/PT/Self Employed Policies  High 
participation 
High 
participation 
Moderate 
participation 
Low 
participation 
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Table  1-3:  Linkage  of  scenarios  to  demographic  components:  outcomes  in  levels  and  distributions 
(indicative trends and parameters) 
Demographic 
component 
Trend or Policy  GROWING 
SOCIAL 
EUROPE 
EXPANDING 
MARKET 
EUROPE 
LIMITED 
SOCIAL 
EUROPE 
CHALLENGED 
MARKET 
EUROPE 
MORTALITY  Lifestyle: Smoking  Mortality 
decrease 
Mortality stable  Mortality 
decrease 
Mortality stable 
  Lifestyle: Diet/Obesity 
(mortality change) 
Mortality increase  Strong mortality 
increase 
Mortality increase  Strong mortality 
increase 
  Lifestyle: Drinking  Mortality stable  Mortality increase  Mortality stable  Mortality increase 
  Medical advances 
(mortality rate change) 
Decrease by 2% 
pa 
Decrease by 1.5% 
pa 
Decrease by 1.0% 
pa 
Decrease by 0.5% 
pa 
  National Health 
Inequalities 
Strong 
convergence 
Strong divergence  Convergence  Divergence 
  Regional Health 
Inequalities 
Strong 
convergence 
Strong divergence  Convergence  Divergence 
FERTILITY  Family versus 
Individual Goals 
Target TFR +0.2  Target TFR +0.1  Target TFR +0.1  Target TFR - 0.2 
  Family Friendly 
Policies 
Target TFR +0.2  Target TFR +0.0  Target TFR +0.1  Target TFR +0.0 
  Assisted Conception  Target TFR +0.2  Target TFR +0.1  Target TFR +0.1  Target TFR +0.0 
  Abortion Law  Target TFR +0.0  Target TFR +0.2  Target TFR +0.0  Target TFR +0.0 
  Extra-Europe Effect  Target TFR +0.2  Target TFR +0.0  Target TFR +0.0  Target TFR +0.0 
  National Fertility 
Inequalities 
Convergence  Divergence  Convergence  Divergence 
  Regional Fertility 
Inequalities 
Convergence  Divergence  Convergence  Divergence 
INTER-REGION   Total Level of Inter-
Region Migration 
Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050 
MIGRATION  Origins: Inter-region 
Out-Migration 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
  Destinations: Inter-
region In-Migration 
Set destination. 
Attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
  Explicit Inter-region 
Migration Policy 
No explicit policy  No explicit policy  No explicit policy  No explicit policy 
INTER-STATE   Total Level of Inter-
State Migration 
Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050 
MIGRATION  Origins: Inter-State 
Out-Migration 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
  Destinations: Inter-
State In-Migrations 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
  Explicit Inter-State 
Migration Policy 
EU policy  EU policy  Some national 
policy 
Some national 
policy 
EXTRA- 
EUROPE 
Total Level of Extra-
Europe Migration 
Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050 
MIGRATION  Origins: Emigrations  Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
  Destinations: 
Immigrations 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
  Explicit Extra-Europe 
Migration Policy 
Permissive policy  Permissive policy  Restrictive policy  Restrictive policy 
LABOUR 
FORCE  
Trends in Participation  Raise rates  Raise rates  Lower rates  Lower rates 
PARTICIPATIO
N 
Pension & Older 
Worker Policies 
Raise rates  Lower rates  Lower rates  Lower rates 
  Female Participation 
Policies 
Raise rates  Lower rates  Raise rates  Lower rates 
  FT/PT/Self Employed 
Policies 
Raise rates  Raise rates  Lower rates  Lower rates 8 
Table 1-4: The influence of policy on the demographic components and the consequences for ageing and 
changes in the labour force 
COMPONENT  POLICIES  CONSEQUENCES FOR 
  Goals  Impact  Examples  Ageing  Labour Force  Regional 
inequalities 
Fertility  To raise 
fertility 
towards 
replacement 
Low  Family friendly 
policies (child 
benefits) 
Reduces 
ageing but in 
the long run 
Takes 20-25 
years before 
labour supply 
rises 
Neutral 
Mortality  To lower 
mortality 
High  Better health 
care, better 
access to all, 
less smoking, 
drinking, eating 
Speeds and 
raises the 
process. See 
Policy 
scenarios 
Should make 
young elderly 
healthier and 
so more 
available for 
working 
Inequalities 
will rise as 
innovations 
are first 
adopted in 
richer regions 
Internal 
migration 
To remove 
barriers to 
mobility 
Low  Little specific, 
responds to 
socio-economic 
developments 
“Winners” 
and “losers” 
dependent on 
selective 
migration 
around 
retirement 
ages 
Shifts 
workers to 
where they 
will be most 
productive 
but causes 
problems in 
losing regions 
Regions of net 
in-migration 
become richer 
because of 
increased 
labour supply 
Inter-country 
migration 
To remove 
barriers to 
mobility 
Moderate  Schengen  
Agreement, 
Some incentive 
schemes 
(Erasmus, 
Marie Curie), 
some temporary 
controls 
“Winners” 
and “losers” 
dependent on 
selective 
migration at 
younger ages 
Shifts 
workers to 
where they 
will be most 
productive 
but causes 
problems in 
losing 
countries 
Regions of net 
in-migration 
become richer 
because of 
increased 
labour supply 
Extra-Europe 
migration 
To balance 
labour market 
demands and 
the need for 
community 
harmony 
High  National and 
EU policies to 
select quality 
migrants, to 
restrict 
numbers, but 
many flows 
cannot be 
limited 
Slows but 
does not stop 
the ageing 
process in 
immigrant 
“target” 
regions 
Adds to 
labour force 
in “target” 
regions; 
subtracts from 
labour force 
in regions of 
emigration 
Regions of net 
in-migration 
become richer 
because of 
increased 
labour supply 
Labour Force 
Participation 
To increase 
participation of 
the inactive 
(women, 
disabled, 
unemployed 
and elders) 
Moderate but 
must shift to 
high 
Reducing 
eligibility for 
benefits (e.g. 
pensions, 
disability), 
changing the tax 
system to 
encourage 
working 
Should shrink 
the numbers 
of inactive 
old people. 
Vital to 
mitigate the 
effects of 
ageing. 
Increases the 
labour force 
and hence the 
GDP. Needs 
older worker 
re-skilling 
Richer regions 
are able to do 
increase 
labour force 
participation 
faster 
 
We illustrate the way in which policies are connected to demographic drivers with some selected 
illustrations. We begin with examples of policies affecting fertility. Provision of financial support for 
families with children, of generous maternity leave arrangements and of pre-school and after scholl 
services to care for children while allowing mothers to work in countries such as France, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom have raised fertility by about half a child compared with countries such as Italy 9 
and Spain (Kohler et al. 2006), where leaving home and marriage is postponed and hence fewer 
children  are  raised.  Policies  on  international  migration  will  have  indirect  effects  on  fertility:  for 
example, in the UK half of the rise in the UK total fertility rate in 2001-2009 by one third of a child 
can be ascribed to a rising proportion of foreign born women (Tromans et al. 2009). 
Policies affecting mortality are in place in all countries in ESPON space and their impact has a 
regional  dimension.  All  European  governments  aim  to  decrease    mortality  rates  and  raise  life 
expectancy  through  investment  in  health  care services,  research into  disease  control  and  through 
promoting  healthy  lifestyles.  These  policies  have  been  remarkably  successful  over  the  past  two 
decades, lowering age specific mortality rates by an average of 2.7% per annum. For example, in the 
UK the budget for the National Health Service is distributed using a formula that recognizes age-
related  met  need  and  overty-related  unmet  need.  Research  has  delivered  new  treatments  for 
cardiovascular disease based on the statin drug class, which have reduced the incidence of cardio-
vascular deaths. Public policy to persuade people not to smoke has halved the smoking prevalence 
rate since the 1960s with consequential lowering of lung cancer and heart disease deaths. European 
countries compete to achieve the best outcomes in health through continual comparison. In Europe all 
countries  and  most  regions  experience  improving  life  expectancy  even  though  socio-economic 
inequalities may mean persistence of differences across countries and regions. This recent history 
contrasts strongly with that of the United States where the life expectancies of the poorest populations 
and areas are falling, despite internationally high levels of health care expenditure (Ezzati et al. 2008)/ 
This contrast is a strong argument for the European social model rather than market delivered health 
care. 
The influence of policy on migration depends on the spatial scale over which it operates. Migration 
between regions within countries is rarely influenced by policy directly because neither controls on 
migration nor direct incentives operate, so that it is only indirectly through policies on the social and 
economic development of regions that migration is affected.  
Within ESPON space (EU, EEA plus Switzerland) freedom of labour migration is guaranteed under a 
succession of European Treaties. The Treaty of Rome (1957) established the right of workers to move 
between European Economic Community (EEC) member states. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) 
embodied a right to circulate and reside freely in the European Community (EC). The Treaty of 
Amsterdam  (1997)  made  the  earlier  Schengen  Agreement  (1985)  European  Union  (EU)  law, 
removing border controls between member states (now 25 though the UK and Ireland opted out). 
These  developments  made  inter-state  migration  within  the  expanding  European  space  easier  and 
easier over time. Policies such as the Erasmus Scheme encourage higher education students to take 
part of their degree programmes in another EU country and this has been expanded since 2007 into 
the Life Long Learning Programme covering older age students. The Marie Curie programmes of 10 
successive European Research Frameworks provide funding for inter-country mobility of researchers, 
including  postgraduate  students,  postdoctoral  researchers  and  established  research  workers.  The 
migration of non-workers is allowed but is only feasible if they are able to port origin country benefits 
to a destination country. An example is the transfer of the pensions of northern country retirees to 
their  southern  country  retirement  locations.  The  labour  recruitment  agreements  of  the  1950s  and 
1960s  have  largely  expired.  However,  there  are  incentive  schemes  for  researchers  (Marie  Curie 
programmes). 
Policy affects immigration from outside Europe most directly. National policy is still important in this 
area and sometimes conflicts with European policy and laws.  Immigration is controlled by a system 
of visas linked to the purpose of migration. Control is influenced by changing eligibility conditions 
for  visas  or  through  imposing  delays    which  stretch  out  the  immigration  process.  “Points  based 
systems” have been introduced which score applications for immigration which are based on the 
qualifications,  skills  and  experience  of  the  applicant  and  the  match  to  current  labour  market 
requirements. However, control is only partial because many immigrants are returning citizens or 
family members of citizens who have a right to enter. There is also a continuing stream of asylum 
applications although the majority of these are disguised economic migrants. However, such is the 
delay in processing applications that there will always be a population of migrants waiting on the 
result of their application or associated appeals. 
In Table 1-4 we include a column that identifies the potential for a policy to affect population ageing. 
Policies designed to increase fertility will, if successful, have an effect on ageing as the new higher 
birth cohorts age. In 15-25 years after the boost to births there will be an increase in young entrants to 
the labour force ages and so a contribution to reducing the rate of increase in old age dependency 
ratios. Policies designed to lower mortality will on the other hand increase the degree of ageing as 
more people from successive cohorts will survive to old age. Each of our policy scenarios assumes 
continued improvement in survival to old age and much more ageing therefore occurs in our policy 
scenarios than in the status quo scenario. However, if health policies  also ensure that older people 
remain healthy or only have mild disability, then they will be able to work for longer, well beyond 
current retirement ages, currently in the younger sixties. 11 
 
Figure 1-2: How demographic scenarios were designed for mortality 12 
2.  CONSULTATION ON AND VALIDATION OF THE SCENARIOS  
2.1  Introduction 
In order to validate the contents of the four policy scenarios, an online expert questionnaire has been 
designed. The results of this survey have been used to formulate assumptions on the kind of policies 
and  their  effectiveness  to  be  associated  with  each  scenario.  The  questionnaire  was  based  on  a 
demographic expert group questionnaire developed by IIASA (Prommer and Wilson, 2006) as part of 
the European Framework 6 MicMac project (NIDI, 2009) and adapted for use by the UK's Office for 
National Statistics (ONS, 2009; Shaw, 2008).  
Participants of the ESPON open conference held at Prague in 2009 were invited to complete this web-
based questionnaire. The primary aim of the questionnaire was to gather information on the degree to 
which the countries belonging to the ESPON space tried to influence the drivers on demographic 
components  and  labour  force  participation  and  to  what  extent  that  policy  was  successful.  The 
specified drivers in future trends in European regions refer to demographic, social, economic and 
environmental factors. In the compilation of the demographic future of Europe, it is assumed that a 
different  mix  of  policies  on  the  specified  drivers  in  combination  with  different  degrees  of 
effectiveness will lead to four alternate scenarios.  
For  each  of  the  specified  demographic  components  (fertility,  mortality,  internal  and  external 
migration) and also the labour force participation), the DEMIFER Transnational Project Group (TPG) 
has  compiled  a  list  of  relevant  drivers.  In  order  to  validate  this  list,  the  respondents  of  the 
questionnaire were invited to give their opinion on to what extent policy makers in their country tried 
to influence the specified drivers. Next they could state, in their opinion, how effective this policy 
was. Finally, in an open question, the experts could indicate how policy might change in the future 
(with respect to the specified demographic components). 
2.2  Response and background of the respondents 
During the ESPON seminar in Prague in 2009 only a small number of respondents found time to fill 
in the questionnaire. However, after a reminder mail by Peter Mehlbye, Head of the ESPON Co-
ordination  Unit,  the  response  improved  to  61  completed  questionnaires.  The  TPG  of  DEMIFER 
thanks Peter Mehlbye for his successful intervention.  
The level of expertise of the respondents on demographic issues was quite high (Figure 2-1). The 
majority of the respondents had some or much experience in the field of demography (about one 
quarter had more than 10 years‟ experience), although about one quarter had no experience at all. 
Planners, researchers and geographers made up nearly half the respondents (Figure 2-2). A large 13 
majority of the respondents worked for the Government (Figure 2-3). With respect to the degree of 
experience in the field of public policy or public administration, it turned out that about half of the 
respondents had been working for over 10 years in this field. All these background characteristics 
suggest  that  the  respondents  were  very  capable  of assessing  the  degree  of  policy  relating  to  the 
specified drivers and their effectiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Background characteristics of the 
respondents to the online consultation 
 
 
Figure  2-2:  Professions  of  the  respondents  to  the 
online consultation 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Employers of the respondents to the online 
consultation 
An important background characteristic of the respondents is the country they belong to (Figure 2-4). 
In the process of making assumptions for the demographic components, it is very relevant to know if 
the importance and effectiveness of policy  measures on drivers does differ between (geographic 
clusters of) countries. Luckily, a great variety of countries was represented in the survey. Moreover, 14 
the respondents were more or less evenly spread over all parts of the European territory. The United 
Kingdom was especially well represented in the survey, with a response from 11 persons. For the sake 
of presentation, a geographic grouping of countries has been used, namely northern, western, southern 
and eastern clusters.  About 30 respondents belonged to western cluster, about 15 to southern cluster 
and 10 to both the eastern and northern cluster. Based on these four clusters, it is expected that a 
reliable description of geographical differences in policy matters can be presented.  15 
  
 
Figure 2-4: Distribution of respondents to the online consultation by country and part of Europe 
West = {UK, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria} 
North = {Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden} 
South = {Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, Spain} 
East = {Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia} 16 
2.3  Structure of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire contained questions on the degree of policy on specific drivers with respect to the 
demographic  events  of  mortality,  fertility,  international  and  internal  migration  and  labour  force 
participation. The respondent  was asked to classify the  strength of policies on the drivers on an 
ordinal scale: no policies, weak, intermediate, strong, very strong and don't know. The results for each 
driver are presented in graphs. However, the results are also presented in tables, in which average 
scores will be used. In order to calculate these average scores, the answer categories are transformed 
into an interval scale: 0 being no policies up to 4 being very strong; the answer „don't know‟ was 
discarded.  A  similar  procedure  was  used  to  present  the  results  on  the  question  of  the  degree  of 
effectiveness  of  policies.  Besides  graphs,  tables  with  average  scores  are  also  provided.  The 
respondents were asked to indicate whether the effect was very negative, negative, no effect at all, 
positive and very positive (indicated respectively by „--', „-„, „0‟, „+‟, and „++‟ in the graphs). In order 
to calculate average score the category '--' was transformed into -2, '-' into -1 etc, with '++' being 
transformed into +2; the answer 'don't know' was discarded.  
2.4  Policy on mortality 
In view of the importance of the ageing of the population in the near future, policy on (curtailing) 
mortality is of a great importance. If this policy was successful, then it might lead to fewer deaths and 
a higher life expectancy. However, this may go together with a higher (financial) „burden‟ for society, 
depending  on  pension  and  benefit arrangements,  due  to  a  higher  old  age dependency  rate (more 
elderly people, who must be sustained by people of the working ages) and  higher medical costs 
(especially with respect to the oldest olds). Policy on mortality may be aimed at influencing behavior 
that impacts on major causes of deaths and/or the system of medical care.  
One of the most important drivers of mortality is smoking behaviour, leading to all kinds of cancers 
(i.e. lung cancer) on the one hand and cardiac diseases (i.e. strokes) on the other hand. So, it might be 
expected  that  the  extent  of  policy  measures  oriented  to  curtailing  smoking  is  rather  high.  This 
expectation is indeed confirmed by the results of the questionnaire. The average score on the strength 
of policies is 2.6 (Table 2-1). In Figure 2-5, we see that about 35 respondents considered the extent of 
policy  in  their  country  oriented  at  curtailing  smoking  as  strong  to  very  strong  and  another  25 
respondents thought the degree was intermediate. With respect to the assessment about whether the 
policy was effective, we see that more than half of the respondents thought that the policy on smoking 
behaviour had a positive effect and about 10 respondents thought it had a strong effect (Figure 2-5). 
The general score on this item was 0.8. So, the respondents clearly trust that this kind of policy does 
work.  17 
Table 2-1: Drivers of mortality – response to questions on the existence of policy and its effectiveness 
Mortality driver  Policy existence  Policy effect 
  Total  East  North  South  West  Total  East  North  South  West 
smoking behaviour   2.6  1.8  3.6  2.3  2.6  0.8  0.0  1.7  0.6  0.8 
diet/obesity   1.4  0.7  2.5  1.2  1.4  0.0  -0.7  0.4  0.0  0.0 
alcohol   2.1  1.5  3.0  2.1  1.9  0.3  0.0  0.9  0.5  0.2 
health care   2.7  2.1  3.4  2.5  2.9  0.8  0.2  1.4  0.9  0.8 
 
   
 
Figure 2-5: Responses to questions about policies on smoking behaviour 
With respect to the regional pattern of the answers, the results show that in the northern countries the 
extent of policy measures on smoking is the highest while in the western countries it is considerably 
lower. Also, in the southern and eastern countries, policies are oriented towards curtailing smoking 
behaviour, although the degree is again somewhat lower. The regional distribution of the strength of 18 
policy on smoking behaviour largely coincides with the opinion on the effectiveness of the policy 
measures. In the northern countries, the respondents believe the degree of success is significantly 
higher than in western and southern countries.  
Heavy drinking of alcohol is detrimental for someone's health. For this reason, Governments might try 
to prevent their populations from drinking too much alcohol. So, it is prohibited to sell alcoholic 
drinks  to  youngsters  in  many  countries.  In  the  opinion  of  the  respondents,  the  extent  of  policy 
concerning  drinking  alcohol  is  somewhat  lower  than  the  policy  concerning  smoking  (i.e.  fewer 
respondents have indicated that the extent of this kind of policy was strong to very strong; the average 
score amounted 2.1 against 2.6 for policies on smoking behaviour; see Table 2-2). Also, they expected 
that this kind of policy was less effective (more respondents filled in the category „no effect‟ and 
fewer respondents filled in the category „positive effect‟) (Figure 2-6). In the regional distribution of 
the answers, more or less the same pattern as with smoking behaviour appears: most policy on this 
matter exists in northern countries, followed by western countries while in the southern and eastern 
countries, the degree of the policy is the lowest. This pattern is repeated in the assessment of the effect 
of the policy. 
Table 2-2: Drivers of fertility – responses to questions on the existence of policy and its effectiveness 
Fertility drivers  Policy existence  Policy effect 
  Total  East  North  South  West  Total  East  North  South  West 
stimulate having children   1.7  1.6  3.1  1.2  1.5  0.0  -0.5  1.0  -0.4  0.2 
influence family size   1.1  1.2  1.6  0.9  1.0  -0.2  -0.2  0.4  -0.7  -0.1 
assist couples with fertility problems   1.7  1.6  2.3  1.2  1.8  0.4  0.4  0.7  -0.2  0.6 
abortion   2.2  1.5  2.9  1.8  2.5  0.4  -0.3  0.5  0.4  0.7 
stimulate migration from counties with 
a high fertility level   0.6  0.3  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.0  -0.4  0.6  0.0  0.2 
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Figure 2-6: Responses to questions about  on alcohol consumption 
Another item of concern is the fact that people tend to eat too much, leading to obesity. Governments 
try to make people aware of the risks of heavy weight and suggest that people follow healthy diets. 
However, according to the respondents (Figure 2-7), the strength of policies on this driver of mortality 
is less important than that with respect to the previous two drivers (the average score is 1.4 against 2.6 
for smoking behaviour). Also the opinion on the effectiveness of this policy is rather skeptical with an 
average score of 0.0. In the northern countries, political attention on the risks of hazardous eating 
patterns seems to be much higher, with a average score of 2.5 against 1.4 for the western countries.  20 
   
 
Figure 2-7: Responses to questions about  on diet / obesity 
Of course, an important driver for mortality is the health care system. Not only the quality of this 
system (the medical treatment) is of importance, but also how many people have an easy access to this 
system (which refers to the way health insurance is organized in each country). In the opinion of the 
respondents (Figure 2-8), much political attention is devoted to this issue, with an average score on 
the strength of policy of 2.7. Also the effectiveness of this kind of policy is rated high with an average 
score of 0.8. In all regions of the ESPON space, the strength of policies on health care is rather high, 
although in the northern countries it is the highest. This goes together with the highest rating on the 
effectiveness of this kind of policy.  21 
   
 
Figure 2-8: Responses to questions about on health care 
The  questionnaire  contained  an  open  question  on  the  issue  to  what  other  policies  could  affect 
mortality (in the country of the respondent). The fields that required more political interference could 
be summarized as follows. First, social and family welfare was considered to be important, and in 
particular  referring  to  issues  as  pensioning  age,  social  status  and  social  inclusion.  Second, 
transportation was mentioned, in particular issues as promoting public transport and bike traffic, and 
measures to decrease car dependency. Less car use would lead to less (fatal) car accidents. However, 
with respect to car driving itself more attention should be paid to curtailing the use of dangerous 
chemicals such as drugs and alcohol. Governments could also give more attention to promote sport, 
e.g. its role in school education (e.g. lessons in swimming) and in urban/spatial planning, lift the lack 
of and prevent the erosion of sport facilities. Also more attention could be given to the safety at work, 
e.g. the prevention of work related accidents. In that respect also the work/private life balance is of 22 
importance,  considering  the  relationship  with  work  related  stress.  Also  the  pollution  of  the 
environment was considered to be a significant field for political attention, in particular the air and 
water quality. Also more political attention could be directed at the elderly persons. This refers not 
only to giving more (medical) care, but also to promote a wealthy lifestyle.  
The questionnaire also contained an open question, about how policies with respect to mortality could 
change in the future. Several respondents stated that regulations on smoking would increase strongly. 
Also more attention would be paid to restricting the use of other popular drugs. Further, regulations to 
prevent  obesity  were  expected  to  increase  although  concrete  policy  measures  still  have  to  be 
implemented. Regarding the drinking of alcohol, it was expected that regulations will be directed at 
combating illegal use, e.g. while driving a car. Social attitudes to drinking are considered extremely 
important. It was not expected that alcohol accessibility will decrease by any means of regulation. 
Regarding health care, the respondents indicated a strong tendency to privatise the supply side. 
Concluding  on  the  topic  of  mortality,  it  is  apparent  that  it  is  a  matter  of  great  concern  for  the 
Governments in nearly all the ESPON countries. In the opinion of the respondents a lot of policy is 
devoted to curtailing bad habits and is assessed as being quite successful. The policy measures are 
notably oriented towards influencing the smoking behaviour and, to a lesser extent, at influencing the 
drinking of alcohol. In the northern countries, a stronger policy is oriented at influencing the drivers 
for  mortality  and  also  the  degree  of  success  seems  to  be  higher.  However,  also  in  the  western 
countries, the degree of policy trying to influence the drivers of mortality is rather high. In the eastern 
and southern countries, the drivers for mortality are somewhat less a matter for policy intervention, 
although still a lot of policy measures are introduced.  
2.5  Policy on fertility 
National population growth is to a large extent dependent on trends in fertility, although in recent 
decades international migration has become more important. In order to sustain a population, it is 
necessary that women give birth to just over two children (in Europe, between 2.06 and 2.15 children 
depending on female mortality levels and the sex ratio at birth). In modern times, this level is hardly 
attained in any western country. In fact, in several countries such as Germany, Italy, Spain and several 
eastern countries, the average number of children per woman is far below 1.5 children. With such a 
low level of fertility (exceptionally), high numbers of migrants are necessary in order to prevent a 
population from shrinking at a fast pace. So, the issue of having (enough) children is very important 
for  the  sustainability  of  the  population.  Although  one  might  say  that  a  high  life  expectancy 
(accompanied  with  fewer  deaths)  is  also  helpful  in  preventing  a  population  to  diminish,  this  is 
accompanied by a large share of elderly people. So, nowadays, a sustainable future for a national 
population is, to a large extent, dependent of policies trying to raise the fertility level.  23 
In the light of above arguments, it could be expected that Governments give a lot of attention to 
policies  that  stimulate  fertility.  However,  looking  at  the  results  (Table  2-2,  Figure  2-9),  this 
expectation  was  not  confirmed:  a  large  majority  of  the  respondents  said  that  policy  oriented  at 
stimulating families to have children was generally weak to intermediate. The average score on this 
issue was 1.1, much lower than the average score for policies oriented at curtailing bad habits such as 
smoking, drinking too much alcohol and eating too much. Also the effectiveness of this kind of policy 
was assessed as rather low, with one third of the respondents indicating it had no effect, another third 
expecting a positive effect and only a few respondents expecting a strong positive effect. The average 
score on effectiveness was negative, with a value of -0.2. The geographical distribution of the answers 
show a pronounced pattern: the strength of policy trying to raise fertility is in the northern countries 
twice as high as in the other countries. Scandinavian countries have (had) a reputation as „forerunners‟ 
in this respect, characterized by providing a large array of arrangements that make it possible for 
mothers to combine work with raising children. Due to this policy, the average number of children per 
woman has exceeded two children in Sweden during the 1980s. However, the economic downturn 
hereafter has led to cuts in several benefits, accompanied by a falling fertility level. It is no surprise 
that in the northern countries the opinion on the effectiveness of policy trying to stimulate having 
children is rated higher than in the other countries. The respondents of the  southern and  eastern 
countries were even pessimistic about this effort, stating it had a negative effect on fertility.  24 
   
 
Figure 2-9: Responses to questions about policies which stimulate having children 
Policies might not only be oriented towards encouraging families to have children, but also towards 
influencing family size (the number of children of couples). The strength of policies on this issue is 
considerably lower than that on policies for stimulating having children (Figure 2-10). Opinions about 
the effectiveness of this kind of policy are also rather negative, with an average score of -0.2.  25 
   
 
Figure 2-10: Responses to questions about policies which try to influence family size 
Another way of raising fertility is to assist couples with fertility problems. The respondents indicated 
that  the  strength  of  policies  on  this  driver  of  fertility  was  considered  to  be  generally  weak  or 
intermediate and over 10 respondents did not know whether policies existed on giving help (Figure 
2-11). The average score on this item of 1.7 was the same as that on policies trying to influence 
having children. Again the opinion on the effectiveness was generally not so positive. Only one third 
of the respondents though it had a positive effect. Nevertheless, with an average score of 0.4, the 
effectiveness was rated higher than that of policies trying to influence having children. With respect to 
the regional distribution of the answer on the degree of policy on this issue, southern countries had the 
lowest score and the northern countries had the highest. 26 
   
 
Figure 2-11: Responses to questions about policies which assist couples with fertility problems 
Abortion may also have a profound influence on the level of fertility. Tolerant policies on abortion 
might cause a lot of public debate. Of all the drivers of fertility, this item receives the highest average 
score,  namely,  2.2.  Respondents  in  the  northern  countries  and  the  western  countries  especially 
evaluated the  strength of policies on abortion as being high, with average scores of 2.9 and 2.5 
respectively.  The  effectiveness  of  policy  on  abortion  is  also  rated  high  in  these  two  groups  of 
countries (Figure 2-12). 27 
   
 
Figure 2-12: Responses to questions about policies which concern abortion 
The last item on fertility concerned policies trying to stimulate migration from countries with a high 
fertility level. According to the respondents, not much policy was devoted to this driver (the average 
score was 0.6) and also the effectiveness of such a policy was considered to be very small (with an 
average score of 0.0) (Figure 2-13). 28 
   
 
Figure 2-13: Responses to questions about policies which stimulate migration 
The questionnaire contained an open question on the issue to what other policies could affect fertility 
(in  the  country  of  the  respondent).  The  experts  pointed  at  the  relationship  between  fertility  and 
employment: policy could give more attention to the role of part-time work, job sharing, gender 
equality and the availability of kinder gardens. Also attention should be given to the changing nature 
of families. This refers to matters as policies on the duration of maternity leave, the possibility of 
parental absence leave, and the cost of children. Also, the role of prolonged education and its role on 
fertility was stressed. In particular,  the long duration of tertiary education would lead to having less 
children. The respondents also mentioned the role of the quality of the living environment, and in 
particular, political attention should be given to the impact of chemicals. Also the housing could 
impact on fertility, in particular for young couples on the verge of stepping into parenthood. An ample 
availability  of  single  family  dwelling  could  stimulate  fertility.  Further,  policy  could  stimulate 29 
immigration from countries with a high level of fertility. In that respect, political attention should be 
given to the integration of minority groups (e.g. Roma have larger families), in particular those groups 
with a specific religious background (e.g. Muslims and Catholics have larger families). 
The chapter on fertility also contained open questions about how policies with respect to fertility 
would change in the future. Many respondents expected a strengthening of measures related to family 
policies, e.g. housing for large families, giving tax discounts and social benefits to households with 
children,  providing  child  care  facilities and  stimulating  part-time  working.  Regarding  assisted 
conception,  the  opinions  went  in  different  directions;  some  experts  indicated  that  assisted 
conception should  be  privately  funded  while  other  experts  thought  it  should  be  publicly  funded. 
Regarding abortion, the respondents had the opinion that it does not have an effect on fertility per se. 
However,  more  attention  could  be  given  to  psychological  assistance.  Regarding  migration  from 
countries with a high fertility, the respondents indicated that the issue of more regulations depends on 
how EU policies will develop. Politically speaking, this could become a burning issue. 
Concluding,  it  seems  that  Governments  are  rather  reserved  about  policies  stimulating  fertility, 
compared with policies trying to curtail mortality. It is possible that choices of having children are 
considered to be something for couples themselves, and it is not appropriate for Governments to 
interfere in this „private matter‟. This reservation is clearly less the case in northern countries where a 
more active policy is taken on stimulating couples to have children. The Nordic countries are more 
keen to provide arrangements for women to combine work with motherhood. Fertility can also be 
increased by giving help to couples with fertility problems. This practical kind of policy is more or 
less apparent in all countries of the ESPON space. 
2.6  Policy on external migration 
In the last decades, the population growth in several western countries has become more or less 
dependent on the influx of foreign migrants. Several countries in the ESPON space have a rather long 
tradition in receiving migrants from other countries, especially the western and northern countries. 
Other countries, such several southern and eastern countries functioned as „donor‟ countries. In the 
1960s and 1970s, labour migrants left the Mediterranean countries and went to western and northern 
Europe in order to work for a couple of years. As prosperity grew in the sending countries, many 
labour migrants returned to their countries of origin. Migrants coming from Africa and Asia took over 
their role as labour migrants. However, their inclination to return was weak and since the 1980s, many 
male  labour  migrants  were joined  with  their  wives  and  children  by  immigration (family  reunion 
migration). Nowadays, the children of the labour migrants (the second generation) have grown up and 
seek a partner in their parents‟ country of origin.  30 
In  the  1990s,  international  instabilities  such  as  wars  have  made  asylum  seekers  a  prominent 
phenomenon, leading to large (mass) migration flows. Also a new type of labour migrant emerged; 
after the fall of the Iron Curtain around 1990, many people living in the former communist countries 
of east Europe went to the much richer western countries. The accession of several of those countries 
to the European Union in 2004 lead to a boost in those migration flows. These labour migrants can be 
considered  as  a  necessary  addition  to  the  ageing  and  shrinking  labour  force  of  several  western 
countries. Governments of countries receiving labour migrants are aware of the fact that (highly) 
skilled labour migrants might stimulate economic growth and for this reason try to stimulate their 
arrival.    However,  the  sending  countries  are  faced  with  a  shrinking  labour  force  and  disrupted 
families. In many western countries, the continuous large migration flows over many decades has led 
to large proportion of the population having a foreign origin. This might impose a threat to social 
cohesion due to different cultures having to live together. Especially in periods of recession, the 
foreign groups have been more susceptible to unemployment and policy has been oriented towards 
creating barriers for immigration. It is clear that international migration is a very important topic for 
policy making. 
A rather large battery of questions in the survey dealt with external migration. From the introduction 
given above, it might be expected that a many policy measures are devoted to either stimulating or 
discouraging  immigration from  outside  the  European  Union. This is  indeed  the  case:  half  of the 
respondents stated that the strength of policies on this issue could be classified as strong to very strong 
(Table 2-3). The average score on the strength of policies on this issue was 2.3. However, with respect 
to the effectiveness of these policies, the respondents were somewhat indecisive: one third called it 
rather positive, one third thought it had no effect and a quarter did not know (Figure 2-14). This led to 
an average score of 0.4.  
Table 2-3: Drivers of international migration – responses to questions on the existence of policy and its 
effectiveness 
International migration driver  Policy existence  Policy effect 
  Total  East  North  South West  Total  East  North  South West 
stimulate/discourage migration from 
outside the EU   2.3  0.9  3.1  2.3  2.4  0.4  0.0  1.1  0.2  0.4 
selectivity on the origin of immigrants   1.8  1.0  2.4  1.5  2.0  0.4  -0.1  1.0  0.2  0.5 
restrict the duration of stay of migrants   2.3  2.0  3.0  2.1  2.4  0.3  .7  1.2  -0.1  0.2 
restrict migrant type   2.0  0.8  2.6  2.0  2.2  0.4  -0.4  0.8  0.4  0.6 
stimulate migration to other EU countries   0.9  0.6  1.1  0.8  1.1  0.0  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2  0.2 
stimulate return migration   1.1  0.8  1.2  1.1  1.3  -0.1  -0.5  0.1  -0.4  0.3 
make your country attractive to migrants   1.5  0.8  2.1  1.4  1.7  0.5  -0.3  0.9  0.2  0.8 
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Figure 2-14: Responses to questions about policies which stimulate/discourage migration from outside the 
EU 
The strength of policies trying to stimulate or discourage immigration is not only high in northern 
countries, but also western and southern countries. Remarkably, in the eastern countries, it is assessed 
as  being  rather  low  and  the  extent  of  policy  measures  is  also  rather  small.  With  respect  to  the 
effectiveness of policy, the northern countries have a particularly positive impression, while in the 
other countries, the opinion was that it had hardly any (positive) effect.  
Selectivity on the origin of the immigrants is also of importance; in particular, the difference between 
western and non-western migrants might have different implications for the social cohesion and the 
contribution to the economy. More than half of the respondents indicated that the strength of policy on 
this issue was intermediate or strong (Figure 2-15). So, trying to influence the origin of immigrants is 
also quite important for politicians, although the average score of 1.8 was somewhat lower than that 32 
of the previous item. Again, with respect to the effectiveness of this policy, the opinion was not clear 
cut: one third of the respondents could see no effect at all while another one third saw a positive 
effect. For northern and, to a lesser extent, western countries, the selectiveness on country of origin is 
more and political issue than for southern and, notably, eastern countries.   
   
 
Figure 2-15: Responses to questions about policies which are selective on the origin of immigrants 
With respect to the question on the degree of policy trying to restrict some migrant types, the pattern 
of answers is more or less the same as the question on the degree of selective policy on the origin of 
immigrants (Figure 2-16). It is quite obvious that a close relationship exists between certain countries 
of origin and certain migrant types. For example, many migrants from eastern countries are labour 
migrants while many migrants from unstable countries in Africa are asylum seekers.  33 
   
 
Figure 2-16: Responses to questions about policies which restrict the type of migrant 
Especially with respect to labour migrants, Governments expect that they will stay for a couple of 
years and then return to their country of origin. However, many immigrants prefer to stay, instead of 
returning.  A  rather  large  gap  in  prosperity  between  the  country  of  origin  and  the  country  of 
immigration might be the cause. Especially in times of recession, this could entail a financial threat as 
the immigrants (and their children) profit from all kinds of social provisions such as unemployment 
benefits or educational facilities. This might lead to policies trying to restrict the duration of stay. 
Over half of the respondents indicated that this was an important political issue and evaluated the 
strength of policies on this issue as being strong to very strong (Figure 2-17). This leads to an average 
score of 2.3. In all regions of the ESPON space, policy measures were taken on this issue, although 
the northern countries again showed the strongest inclination. With respect to the effectiveness, the 34 
impression was that it was rather successful,  with half of the respondents classifying it as being 
positive to very positive. 
   
 
Figure 2-17: Responses to questions about policies which restrict the duration of stay of migrants 
Not  only  might  immigration  be  a  focus  for  political  interference,  but  also  emigration.  Financial 
stimuli in particular might encourage immigrants who have settled in their new countries to return to 
their country of origin. In contrast to policies on stimulating immigration, there are few political 
actions undertaken in order to stimulate migration to other EU countries. Almost two thirds of the 
respondents indicated that policies on this issue did not exist or the degree was weak (Figure 2-18). 
Compared with the scores on the other items on international migration, this item had a low score 
with 0.9. In all groups of countries, the degree of policy on this issue was classified as being rather 
low. With respect to the effectiveness of this kind of policy, the general opinion was that it had no 35 
effect at all (the average score amounted to 0). For the respondents coming from eastern countries 
though, it even had a considerable negative effect. 
   
 
Figure 2-18: Responses to questions about policies which stimulate migration to other EU countries 
Respondents  judged  policies  on  return  migration  (stimulating  migrants  to  return  to  their  origin 
countries) to be weak or non-existent in the main and without any effect (Figure 2-19). 36 
   
 
Figure 2-19: Responses to questions about policies which stiulate return migration 
Finally, the respondents were asked to evaluate the strength of policies dealing with making a country 
attractive to migrants. With an average score of 1.5, the opinion of the respondents indicated that this 
degree was rather high, although lagging behind several other issues on international migration. The 
northern countries especially try to make their country attractive and the effectiveness of this kind of 
policies was evaluated as rather high, with an average score of 0.5. Again the northern countries had 
the highest score, namely 0.9 (Figure 2-20). 37 
   
 
Figure 2-20: Responses to questions about policies which make countries attractive to migrants 
An  open  question  dealt  with  other  fields  of  political  interference  with  respect  to  the  external 
migration. A very important political topic is the role of employment in the receiving country. This 
refers  to  issues  as the access to  work  and the  orientation  on important  economic  sectors  (which 
according to the respondent currently are tourism and agriculture). Also the importance of bilateral 
agreements were stressed by the respondents, for instance those with former colonies. Other fields for 
political interference that were mentioned were cultural exchange, the role of housing, the health care 
system, the role of ICT and technology. Also the legal system is very important, e.g. (tolerant) laws 
on immigration. It is noticed by the respondents that countries in the EU could learn from each other 
in this respect. Also national differences in the social welfare benefits could impact on immigration. 
At  last,  political  attention  should  be  given  to  an  unbalanced  economic  performance  between the 38 
countries in the European Union: this has created an East-West flow and the migration flows could 
even increase due to less tighter labour market regulations.  
The open questions of the chapter on external migration dealt with how policies could change in the 
future. With  respect to  migration  policy  in  general, a  change  in orientation  was  foreseen  by  the 
respondents: less  incentives  to  host refugees and  more incentives to  attract  labour  migrants. The 
respondents thought that regulations on entrance of the EU would increase, so that it would become 
more difficult for immigrants to come legally to the EU. As a result, control on clandestine entrance 
would become an important political issue. However, not all regulations would lead to restrictions on 
immigration  as  specific  economic  situations  might  require  stimulated  entrance  of  high-skilled 
workers. Issues such as the stimulation of family reunification and arrival of asylum seekers would 
depend on the political climate, which in turn would depend on matters such as ethnic tension and the 
degree of integration. Several respondents suggested that aid projects in countries of origin (outside 
the  EU)  could  be  launched  in  order  to  avoid  excessive  migration.  Regarding  the  acceptance  of 
immigrants,  the  respondent  thought  that  bilateral  agreements  between  the  EU  and  third  world 
countries could be important. Further, a political priority could entail the attraction of young and 
educated people. Some respondents pointed tot the tendency to increase controls in order to track 
down illegal migrants.  
Regarding the migration between countries of the EU, no need was signaled to stimulate permanent 
outmigration, although outmigration of (PhD) students should be encouraged. More political measures 
were expected relating to the attraction of skilled people. These policies could be enhanced as a result 
of the ongoing globalization and competition between countries. A stronger tendency was expected 
for political measures directed at the improvement of living and working conditions for immigrants. 
Immigration was seen as a powerful instrument to counteract declining populations.  
In  conclusion,  in  view  of  the  growing  importance  of  immigration  for  the  population  growth  of 
countries, it is no surprise that politicians give much attention to stimulating or discouraging external 
migration. Also many political actions are developed on specific topics such as the origin of migrants, 
the type of migrants and the duration of stay. However, it is remarkable that this does not apply to 
emigration (i.e. stimulation of migrants to go to other EU countries). The focus of policies trying to 
influence immigration is apparent in all regions of the ESPON space, although (again) the degree of 
political  actions  was  somewhat  higher  in  northern  countries  and  significantly  lower  in  eastern 
countries.  
2.7  Policy on internal migration 
In several countries, regional trends in population growth are clearly divergent: mostly central regions 
are still growing while peripheral regions are shrinking or have hardly any population growth.  This 39 
disparity might be explained by the fact that capital cities are generally located in central regions. 
Many internal migrants move from peripheral regions to central regions.  To a large  extent, this 
movement  involves  youngsters  moving  to  the  central  cities  where  there  are  universities  and 
institutions for higher education in combination with an abundance of jobs for starters on the labour 
market. However, this reinforces the ageing and depopulation of peripheral regions and suggests 
major economic implications for peripheral regions. For this reason, one would suppose that political 
actions  will  be  undertaken  in  order to  prevent  peripheral  regions  from  shrinking  even  further  or 
preventing an aggravation of the imbalance of age groups. All in all, internal migration constitutes an 
important driver behind regional divergence trends. 
Notwithstanding  the  reflections  presented  above,  hardly  any  political  actions  are  oriented  at 
stimulating migration to other regions within a country. Half of the respondents indicate that no 
policies exist and only a quarter of the respondents could discern a weak policy in this domain (Figure 
2-21). The average score reflected this tendency with a value of 0.8 (Table 2-4). This situation is 
visible everywhere in the ESPON space, although in the northern countries the strength of policies on 
this issue is a bit higher. With respect to the effectiveness of these policies, the eastern countries are 
rather negative while the northern countries are slightly positive.   40 
   
 
Figure 2-21: Responses to questions about policies which  stimulate people to migrate to other regions 
Table  2-4:  Drivers  of  internal  migration  –  responses  to  questions  on  the  existence  of  policy  and  its 
effectiveness 
Internal migration driver  Policy existence  Policy effect 
  Total  East  North South West  Total  East  North South West 
stimulate people to migrate to other regions  0.8  0.6  1.4  0.5  0.8  -0.2  -0.8  0.2  -0.3  0.0 
create provisions to attract internal migrants  1.0  0.4  1.6  0.8  1.0  0.2  -0.6  0.4  0.2  0.5 
stimulate weaker regions   1.9  1.9  2.6  1.5  1.8  0.2  0.3  0.4  -0.2  0.3 
 
With respect to policies oriented at providing provisions in order to attract internal migrants, the 
picture is almost the same (Figure 2-22). About one third of the respondents indicated that no policies 
exist and about another one third classify the extent of this kind of policy to be weak to intermediate. 41 
This led to a rather low average score of 1.0. Again, in the northern countries, the strength of policies 
trying to create provisions is more prominent than in the other regions of the ESPON space whilst 
eastern countries foresee a negative effect of this kind of policy.  
   
 
Figure 2-22: Responses to questions about policies which attract internal migrants to regions 
Although policies oriented at influencing internal migrants are in general weak, this does not apply to 
policies oriented at stimulating weaker regions (Figure 2-23). Almost half of the respondents indicate 
that the degree of this kind of policy could be classified as intermediate. This brought the average 
score  to  1.9  (almost  twice  as  high  as  the  average  score  on  the  previous  issue).  The  regional 
differentials are not so pronounced: in all four groups of regions the degree of this kind of policy is 
evaluated as being intermediate. In the light of the rather high strength of policies on stimulating 
weaker regions, it is remarkable that the opinion on the effectiveness on these political actions is 
rather pessimistic; about one third of the respondents thought it had a positive effect and another one 42 
third thought it had no effect at all. The total score was the same as that on the effectiveness of the 
other two issues.  
   
 
Figure 2-23: Responses to questions about policies which stimulate weaker regions 
An open question learnt that other fields of political interference with respect to internal migration can 
be summarized as follows. The infrastructure was considered as very important, this refers to the 
quality  of  the  living  environment,    in  particular  the  mix  of  nature  and  culture.  Moreover,  more 
political attention could be given to the attractiveness of capitals, the role of suburbanization and 
education  facilities.  Migration  pattern  of  young  people  can  be  influenced  by  the  presence  of 
universities in certain regions. Also housing conditions are very important, in particular acceptance 
criteria for social housing. Also the role of transportation was mentioned as a field of political interest, 
in particular the stimulation of public transport.  43 
The open question on how policies with respect to internal migration could change in the future 
revealed that there was a clear need to develop more consistent policies on this issue. These policies 
should take into account that internal migration is driven by economic developments. Moreover, it 
should  be  recognised  that  the  direction  of  migration  flows  can  be  influenced  by  policies  on 
(de)concentration and rural development. In that respect, policies on flexible housing are needed: the 
current preference to live in an owner occupied house might change into a preference for (non-profit) 
rental housing. The experts also pointed to the fact that policies on internal migration tended to be 
local and did not take into account the regional context. However, in the light of shrinking regions, it 
could be important for local authorities to cooperate in this respect. At the national level, it would be a 
good idea to improve the quality of life in peripheral regions in order to attract people to these 
regions.  More  effective  national  regional  policies  are  required  in  this  respect  and  this  could  be 
financed by European Structural Funds.  
In conclusion, the strength of policies on internal migration is rather modest. However, the number of 
shrinking regions will grow rapidly in the near future (due to a continuous low level of fertility). This 
might  pose  many  challenges  for  mostly  peripheral  regions.  The  exodus  of  youngsters  to  central 
regions  leads  to  diminishing  levels  of  all  kinds  of  provisions.  It  seems  that  awareness  of  these 
problems is growing and this might be reflected in the fact that the strength of policies on stimulating 
weaker regions is stronger than the  strength of policies on other matters with respect to internal 
migration. 
2.8  Policy on labour force participation 
In  most  countries,  the  labour  force  has  been  growing  in  the  past.  A  growing  population  in 
combination with rising labour force participation rates contributed to this growth. Trends in labour 
force participation have been different for males and females in the last decades. The participation 
rate of women has shown a tremendous rise in several countries in the second half of the twentieth 
century. The age pattern of activity rates used to be characterized by a pronounced left handed peak, 
due to comparatively high activity rates for non-married women aged between 20 and 25 and steep 
falling activity rates as most women withdrew from the labour market upon marriage or childbirth. 
Since the mid 1970s, drastic changes in female activity rates have taken place in most countries. The 
impact of having children on economic activity diminished and this led to (steep) rising activity rates 
at prime working ages. In Scandinavian countries, labour force participation at the middle age is 
almost as high as that of males.  
The age pattern of activity rates of males has also changed over the last decades, although to a lesser 
extent. At older ages (above 50 years) in many countries a steep fall has been experienced in labour 
force participation due to the trend of early retirement. Especially in periods of rising unemployment, 44 
policy was oriented at stimulating employees to leave the labour force at an earlier age. Lately, this 
trend has been reversed in several countries, due to the rising cost of financing a large part of the 
working age population who are unemployed.  At younger ages, contrasting trends in labour force 
participation  applied.  In  line  with  the  rising  educational  attainment  of  the  population  over  time, 
youngsters tended to stay longer in the educational system than before, with a negative effect on 
labour force participation. However, an increased tendency to combine education with working (in 
small jobs) had a positive effect on labour force participation. 
According  to  the  respondents,  nowadays  the  inclination  of  politicians  to  increase  labour  force 
participation is quite prominent. About one third of the respondents indicated that the degree of policy 
on  this  issue  is  strong  to  very  strong,  and  almost  half  of  the  respondents  classified  it  as  being 
intermediate (Table 2-5). Round half of the respondents thought this kind of policy has a positive 
effect on labour force participation, although another quarter thought it has no effect (Figure 2-24). 
This leads to an average score of 2.3. The tendency of policy to raise labour force participation is 
apparent in all regions of the ESPON space, although the strongest degree of policy applies to the 
northern countries. With respect to the effectiveness, the respondents were rather optimistic with half 
of them thinking it had a positive effect.  However, in the eastern countries, the respondents expected 
no effect of this kind of policy. Again, the respondents of the northern regions were the most positive.   
Table 2-5: Drivers of labour force participation – responses to questions on the existence of policy and its 
effectiveness 
Labour force participation drivers  Policy existence  Policy effect 
  Total  East  North  South  West  Total  East  North  South  West 
try to raise participation   2.3  1.9  3.0  2.1  2.4  0.6  0.0  1.1  0.6  0.6 
try to raise participation of young people   2.0  1.5  2.4  1.7  2.2  0.2  -0.1  0.4  0.1  0.3 
try to raise participation of women   2.1  1.6  3.0  2.1  2.1  0.6  -0.2  1.4  0.4  0.8 
try to raise participation of the elderly   1.5  0.9  2.3  1.4  1.5  0.0  -0.5  0.4  0.0  -0.2 
address the fulltime/part-time/self 
employment discourse   1.8  1.0  2.4  1.7  2.0  0.3  -0.3  0.7  0.3  0.5 
try to increase labour productivity   1.9  1.2  2.6  2.0  1.9  0.4  -0.3  0.9  0.4  0.5 
invest in the educational system   2.4  1.7  3.2  1.8  2.7  0.5  0.0  1.1  0.0  0.8 
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Figure 2-24: Responses to questions about policies which try to raise labour participation 
Also the strength of policies aiming to raise labour force participation of young people is quite high 
(Figure 2-25). The general picture reflects that of policies for raising female participation, although 
the northern countries are less keen on it than on raising participation of youngsters. The opinion 
about the effectiveness of raising participation of young people is less positive than the opinion about 
the effectiveness of raising female participation. With an average score of 0.2, the respondents hardly 
expect a positive effect.  46 
   
 
Figure 2-25: Responses to questions about policies which try to raise labour participation 
As  mentioned  above,  the  increase  of  the  labour  force  was  to  a  large  extent  due  to  the  rising 
participation of women. Nowadays, however, the rate of female participation is already quite high in 
several countries, so a further rise will be problematic although there are enough chances to increase 
the  labour  force in  terms  of  full-time  equivalents  by  converting  part-time  working  into  full-time 
working. The political issue of raising female participation is evaluated as being quite important: 
about one third of the respondents indicated that the degree of policy on this issue is intermediate and 
about one third indicate it is strong to very strong (Figure 2-26). This leads to an average score of 2.0. 
Although the issue of raising female participation is prominent in all regions of Europe, the degree of 
this kind of policy is by far the strongest in the northern countries, while the eastern countries have a 
rather low degree.  With respect to the effectiveness about half of the respondents think it is positive 47 
to very positive. This brings the total score to 0.6; with the northern countries being by far the most 
positive on it.  
   
 
Figure 2-26: Responses to questions about policies which try to raise the labour participation of women 
The strength of policies devoted to raising the participation of older people seems to be much lower, 
than that of raising participation of women and youngsters (Figure 2-27). The average score of 1.5 is 
significantly lower than that of the previous items. The eastern countries in particular lag behind in the 
strength of policies for raising the participation  amongst the elderly. The general opinion on the 
effectiveness of this kind of policy is rather negative: no effect is expected considering the average 
score of 0; the eastern countries are skeptical and expect a negative effect. 48 
   
 
Figure 2-27: Responses to questions about policies which try to raise the labour participation of older 
people 
The strength of policies addressing the full-time/part-time/self employment discourse is rather high, 
with an average score of 1.8 (Figure 2-28). Especially in the northern countries, this discourse is a 
matter of political interference. In the eastern countries, the strength of policies on this matter is rather 
low. A rather modest effect of this kind of policies is expected by the respondents, who gave it an 
average score of 0.3.  49 
   
 
Figure 2-28: Responses to questions about policies which  address full time/part time/self employment 
issues 
Not only is the number of persons in the labour force important, but also their productivity. Policies 
might be oriented to raising labour force productivity in order to stimulate the competitiveness of their 
country. According to the respondents (Figure 2-29), the strength of policies on these matters is 
significant, with an average score of 1.9. In the northern countries especially, the strength is judged to 
be  quite  high.  The  opinion  on  the  effectiveness  is  also  rather  positive,  notably  in  the  northern 
countries with an average score of 0.9.  50 
   
 
Figure 2-29: Responses to questions about policies which try to raise labour productivity 
In order to meet the demands of industries and all kinds of organizations in the service sector, the 
employees must possess the appropriate skills. In order to warrant this, investments in the educational 
system are necessary.  The volume of policies on this is impressive. According to the respondents, the 
average strength of policies is very high with an average score of 2.4 (Figure 2-30). The northern 
countries, but also the Western countries, show a high strength of policy activity. The effectiveness is 
also considered to be rather high, with an average score of 0.5. However, a clear distinction is visible 
between the northern and western countries, where the respondents see a rather positive effect, and the 
eastern and southern countries where no effect is expected by the respondents. 51 
   
 
Figure 2-30: Responses to questions about policies which invest in education 
According to the respondents a very important field of political interest was the educational system. 
The respondents mentioned that in particular more attention should be given to ICT and technology.  
With  respect  to  the  open  question  on  how  policies  with  respect  to  labour  market  participation 
attracting internal migration could change in the future, the respondents expected that existing policies 
would be strengthened in order to  achieve a better use of the potential labour force. This refers 
especially to unused reserves for the labour market such as women, older persons and long-duration 
sick people. Also the revenues of current labour force could be increased by training programmes. 
The respondents expected a clear need to provide more professional and specialised training. Policies 
should concentrate especially on training youngsters. With regard to female participation, the current 
focus of policy to promote the (re)entrance of women (who quit working after becoming mothers) into 
the labour market would be become less strong. Future policies would pay more attention to the 52 
combination  of  having  a  professional  career  and  being  able  to  rear  children.  When  younger 
generations of women arrive on the labour market, they should be able to make use of child care 
facilities. Regarding elderly persons, policies would get more focussed on trying to delay the exit of 
elder workers from the labour market. In this way, the pressures on public social security systems 
could be relieved. In this respect, also the arrival of young migrants could make a contribution. The 
importance of the „silver economy‟ will rise in the future, and this will require policies for a flexible 
labour market. Companies should be encouraged to create part-time as well as full-time jobs.  
In conclusion, it can be stated that a lot of political interference concerns the matter of raising labour 
force participation. This active attitude concerns not only labour force participation in general, but 
also participation of several groups that used to have a rather weak position in the labour market, such 
as women in the phase of raising children combining education with small jobs and  elderly people 
used to leaving the labour market due to early retirement. However, the interest in policy goes even 
further and extends to issues such as the discourse on working full-time or part-time or being self 
employed,  increasing  labour  productivity  and  the  level  of  investment  in  the  education  system. 
Investment in the educational system is considered to be a particular issue that receives a lot of 
political attention. In general, in the northern countries, the level of political interference is the highest 
and in the eastern countries it is the lowest. With respect to the effectiveness of this policy, in general 
a positive effect is stated by the respondent, although on the matter of raising the participation of 
elderly persons, the respondents were rather skeptical as they expected no effect of political measures. 
Especially positive effects were expected on matters of increasing labour participation in general, 
raising participation of women and investments in the educational system.  
With respect to the effectiveness of this policy, in general a positive effect is stated by the respondent, 
although on the matter of raising the participation of elderly persons the respondents were rather 
sceptical  as  they  expected  no  effect  of  the  political  measures.  Especially  positive  effects  were 
expected on matters of raising labour participation in general, raising participation of women and 
investments in the educational system.  53 
3.  MORTALITY SCENARIOS 
3.1  Introduction 
In this chapter of the report, we describe the methods used to develop scenarios for mortality and the 
outcomes  of  the  analysis.  Each  mortality  scenario  produces  the  mortality  inputs  needed  for  the 
MULTIPOLES projection model (see Deliverable D4, Report on the multilevel scenario model). The 
first set of methods is used to estimate historical trends in mortality rates by country and region for the 
1990s and 2000s. The second set of methods is used to project mortality rates into the future by five-
year periods from 2010-15 to 2045-50. For the period 2005-10, a mix of estimated and modelled 
mortality rates are used. In developing the projected mortality rates for each scenario, we show how 
the framework explained in Chapter 1 of the report is made operational for mortality. 
The mortality rates which are developed in this chapter of the report have the following properties: 
-  They are annual rates that use deaths as their numerator and average populations for the year 
as their denominator, reported as deaths per thousand. 
-  The average population for the year is normally computed as half of the sum of the January 1 
populations of successive years, except where only the mid-interval population is available. 
-  The age-time plan is the period-age space (Figure 3-1). The mortality rates for period-ages are 
converted into period-cohort estimates in the MULTIPOLES projection model. 
-  The time series of observed regional mortality rates refers to calendar years 1991-2006, when 
a fairly full set of data on country mortality by age and sex and regional deaths by sex is 
available.  
-  The time series of projected mortality rates are annual averages for five-year periods, 2005-10 
to 2045-2050. 54 
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Figure 3-1: Age-time plans for recording deaths and mortality rates 
3.2  Data  
3.2.1  Data on deaths and populations 
Data for deaths and populations by five-year ages from 0-4 to 100+ for persons, males and females 
were assembled for ESPON countries (31) and NUTS2 regions (287) from a DEMIFER database 
constructed  by  the  Nordregio  Institute,  drawing  on  previous  ESPON  projects  and  data  available 
directly from Eurostat. This was organized year by year in sheets from 1990 to 2007. From these 
sheets were constructed time series of age-specific death rates (ASDRs) for each age group 0-4 to 
100+. These data were not complete in several respects. Firstly, the year 1990 was one of transition 
for many countries and their statistical systems could not deliver, years later, the required data to 
Eurostat.  Secondly,  many  population  and  mortality  series  did  not  contain  a  full  set  of  data 
disaggregated by age to 100+. At the region scale, most series had a final age group of 85+ though 
data for five-year ages to 95-99 and 100+ were available at national scale. Thirdly, data on mortality 
were not available for all countries and regions for 2007 at the time of data assembly (July-November 
2009).  Fourthly,  changes  in  the  administrative  units  for  which  demographic  data  were  reported 
occurred in many countries and, in addition, Eurostat revised its NUTS2 regionalization of those 
administrative units several times during the 1990-2007 period. However, Eurostat does not require 
National Statistical Offices to revise their time series backward to take account of revisions in NUTS2 
regional boundaries and the data are therefore often absent.  55 
One of the data deficiencies was a lack of mortality and population information for ages 85-89, 90-94, 
95-99 and 100+. Why did we decide to extend the age groups to 100+? The basic reason is that 
European populations are living longer. Table 3-1 shows what applying the average decline in ASDRs 
for 2001-2006 will produce in the period to 2050. These life expectancies imply that by 2050 about 
half of birth cohorts will survive to ages 90 and over. At these ages, people will have substantial needs 
for social and health care. 
Table 3-1: Life expectancies for Europe, based on a modelled decrease of mortality rates converging on 
2.7% per annum in 2025-30 
Gender  2005-10  2010-15  2015-20  2020-25  2025-30  2030-35  2035-40  2040-45  2045-50 
Male  76.2  77.6  79.1  80.6  82.2  83.8  85.4  87.0  88.6 
Female  82.2  83.3  84.4  85.5  86.8  88.0  89.3  90.6  91.9 
Note: Europe is defined as the 27 European Union member states, the 3 European Economic Area States plus 
Switzerland. Life expectancies are years of life expected at age 0, using the projected mortality rates for the 
period. Note that cohort life expectancies will be higher. 
How did we fill in the data gaps? We used national shares of the population beyond the last age for 
which regional information was provided to decompose regional last age totals (e.g. normally 95+, 
90+,  85+  or  80+  but  occasionally  75+  or  70+  for  extra-Europe  NUTS2  regions  such  as  the 
Departéments  d‟Outre  Mer  (DOM)  of  France.  Where  we  did  not  have  population  or  deaths 
information for the 2006 NUTS2 revision used in the project for a particular year, we used regional 
data for a later year adjusted to national data for the year with missing data. In some cases, a large 
body of data was missing for a country and we then used data from the country‟s National Statistical 
Office  to  estimate  the  missing  information for  NUTS2  regions  from  smaller  administrative  units 
which could be aggregated to those regions. One example of missing data in Eurostat records was for 
NUTS2 regions in the United Kingdom (1990-2007). The reason for the UK gap was that there was a 
small mismatch between local administrative areas (LAU1 in the NUTS scheme) and NUTS2 regions 
in Scotland. The Isle of Arran, part of the Scottish Council Area of North Ayrshire, was incorrectly 
placed  in  the  NUTS2  region  Highlands  and  Islands  rather  than  South  Western  Scotland.  We 
assembled a full set of population and deaths data for NUTS2 regions for the United Kingdom and 
supplied them, with the permission of the Office for National Statistics, to Eurostat. 
3.2.2  Mortality rates for countries 
Mortality  rates  were  computed  from  a  combination  of  data  from  the  Human  Mortality  Database 
designed for the study of mortality at the oldest ages (HMD, 2009) for 25 countries and from Eurostat 
for the other six countries (Eurostat, 2009). Figure 3-2 displays the age-specific mortality rates for the 
31 countries for 2006. There is considerable variation across Europe in the mortality rate schedules 
between Iceland with the best profile and Latvia with the worst. The smallest countries (Malta and 
Liechtenstein) show jagged profiles because of their small populations (408 and 35 thousand only). 56 
The schedules show the universal decline from high rates in the 0-4 age group to minima in the 5-9 or 
10-14 age group, followed by an exponential rise in mortality to the last two ages, interrupted by the 
rise  in  rates  at  ages  15-19  and  20-24.  At  these  ages,  young  people  take  risks  which  raise  their 
mortality above the biologically determined exponential trend. The slowdown in the exponential rise 
in the last two ages is artificial because both mortality rates are assumed to be equal to the pooled 95+ 
rate, a decision forced by very erratic fluctuations in the rates estimated separately. There is evidence, 
however, that the rise in mortality at the oldest ages does slow down at the oldest ages (Yi and 
Vaupel, 2003). It is likely that the departure of the Hungary schedule at ages above 85 is due to some 
data errors rather than a unique success in holding down the mortality of the oldest old. 
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Figure 3-2: Mortality rates for countries, persons, 2006 by age group (log10 mortality rates) 
Notes:  The  country  codes  are  as  follows  –  AT=Austria,  BE=Belgium,  BG=Bulgaria,  CH=Switzerland, 
CY=Cyprus,  CZ=Czech  Republic,  DE=Germany,  DK=Denmark,  EE=Estonia,  ES=Spain,  FI=Finland, 
FR=France,  GR=Greece,  HU=Hungary,  IE=Ireland,  IS=Iceland,  IT=Italy,  LI=Liechtenstein,  LT=Lithuania, 
LU=Luxembourg,  LV=Latvia,  MT=Malta,  NL=Netherlands,  NO=Norway,  PL=Poland,  PT=Portugal, 
RO=Romania, SE=Sweden, SI=Slovenia, SK=Slovakia, UK=United Kingdom 
3.2.3  Mortality rates for HMD Europe and ESPON Europe 
The  mortality  scenarios  are  contained  in  the  following  workbook  files:  DEMIFER  Mortality 
ScenariosFinal.xlsx  and  DEMIFER  Mortality  ScenariosFinal.xls.  These  work  books  contain  the 57 
sheets outlined in Table 3-2, which are linked to perform the necessary computations of mortality 
rates under the four scenarios plus a trend projection of mortality. 
Table 3-2: Structure of the DEMIFER Mortality Scenarios database – analysis of the 1991-2006 time 
series of country and region mortality data 
Sheet in Workbook  Contents 
ESPON Pop Shares  Summaries for 25 countries of older population numbers and shares 
ESPON ASDRs  Summaries for 25 countries of age-sex death rates for older ages used in 
estimating deaths in countries or regions where information is missing. 
Country Populations 1991-
2007 
January 1 populations for all 31 countries in the ESPON definition of the 
European space 
Country Pop Shares  Populations and population shares for the older age groups used in estimating 
the older populations for regions where information is missing. 
Country Deaths 1991-2006  Country deaths by age and sex for the years where there was complete 
information at time of assembly (July-October 2009). 
Country ASDRs 1991-2006  Country age-sex death rates computed using the Country Deaths 1991-2006 and 
average populations from successive January 1 Country Populations 1991-
2007. 
Europe ASDRs 1991-2010  Europe age-sex deaths rates for 31 countries combined for 1991-2006 with 
model extrapolation to period 2005-2010. 
Europe ASDRs Transposed  The contents of the Europe ASDRs 1991-2010 sheet transposed for later 
analysis. 
Europe ASDR % Change 
1991-2010 
The percentage change from one year to the next for each age and sex for 
Europe for 1991-2006 (estimated) and 2005-10 (modelled). 
Europe ASDR Scenario 
Declines 
The annual percentage change for each age and sex for Europe for five year 
intervals 2005-10 to 2045-50 (modelled) for scenarios: TRE, GSE, EME, LSE, 
CME. 
Europe ASDRs 2010-50  The age-sex death rates for Europe projected for five year intervals for each of 
the scenarios: TRE, GSE, EME, LSE, CME. 
Europe Life Tables 2010-50  Abridged life tables for five year intervals for Europe for each of the scenarios: 
TRE, GSE, EME, LSE, CME. 
Regional Deaths 1990-2007  NUTS2 Regional totals for deaths for 1990-2007 (1991-2006 are complete for 
persons, 1990 and 2007 partially complete). 
Reg Deaths Age-Sex 2003-
2006 
NUTS2 Regional deaths by age and sex for 2003-2006 (compiled by Dorota 
Kupiszewska from the latest Eurostat statistics). 
Reg ASDRs Age-Sex 2003-
2006 
NUTS2 Regional age-sex death rates for 2003-2006 using Reg Deaths Age-Sex 
2003-2006 and Reg MY Pops Age-Sex 2003-2006 sheets (from Dorota 
Kupiszewska) 
Regional Pops Age-Sex 1990-
2007 
NUTS2 Regional populations (1 January) by age and sex for 1990-2007 (1991-
2006 are complete for persons, 1990 and 2007 partially complete).  
Reg MY Pops Age-Sex 2003-
2006 
NUTS2 Regional populations (mid-year=30 June/1 July) for 2003-2006 
(compiled by Dorota Kupiszewska from the latest Eurostat statistics). 
Indirect SMR Computations  Indirect Standardized Mortality Rate computations using Europe Standard of 
ASDRs and NUTS2 Regional Populations 
Indirect SMRs 1991-2006-
2050 
Indirect SMRs from Indirect SMR Computations sheet assembled as a time 
series and projected from 2005-2050 using a model. 
Reg ASDRs EU mod 1991-
2006 
NUTS2 Regional age-sex death rates (as proportions) from model using Europe 
ASDRs and Regional Indirect SMRs by sex. 
Reg ASDRspt EU mod 1991-
2006 
NUTS2 Regional age-sex death rates (per 1000 population) from model using 
Europe ASDRs and Regional Indirect SMRs by sex. 
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ESPON Pop Shares. This sheet contains data on summaries of all country populations for the older 
age groups, which were taken from the Country Populations 1991-2007. The Country Populations 
1991-2007 are a sum for 25 of the 31 countries defined as part of the ESPON space (the 27 EU 
member states, the 3 EEA member states and Switzerland). These 25 countries were those for which 
good  population  data  were  available,  mainly  from  the  Human  Mortality  Database  (HMD) 
(http://www.mortality.org/), a joint project of the Department of Demography of the University of 
California at Berkeley and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock, Germany. The 
population data for the 25 countries are used to compute the shares that populations in five age groups 
make up of the 80+, 85+, 90+ and 95+ populations for persons, males and females. These shares are 
used later to help disaggregate the population of the last age group provided for a country or a region 
population in the DEMIFER or Eurostat databases. The assumption is made where necessary that the 
country population distribution at the oldest ages is the same as that for the whole of Europe (ESPON 
definition). 
ESPON ASDRS. This sheet contains the Age Specific Mortality Rates (ASMRs) computed for the 25 
ESPON  countries  with  the  best  information,  for  older  age  groups  (80-84  to  100+)  for  use  in 
estimating deaths in older ages for countries and regions when this missing. 
Country Populations 1991-2007. The January 1 populations from 1991 to 2007 of all 31 ESPON 
countries have been extracted from three sources: the DEMIFER project initial database (mainly from 
Eurostat files), more recent Eurostat demographic data and HMD database. On 1 January 1991, the 
total population of Europe (ESPON 31 definition) was 483 millions. On 1 January 2007, the Europe 
population was 506 millions. The European population thus grew by a mere 4.6% over 17 years or 
only 0.27% per annum. 
Country Pop Shares. The shares in each of the older ages are computed for countries for future use in 
estimating  the  distribution  of  regional  populations  across  older  ages.  This  has  been  done  for  a 
sequence of old age sums: 75+, 80+, 85+, 90+, 95+ and, for some countries, 60+ and 65+. When these 
shares are used to estimate the older regional populations, the assumption is made that the national 
share applied in each constituent region. Why was this done? The goal was to estimate populations 
and project them to old ages extending to 100+ because improving survival chances for European 
populations meant that the population numbers in older ages would grow substantially in the future. It 
is now common practice among national statistical offices to project populations to ages up to and 
including 100+. We extend this practice to regional populations. 
Country Deaths 1991-2006. This sheet holds the deaths by five-year ages from 0-4 to 95-99 together 
those at ages 100 and over. We did seek to assemble mortality information for additional years, for 
1990, 2007 and 2008 but decided that the gaps were too great to bridge. The 2007 and 2008 data will 59 
become  available  to  Eurostat  soon  and  so  the  database  can  be  extended  in  future.  From  this 
information  we  proceed  to  compute  Country  ASDRs  and  Europe  ASDRs  based  on  the  sums  of 
country deaths and populations by age and sex. We then measure the annual percentage changes in 
Europe ASDRs for each year from 1991-2006. Focussing on the period 2001-2006, when the data 
series is most reliable, we average the rates of ASDR change and then compose the alternative rates of 
change for the different scenarios. 
3.3  Theoretical aspects of mortality change 
With respect to mortality, most societies are agreed that living longer is „a good thing‟ that should be 
strived for. Preventing premature death (before a „respectable‟ old age) is the goal of much health 
sector policy and the by-product of various social and economic policies. There is a huge literature, 
for  example,  that  establishes  the  links  between  socio-economic  deprivation,  poor  health  and 
premature mortality (The Marmot Review, 2010; Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 
2008).  
In Table 3-3, we set out the factors affecting health, following on from the discussions in Chapter 2. 
The  first  four  rows  of  the  table  list  the  lifestyle  health  risks  for  developed  country  populations. 
Smoking is still the underlying cause of most cancers of the lung, throat and oesophagus but also 
implicated in other cancers and in cardio-vascular disease (heart attacks and strokes). But smoking 
prevalence is linked to social class and cultural history. Since the links between smoking and lung 
cancer were established by the longitudinal cohort study of doctors in the 1950s by Doll and Peto, 
national health departments have run campaigns to persuade smokers to give up smoking and non-
smokers not to start and national Parliaments have increased taxes on tobacco and steadily restricted 
the places where smoking can be carried out. The health message has been received earliest by the 
higher social classes so that a social gradient in smoking prevalence has emerged. Because the mix of 
social classes varies across regions, regional gradients in smoking and in smoking related disease have 
been produced. 60 
Table 3-3: Qualitative aspects of the mortality scenarios 
Demographic 
component 
Trend or Policy  GSE  EME  LSE  CME 
MORTALITY  Lifestyle: Smoking  Prevalence 
falls 
Trend 
continues 
Prevalence 
falls 
Trend 
continues 
  Lifestyle: Diet/Obesity  No 
epidemic 
No 
epidemic 
Epidemic  Epidemic 
  Lifestyle: Drinking & Drug Use  Prevalence 
falls 
Trend 
continues 
Prevalence 
falls 
Trend 
continues 
  Medical advances  Continue  Continue  Slow  Slow 
  National Health Inequalities  Reduced  Persistent  Reduced  Persistent 
  Regional Health Inequalities  Reduced  Persistent  Reduced  Persistent 
 
A lifestyle factor which is increasing rapidly in its prevalence is obesity, defined as a Body Mass 
Index (BMI) (weight in kilograms/height in metres
2). The Foresight report on obesity (Government 
Office for  Science,  2009)  reports  on  increasing  obesity  in  the  UK and likely  future  trends,  with 
predicted percentages obese in 2050 as 60% for men and 50% for women. Obesity increases the risk 
of a number of diseases, particularly diabetes leading to premature mortality. The Foresight report 
predicts decreases in life expectancy (below an increasing trend) of 0.51 of year for men and 0.22 for 
women. However, these figures look quite low compared with the relative mortality risks against BMI 
groups established in a very large set of cohort studies (Prospective Studies Consortium 2009).  
A third lifestyle factor which increases mortality is excessive consumption of alcohol and use of 
addictive drugs. Alcohol is a main cause of liver disease and a contributor to many others. Drug abuse 
causes  mental  trauma  and  addiction leads  to  rapid  downward  mobility,  which  is  associated  with 
higher mortality. Both lifestyle factors are linked to social class and cultural attitudes which vary 
across countries in Europe and across regions within countries. 
Medical  advances  have  been  crucial  to  achieving  decreases  in  age-specific  mortality  in  the  past 
century, although societies should not take for granted continued efficacy of particular treatments (e.g. 
antibiotics) or listen to false claims about vaccines (e.g. about the Mumps-Rubella-Whooping Cough 
vaccine). Mortality inequalities across Europe have been studied intensively: Vallin  et al. (2001) 
provides a comprehensive overview. Mortality inequalities within countries have been related to the 
degree of inequality in societies by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009): the more unequal society is, the 
higher the mortality level is, controlling for average income. European countries have better life 
expectancies in general than the United States, for example, though income levels are lower. In Table 
3-3, we make a judgement about what the trends in these factors would look like under our four policy 
scenarios and in Table 3-4, we attach some explicit directions to the trends and numbers to the key 
mortality decline parameters. 61 
Table 3-4: Quantitative aspects of the mortality scenarios 
Demographic 
component  Trend or Policy 
GROWING 
SOCIAL 
EUROPE 
EXPANDIN
G MARKET 
EUROPE 
LIMITED 
SOCIAL 
EUROPE 
CHALLENG
ED 
MARKET 
EUROPE 
MORTALITY  Lifestyle: Smoking  Mortality 
decrease 
Mortality 
stable 
Mortality 
decrease 
Mortality 
stable 
  Lifestyle: 
Diet/Obesity  
Mortality 
increase 
Strong 
mortality 
increase 
Mortality 
increase 
Strong 
mortality 
increase 
  Lifestyle: Drinking  Mortality 
stable 
Mortality 
increase 
Mortality 
stable 
Mortality 
increase 
  Medical advances  High advances  High medium 
advances 
Low medium 
advances 
Low  
advances 
  National Health 
Inequalities 
Strong 
convergence 
Strong 
divergence 
Convergence  Divergence 
  Regional Health 
Inequalities 
Strong 
convergence 
Strong 
divergence 
Convergence  Divergence 
ASDR change 
 (% per annum) 
Trend  GSE  EME  LSE  CME 
Male  -2.8%  -3.8  -3.3  -2.3  -1.8 
Female  -2.6%  -3.6  -3.1  -2.1  -1.6 
% of SMR 95/5 
Range assumed 
in 2045-50 
2005-10 95/5 range  GSE  EME  LSE  CME 
Male and 
Female 
100  75  115  85  125 
 
The trends in ASDR reduction in the years 2001 to 2006 were 2.8% for men and 2.6% for women. 
For the GSE Scenario, we assume a bundle of policies favourable to mortality reduction are adopted. 
The  Marmot  review  2010  provides  a  full  review  of  policy  recommendations,  “a  framework  for 
delivering and monitoring reductions in health inequalities along the social gradient”. So we assume 
an increased rate of mortality decline of 3.8/3.6% for the GSE Scenario and of 3.3/3.1% for the EME 
Scenario.  Where  there  are  fewer  resources  to  advance  improvements  in  health  under  the  LSE 
Scenario, we assume an improvement of only 2.3/2.1% and for the CME Scenario, the reductions per 
annum  are  1.8%  for  men  and  1.6%  for  women.  The  mortality  declines  are  assumed  to  operate 
uniformly across all ages from 2025-30 to 2045-50. From 2005-10 to 2025-30, the rates of change are 
interpolated between the observed rates, which differ by age, and the target rates. This method was 
applied in the 2006-based national population projections by ONS (2008). 62 
3.4  Implementing mortality scenarios for regions 
Regional ASDR estimates are reliable in a majority of the ESPON space countries in the 1991-2006 
period but there are a number of countries where the reported data are not believable, usually because 
of  difficulties  in  geo-converting  from  older  regional  definitions  to  the  2006  NUTS2  regions. 
Therefore we made cruder estimates of regional ASDRs using the total deaths count for regions, the 
European standard ASDR profiles we had estimated and the regional populations by age and sex 
which had been assembled by Eurostat via the DEMIFER project. We computed SMRs for a region 
by dividing total deaths in a region by the sum of the European standard ASDRs multiplied by the 
estimated regional populations for each year from 1991 to 2006. We report on the findings from this 
time series a little later in the report. We modify the dispersion of regional SMRs across Europe to 
reflect the trends built into the scenarios. To measure the dispersion, we use the range between the 
ninety-fifth percentile and the fifth percentile because this avoids the distorting effects of extreme 
outliers.  
This 95/5 range is reduced to 75% of its estimated 2005-10 value by 2045-50 in the GSE Scenario 
because we envisage policies will be in place to favour regions with a worse mortality experience. In 
the  UK,  for  example,  the  Advisory  Committee  for  Resource  Allocation  for  the  National  Health 
Service in England uses an inequality indicator (disability free life expectancy) to redistribute 15% of 
the circa £100 billion annual expenditure across Primary Care Trusts, the lower-tier administrative 
units responsible for delivering health care to the English population. Under the LSE Scenario, we 
also  envisage  a  narrowing  of  inequalities  to  85%  of  their  starting  values.  The  EME  Scenario, 
however,  sees  widening  inequalities  as  health  provision  drifts  towards  the  private  sector  which 
focuses on regions with the highest ability to pay and we assume the 95/5 range is stretched by 115%. 
Things become even more extreme in the CME Scenario where cuts must be made in public health 
expenditure which impact most on the poorest people and the poorest regions. We assume the 95/5 
range expands to 125% of its 2005-10 value. 
We  compute  age-sex-specific  mortality  rates  for  regions  for  future  periods  by  multiplying  the 
estimated ASDRs for 2005-10 (extrapolated from precise computations of the 2003-2006 ASDRs for 
which reliable data were available from Eurostat) by the ratio of SMR to 100. Table 3-5 lists the 
sheets in the DEMIFER Mortality Scenarios database where the computation results are generated. 
Thus the age-sex profile shifts in two ways: first through variation across scenarios in the assumed 
Europe wide decline rate and second through the assumed degree of convergence or divergence in the 
inter-regional variation. This provides a simple but powerful combination of drivers for our Policy 
Scenarios. We now turn to the actual and projected mortality experience of European regions. 63 
Table  3-5:  Structure  of  the  DEMIFER  Mortality  Scenarios  database  –  modelled  country  and  region 
mortality rates for 2005-10 to 2045-50 for the four scenarios 
Sheet in Workbook  Contents 
Reg ASDRs 2005-10  NUTS2 Regional age-sex death rates modelled from Reg ASDRs 2003-
2006 sheet 
Reg ASDR Scen TRE 2005-50  NUTS2 Regional age-sex death rates (per 1000 pop) based on TRE 
scenario in Europe ASDR Scenario Declines sheet 
Reg ASDR Scen GSE 2005-50  NUTS2 Regional age-sex death rates (per 1000 pop) based on GSE 
scenario in Europe ASDR Scenario Declines sheet 
Reg ASDR Scen EME 2005-50  NUTS2 Regional age-sex death rates (per 1000 pop) based on EME 
scenario in Europe ASDR Scenario Declines sheet 
Reg ASDR Scen LSE 2005-50  NUTS2 Regional age-sex death rates (per 1000 pop) based on LSE 
scenario in Europe ASDR Scenario Declines sheet 
Reg ASDR Scen CME 2005-50  NUTS2 Regional age-sex death rates (per 1000 pop) based on CME 
scenario in Europe ASDR Scenario Declines sheet 
Reg ASDR Index Scen TRE  NUTS2 Regional rolling index ASDRs (proportional multipliers) based 
on Reg ASDR Scen TRE 2005-50 sheet 
Reg ASDR Index Scen GSE  NUTS2 Regional rolling index ASDRs (proportional multipliers) based 
on Reg ASDR Scen GSE 2005-50 sheet 
Reg ASDR Index Scen EME  NUTS2 Regional rolling index ASDRs (proportional multipliers) based 
on Reg ASDR Scen EME 2005-50 sheet 
Reg ASDR Index Scen LSE  NUTS2 Regional rolling index ASDRs (proportional multipliers) based 
on Reg ASDR Scen LSE 2005-50 sheet 
Reg ASDR Index Scen CME  NUTS2 Regional rolling index ASDRs (proportional multipliers) based 
on Reg ASDR Scen CME 2005-50 sheet 
3.5  Policy scenario results for mortality  
It  would  be  very  useful  to  learn  from  our  1991-2006  mortality  database  whether  Europe  had 
experienced convergence or divergence in mortality experience. The trend would indicate the extent 
to which the last two decades had been characterised by convergence or divergence. Figure 3-3 to 
Figure 3-5 assemble the evidence by plotting three different measures of the variation in SMRs across 
the 287 NUTS2 regions in ESPON Europe. Figure 3-3 plots the 95
th/5
th percentile range, within which 
90% of the 287 region SMRs fall, for persons, males and females over the 15 year period. We have 
included persons because, on occasions, data for one or both of the sexes are less reliable. Figure 3-4 
plots the inter-quartile range, the 75
th/25
th percentile range, within which 50% of region SMRs fall. 
Figure 3-5 graphs the standard deviation in which all 287 values are used. Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-5 
tell a similar story. In the 1990s, the SMR variation rose from 1991 to 1994 probably because of the 
poor experience of transition countries immediately after the breakup of the Soviet empire (discussed 
in Vallin et al., 2001). Then the standard deviation declines to 2000 while the 95/5 range fluctuates 
around a flat trend. Then, after 2000, there begins a sustained rise in both measures of variation to 
much  higher  levels than in  1991 for  males  and  higher levels  than  2000  for females. This rising 
inequality means that cohesion in the mortality sphere has retreated. In the middle of the distribution, 
something  different  is  happening:  after  a  steep  initial  fall  the  measure  moves  gently  downwards 
indicating convergence in the middle except in the last year when 2006 values are higher than 2005. 64 
What has been the spatial pattern of mortality across Europe in the last 15 years? Europe standardized 
SMRs are helpful for comparison because the secular decline in ASDRs is screened out as each SMR 
is re-based to a Europe-wide average for the year in question. Figure 3-6 presents maps of the SMRs 
in  1992  and  2005.  Overall  the  pattern  has  been  very  stable  with  lowest  SMRs  in  a  broad  belt 
encompassing France, northern Spain, northern Italy and the Alpine countries. Also below the Europe 
SMR  of  100  are  many  but  not  all  regions  in  Norway,  Sweden,  Iceland,  the  Low  Countries  and 
southern England. At the other extreme, with SMRs above 115 are 2004, are Accession countries in 
central and south-east Europe from Estonia to Bulgaria together with south central Scotland (Glasgow 
and surrounding cities and towns).  Note that four countries have a wide dispersal of SMR values 
indicating high regional inequality: Germany (south-north and west-east gradients), United Kingdom 
(south-north  gradient),  Belgium  (Flanders-Wallonia contrasts)  and  Austria  (western-eastern länder 
gradient). Factors which contribute to these patterns include income variations between countries and 
within countries, the efficacy of social welfare and health care systems and the „Mediterranean‟ diet 
which helps people avoid early onset of cardiovascular disease. 
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Figure  3-3:  Ninety  fifth/fifth  percentile  range, 
1991-2006 
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Figure 3-4: Inter-quartile range, 1991-2006 
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Figure 3-5: Standard deviation, 1991-2006 65 
 
Figure 3-6: SMRs for males and females, 1992 and 2005 
Notes: SMR = Standardised mortality ratios. SMR = 100 = Europe average for year. Years to be shifted to 2001 
and 2006 when some data or formulae errors have been tracked down 66 
Where have the changes occurred between 1992 and 2005? The countries which have improved their 
position in the European mortality league include Ireland, Finland, Slovenia and the eastern länder of 
Germany.  These  are  also countries  which  benefitted  from  European cohesion funds  and  regional 
funds. The countries which have slid down the league table are Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece and 
Portugal together with southern Spain. Regional inequality in Germany has fallen but not in the UK.  
Note that these changes have occurred against a background of rising life expectancy in virtually all 
regions. Even regions at the bottom of the league, such as Glasgow, did see male life expectancy 
reach 70 years by 2006. Our Mortality Scenario Database can, of course, yield time series of mortality 
indicators for any or all of the 287 NUTS2 regions. Figure 3-6 lists the case study regions described in 
Deliverable D12. Figure 3-7 to Figure 3-10 present SMR time series for these regions we have chosen 
for more detailed case study analysis. 67 
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a: Overbayern (DE21) 
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b: Nord-Est (RO21) 
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c: Sydsverige (SE04) 
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d: West Yorkshire (UKE4) 
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e: Jihovýchod (CZ0 
Figure 3-7: SMRs for case study regions, 1992-2005 
(1):  Oberbayern  (DE21),  Sydsverige  (SE04), 
Jihovýchod (CZ06) 
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f: Inner London (UKI1) 
Figure 3-8: SMRs for case study regions, 1992-2005 
(2):  Nord-Est  (RO21),  West  Yorkshire  (UKE4), 
Inner London (UKI1) 68 
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a: Outer London (UKI2) 
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b: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (DE80) 
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c: Piemonte (ITC1) 
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d: Molise (ITF2) 
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e: Arnsberg (DEA5) 
Figure 3-9: SMRs for case study regions, 1992-2005 
(3):  Outer  London  (UKI2),  Piemonte  ITC1). 
Arnsberg (DEA5) 
 
SMRs: 1992-2005 HIS
70.0
75.0
80.0
85.0
90.0
95.0
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
S
M
R
s
 
(
E
u
r
o
p
e
=
1
0
0
)
Persons
Males
Females
 
f: Cataluña (ES51) 
Figure  3-10:  SMRs  for  case  study  regions,  1992-
2005  (4):  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  (DE80), 
Molise (ITF2), Cataluña (ES51) 
Oberbayern experiences a fall in its SMR values until a small upturn in the last two years (Figure 3-7, 
top graph), although men have a better mortality experience relative to Europe than women in Munich 
and its hinterland. Sydsverige has SMRs well below the European standard throughout the 15 years 69 
but the relative position of women becomes less favourable from 1996 onwards (Figure 3-77, middle 
graph). Jihovýhod has higher mortality than the European standard (though the differences between 
men and women prior to 1998 may be due to estimation errors (Figure 3-7, bottom graph). After 1998 
SMRs are relatively stable.  
Nord-Est Romania (Figure 3-8, top graph) also has SMRs well above the Europe standard and the first 
post-transition decade is characterized by worsening of this position, with stability after 1997 at a high 
level. West Yorkshire in the UK (Figure 3-8, middle graph) has a relatively stable SMR over the 15 
years around the Europe average, though SMRs for women are above the Europe norm and rise after 
2000 and SMRs for men are below 100. Inner London starts off the period with SMRs just above the 
European norm (Figure 3-8, bottom graph). These fall from 1996 to 2000, then rise to 2002 (effects of 
the  previous  recession  perhaps)  and  then  resume  falling  to  2006  (pre-crash  boom  perhaps).  The 
relative  positions  of  men  and  women  switch  around  2000.  Outer  London  has  SMRs  below  the 
European norm throughout the 15 year period with women‟s SMRs persistent above those of men 
(Figure 3-9, top graph). This is fairly general for the UK and is probably linked to the changing job 
market for men and women: men have shifted out of more dangerous jobs in heavy industry with re-
structuring while women have moved out of housewife inactivity into white collar jobs but retained 
stressful responsibilities for housework and children. 
Piemonte exhibits SMRs consistently below the European standard, fluctuating around a stable trend 
(Figure  3-9,  middle  graph).  Arnsberg‟s position  slightly  above  the  European standard  reflects its 
industrial character (Figure 3-9, bottom graph). Small falls were experienced to 2000 followed by 
rises after that year. The position of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern above the European standard reflects 
its DDR history but there is a steady improvement over the 15 years, reflecting perhaps the success of 
Germany‟s  unification  project,  involving  massive  investments  and  social  transfers  to  the  eastern 
länder (Figure 3-10, top graph). Molise experiences low SMRs relative to the European standard 
(Figure 3-10, middle graph). The fluctuations are probably a function of small population numbers 
and low mortality rates and there does not appear to be a trend. Finally, Cataluña also has SMRS 
significantly lower than the European standard but there is a little convergence toward the European 
average over the period (Figure 3-10, bottom graph).  
These set of graphs show that SMRs are excellent indicators for monitoring the position of the region 
relative to the European average and therefore can fulfil an important role in assessing the degree to 
which cohesion across countries and regions is being achieved. We now turn from the recent past to 
the coming decades to mid-century. 
In the Policy Scenarios, we make assumptions about the direction of change in regional variations in 
mortality. Figure 3-11 and Figure 3-12 show how these assumptions work for the GSE and EME 70 
Scenarios. The top graph in Figure 3-11 shows the assumed linear reduction in the 95
th/5
th percentile 
range and the bottom graph shows the assumed fall in the standard deviation of SMRs. These falls are 
within the scope of falls exhibited by the historical series (Figure 3-5), though in the GSE Scenario 
the direction of change reverses the 2000-2006 experience. Under the EME Scenario, both the 95
th/5
th 
percentile range and the standard deviation rise, again within the limits of the experience of 1991-
2006. This rise is in line with 2000-2006 experience in Europe. In those years we were experiencing 
an EME Scenario.  
 
Ninety fifth/fifth percentile range (SMRs for NUTS2 
287 regions) 
 
Standard deviations (SMRs for NUTS2 287 regions) 
Figure 3-11: Ninety fifth/fifth percentile range and 
standard deviation, 2005-2050, GSE Scenario 
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287 regions) 
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Figure 3-12: Ninety fifth/fifth percentile range and 
standard deviation, 2005-2050, EME Scenario 
The outcome of these assumed trends in regional convergence or divergence are shown in Figure 3-13 
with the GSE SMRs in 2045-50 in the upper pair of maps and the EME SMRs in 2045-50 in the lower 
pair of maps. We can see from the shadings on the maps that the GSE Scenario produces more regions 
in the middle bands than the EME Scenario. GSE, if it comes to be, would be a more equal Europe in 
which the laggard regions have moved towards the average and the advanced regions have less 
advantage than at present. The EME Scenario moves regions further apart. Note that, even under the 
favourable trends assumed for the GSE Scenario there are still unacceptable differences across Europe 
in the mortality experience of regional populations. 71 
 
Figure 3-13: SMRs for males and females for 2045-50, GSE and EME scenarios 72 
Figure 3-14 and Figure 3-15 show the trajectories of SMRs assumed for the LSE and CME Scenarios. 
The convergence of the LSE Scenario is lower than in the GSE Scenario, while the divergence in the 
CME graphs is greater than in the EME Scenario. The SMR outcomes for 2045-50 are mapped in 
Figure 3-16 and show these results in colour. The CME Scenario shows in particular a deepening of 
the gulf between disadvantaged eastern regions and advantaged regions in the belt of regions running 
from Galicia to the west, Île de France in the north and Calabria in the south east. In the mortality 
sphere, this is Europe‟s longevity advantaged super-region. 
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Figure 3-14: Ninety fifth/fifth percentile range and 
standard deviation, 2005-2050, LSE Scenario 
Figure 3-15: Ninety fifth/fifth percentile range and 
standard deviation, 2005-2050, CME Scenario 73 
 
Figure 3-16: SMRs for males and females for 2045-50, LSE and CME scenarios 74 
SMRs make possible an analysis of relative advantage and disadvantage. But we should not forget 
that our scenarios assume continuance of the mortality rate reduction of this decade (which have also 
been characteristic of non-Communist Europe for at least four decades and for transition countries 
since  the  mid-1990s.  To  monitor  this  absolute  shift  in  mortality  experience,  we  have  computed 
abridged life tables for each of the 287 NUTS2 regions under the four Policy Scenarios. The results 
for two indicators from the life tables, life expectancies at birth for men and women, are mapped in 
Figure 3-17 to Figure 3-19. 75 
 
Figure 3-17: Life expectancies at birth for males and females, 2005-10 and 2045-50, trended mortality 76 
 
Figure 3-18: Life expectancies at birth for males and females, 2045-50, GSE and EME scenarios 77 
 
Figure 3-19: Life expectancies at birth for males and females, 2045-50, LSE and CME scenarios 
Figure  3-17  maps  the  assumed  underlying  trend  in  life  expectancy  from  which  the  four  Policy 
Scenarios deviate. We define classes using values in 2005-10 and 2045-50 across this Trend Scenario 78 
and  the  Policy  Scenarios to  capture the  dramatic changes  in  prospect for  Europeans through  the 
transformation in the map colours. The male life expectancy map in 2005-10 (Figure 3-17, top left) is 
coloured uniformly beige and yellow: all regions fall in the classes 64 to 75 or 75 to 80 years. For 
women, all regions are coloured uniformly yellow (75 to 80) or red (80 to 85). Contrast this with the 
situation 45 years later under the GSE Scenario, where there are no beige or yellow regions on the 
male map (Figure 3-17, top left map) and only a few reds. Everywhere regional life expectancies are 
above 80 years for men and most are above 85. For women, all regional life expectancies are above 
85 and most are above 90. You may object that this is optimistic and say that most official statistical 
agencies assume that the improvement slows down after a couple of decades, but if you had bet on 
this slowdown in mortality reduction happening in the past 40 years in Europe, you would have been 
mostly wrong. Of course, such dramatic improvements depend on success of all the policies included 
in the GSE bundle. If the position was less favourable and the CME Scenario came about (Figure 
3-17, bottom left and bottom right maps), substantial progress has been made although men in the 
majority of eastern regions will still be in the 75-80 class. Is this what we want? 
3.6  Impact of mortality on cohesion and competitiveness 
In  this  chapter  of  report  we  have  developed  mortality  outcomes  for  our  four  Policy  Scenarios, 
building on a knowledge base of the decade and a half prior to our projection period. We have shown 
how SMRs can be used as a very useful indicator of the degree to which cohesion (in the face of 
death) has been achieved. We have also shown how considerable increases in longevity could occur 
on  relatively  conservative  assumptions  about  reductions  in  mortality  rates.  The  increases  in  life 
expectancy  mean  additional  ageing  of  the  population,  which  will  have  implications  for  regional 
competitiveness,  which  we  explore  in  Deliverable  D7.  However,  the  increases  in  prospect  do 
represent a considerable triumph for European society, which we should celebrate. The challenges of 
the additional ageing can be met if we achieve the conditions of the GSE or EME Scenarios. 79 
4.  FERTILITY SCENARIOS 
4.1  Introduction 
Fertility is still the most important component of population change. Although yearly fluctuations in 
net migration may be quite impressive, (large) changes in the number of live born children have a 
more profound effect on population growth (or decrease) in the long run. This chapter describes the 
assumptions on fertility underlying the four policy scenarios.  
After the Second World War, substantial changes in the average number of children per woman have 
occurred  and  also  the  average  age  at  which  women  give  birth  to  the  first  child  has  changed 
impressively.  In the southern European countries, fertility falls to an all-time low, reaching extremely 
low levels. Also, in the eastern countries, a tremendous fall in fertility could be witnessed after the fall 
of the Iron Curtain in the 1990s. In the light of these profound changes in the past, it seems very 
difficult to foresee what will happen in the long-term future. It is a real challenge to make sense of the 
complex  relationships  between  fertility  changes  on  the  one  hand  and  socio-cultural  and  socio-
economic changes on the other. New cohorts of couples may make other choices with respect to 
fertility  than  present  couples.  All  these  considerations  lead  us  to  the  conclusion  that  plausible 
scenarios  of  fertility  trends  can  only  be  made  if  justice  is  done  to  the  large  variety  of  fertility 
behaviour  of  individuals  in  combination  with  wide  array  of  social,  economic  and  political 
developments. In the four scenarios, possible future developments in fertility are laid down.  
This part of the report will start with a brief overview of fertility theories. These theories have been 
used  in  the  formulation  of  the  qualitative  assumptions  of  the  Policy  Scenarios.  The  quantitative 
assumptions are to a large part inspired by the results of the expert opinion survey. To conclude this 
part, the results for the fertility in the regions of the ESPON space will be presented.   
4.2  Theoretical aspects of fertility change 
One of the first fertility theories is that of the so-called „first demographic transition‟. This theory can 
be summarized as follows (see Van de Kaa, 1996, for a comprehensive description). A process of 
modernization has led to higher standards of living in western countries in the second half of the 
nineteenth  century.  Populations  started  to  grow  rapidly,  in  the  beginning  due  to  a  decrease  in 
mortality. Later on, fertility figures also started to fall, as couples began to practice birth control in 
order to limit the number of children. The reason behind the wish to curtail family size was a huge 
reduction in infant mortality: if more children survive, a reduction in the number of births is necessary 
if couples aspire to have a limited number of children. This theory is outdated when it comes to the 
explanation  of  modern  fertility  trends.  However,  the  recognition  that  modification  processes  of 
society lead to a changing level of fertility is also an important ingredient of modern fertility theories. 80 
According to the „theory of new home economics‟ (Becker, 1991 and 1993), the rapid fall in fertility 
in most western countries since the mid-1960s can be a rise in „opportunity costs‟ of children. These 
costs can be considered as forfeited income, in case the woman becomes a full-time mother after 
childbirth instead of participating (or continuing to participate) in the labour market. In the 1960s, the 
opportunity costs of women rose rapidly, due to  their stronger earning power. A higher level of 
female educational attainment in combination with a higher rate of labour market participation had 
resulted in a higher actual or potential income. Given the situation that many women do not prefer or 
are not capable of combining raising children with working outdoors, higher earning power leads to 
an increase in the opportunity costs. However, it might be argued that more and more substitutes for 
domestic chores can be acquired on the market, and it has also become more common to „buy‟ child 
care. In this way, income can be used for the acquisition of these substitutes and as a result, negative 
effects of opportunity costs on the number of children can be mitigated. 
The  „human  capital  theory‟  (Mineer  and  Polachek,  1974;  Becker,  1975)  is  another  important 
economic theory. Human capital consists of knowledge, experience and health, i.e. a person‟s skills, 
faculties and abilities. The quantity of human capital is decisive for a person's income. The amount of 
human capital is influenced by the accretion of new capital, due to investments like schooling and 
getting more work or educational experience. However, a reduction of existing capital may occur in 
periods when a person does not participate on the labour market or does not follow education. Human 
capital theory states that fertility trends are linked to developments in the educational level. Women 
with a high educational attainment have compiled a large quantity of human capital and want to 
increase their human capital further by obtaining work experience. By means of a professional career, 
a high potential income can be realized. However, this will lead to the postponement of motherhood 
eventually to involuntary childlessness, as fertility decreases at higher ages. One implication might be 
a reduction in the number of children. 
Easterlin (1996 and 1975) relates fertility trends to the (relative) income situation in the future. While 
the low income prospects of youngsters, in comparison to their parents, will lead to a small number of 
children, high income prospects will have the opposite effect. This hypothesis is based on the fact 
that, in the past, relatively large numbers of children were born and raised in periods of high economic 
growth. These children, who grew up in relatively prosperous families, developed a high level of 
consumption aspirations. However, at the time they started to work, these aspirations could not be met 
by their earnings, due to the large numbers of young people entering the labour market at the same 
time. As a result, the „investment‟ in children was delayed or even cancelled. According to Easterlin, 
the post-war „babyboom‟ in the United States originated from the generation born during the Great 
Depression,  having  low  consumption  aspirations  and  high  earnings.  In  contrast,  the  „babybust‟ 81 
originated  from  the  next  generation,  born  in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  having  high  consumption 
aspirations and being confronted with low economic growth. 
These theories are more or less economic orientated explanations of fertility trends. Also several 
socio-cultural theories have been developed. Van de Kaa (1988) and Lesthaeghe and Verleye (1992) 
point to the connection between the evolution of the social system and fertility trends. Their theory of 
the „second demographic transition‟ describes the demographic developments after 1965, which might 
be  seen  as  a  turning  point  in  demographic  history.  The  rapid  social  and  economic  changes  of 
European societies during the last three decades of the twentieth century were the result of a process 
of modernization. This process involved a shift from a manufacturing and goods producing economy 
to a service economy. In such an economy, information, automation and computerization play an 
increasingly important role. The resulting „post-industrial society‟ or welfare state offers opportunities 
for high living standards to families and individuals. Women remain longer in full-time education and 
participate more often in the labour market. Many of them have to face a difficult choice between 
„career‟ and „family‟. According to Van de Kaa, the choice for a first child is more likely to be taken 
when it will contribute to the self-fulfilment of the woman and her partner. All these developments 
lead  to  decreasing  fertility  rates  at  young  ages,  causing  a  delay  of  motherhood.  Lesthaeghe  and 
Verleye focus on the sequence of socio-cultural developments. The second demographic transition 
started with an increase of divorces, followed by postponement of both marriage and having children. 
Marriage became less common, as cohabitation became more and more accepted, not only as a union 
(„paperless marriage‟) between men and women, but also as the proper social union for childbearing. 
In the final stage of the second demographic transition, the decrease of fertility figures at young ages 
comes to an end while fertility rates at higher ages start to rise due to a process of catching up. 
According to the two authors, these new trends had their origin in a number of vanguard countries 
(such as Denmark and Sweden), and from there it spread to other countries of Europe.  
The decline in fertility, observed in almost all western countries, can also be explained in the context 
of norms favouring smaller families (see the United Nations, 1992). However, the emergence of these 
norms  can  be  related  to  economic  trends,  such  as  the  industrialization  after  the  World  War  II. 
Rebuilding activities led to an increased participation of women in the labour force. Technological 
progress required more skills to be acquired by longer education and training. This facilitated the 
expansion of female education. The desire of women to take a greater part in social life led to the wish 
to have increased access to birth regulation. This stimulated the diffusion of contraceptive knowledge 
and practice. In the post-war years, new societal conditions emerged and cultural values and social 
norms were changing. A tendency developed to satisfy individual, more material aspirations and the 
importance for couples to have children diminished. Motherhood was no longer the major goal for 
women in their life. For women social rewards and individual satisfaction could be also be achieved 82 
by working outside the household and the additional income gained could provide a more fulfilling 
lifestyle than that found in rearing a lot of children.   
Some authors think that young generations are more materialistic and less altruistic (Cruijsen, 1991). 
This opinion seems to be confirmed by the results of „The European Comparative Survey on the 
Acceptance of Population-related Policies‟ (Moors and Palomba, 1995). In several countries, the most 
frequently mentioned reason for not having children was the wish to maintain the current standard of 
living. Another important reason was the perceived impossibility to combine motherhood with labour 
participation. 
All theories mentioned above are intended to explain the decline in fertility. Most theories stress the 
financial costs of children to parents and the opportunity costs children impose by inhibiting women 
to  participate  in  the  labour  market.  Nevertheless,  in  most  industrialized  countries  only  a  small 
minority of adults intend to stay childless. According to Schoen et al. (1997), an explanation why 
couples still want to have children, despite widespread female labour force participation and high 
costs of children, are the (in economic terms) the „utilities‟ provided by children. Firstly, children can 
be considered as a source of intrinsic, non-substitutable pleasure. Secondly, children can also be 
considered as social capital; the ability of children to create access to critical resources through ties of 
kinship and other personal relationships (among e.g. parents, grandparents and friends). In this way 
fertility can play a positive, status-enhancing role in industrialized societies. 
4.3  Policy scenarios on fertility 
4.3.1  Qualitative assumptions 
The Policy Scenarios of the DEMIFER project are based on two underlying dimensions (namely 
„Economy-Environment‟ and „Distribution-Fairness‟) which, in combination, lead to four scenarios. 
Each of these scenarios is associated with a set of policies which are assumed to impact, to a greater 
or lesser degree on the level of fertility. However, this impact is not direct but indirect, as it leads 
specific effects on the driving forces behind each demographic component. In Table 4-1 the assumed 
impact of each scenario on the distinguished driving forces of fertility are shown.  83 
Table 4-1: Linkage of scenarios to fertility via trends and policies 
Demographic 
component  Trend or Policy  GSE  EME  LSE  CME 
FERTILITY  Family versus Individual Goals  Family 
goals 
Individual 
goals 
Family 
goals 
Individual 
goals 
  Family Friendly Policies  Strong  Weak  Strong  Weak 
  Assisted Conception  Socially 
supported 
Privately 
supported 
Socially 
supported 
Privately 
supported 
  Abortion Law  Permissive  Restrictive  Permissive  Restrictive 
  Extra-Europe Effect  High effect  Low effect  Low effect  Low 
  National Fertility Inequalities  Reduced  Persistent  Reduced  Persistent 
  Regional Fertility Inequalities  Reduced  Persistent  Reduced  Persistent 
 
In  the  GSE  Scenario,  the  policy  context  stems  from  the  combination  of  high  economic 
growth/sustainable environment with a political orientation focused at social and regional cohesion. In 
such a political context, women try to become mothers and have at least two children. So women 
prefer to achieve family goals above pure individual goals, such as having  a career. However, a 
difficult choice between these two goals can be avoided, as Governments promote the combination of  
motherhood and working outside the home. This results in financing all kinds of child care facilities 
and financial allowances and/or tax reductions for families with children. However, these economic 
conditions might not be sufficient. Also a more equal distribution of responsibilities between husband 
and wife is necessary and both partners will have to participate in the task of raising their children. 
For this reason, the policy tries to support trends of emancipation. This can be done by promoting 
flexible working hours but also practical support is offered to couples with fertility problems. Assisted 
conception through in vitro fertilization is supported financially by the Government. On the other 
hand, a liberal standpoint is taken on the issue of abortion law. It is legal for women to have an 
abortion.  Although  this  might  lead  to  a  reduction  of  fertility,  it  has  hardly  any  influence  as  the 
Ggovernment also promotes and subsidizes the use of birth contraceptives. In this way, couples can 
have their children at a point in their lives when they are ready for parenthood, and disappointments 
of  having  to  undergo  an  abortion  can  be  prevented  (as  this  can  have  negative  effects  on  future 
fertility).  
The policy with respect to the arrival of immigrants from countries with a high level of fertility is also 
permissive.  No  legal  barriers  are  raised  to  prevent  the  arrival  of  immigrants  from  non-western 
countries. This leads to the phenomena as family reunion (wives and children being joined with the 
husband who arrived earlier as a labour migrant) and family formation migration (persons from the 
second generation who seek a partner in the country of origin of the parents). Also asylum seekers 84 
from all over the world, and especially countries where fertility is still high, are welcomed. In sum, all 
these migration flows lead to a substantial increase in fertility. 
National inequalities in fertility are rather impressive. In the southern and eastern countries of Europe, 
fertility is well under 1.5 children per women, while in the western and northern countries, figures up 
to  2  children  per  woman  are  reached.  To  a  large  extent,  these  inequalities  can  be  explained  by 
differences in welfare. In the former communist countries, fertility plummeted after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain due to a severe economic recession and a cutting back on the family friendly policies (of the 
communist regimes). Couples postponed having children and waited for better times. Also a lot of 
facilities for child care were cut short. Also, in the southern countries, a lack of financial support may 
have caused a low inclination to have large families (here one child families are rather common). In 
the GSE Scenarios, the combination of high economic growth with policies trying to reduce national 
inequalities leads to smaller differences in welfare between the countries of the ESPON space. In 
particular, southern and eastern countries are confronted with a rise in fertility. Also, within countries, 
regional differences become smaller. More perspectives for economic lagging regions prevent an 
exodus of young couples on the verge of starting a family. Due to the success of this policy, these 
mostly peripheral regions enjoy a higher increase in fertility than the other, more prosperous, regions.  
In the EME Scenario the economic circumstances are also good, and even better than in the GSE 
Scenario, and a market philosophy colours the political climate. The focus is on individuals rather 
than on couples, striving to achieve their rather material goals. Given this focus, family goals are less 
important than individual goals, such as making a professional carrier. To a certain extent, this has a 
negative effect on fertility, although having children can, to a certain extent, be seen as an indicator of 
personal success and leading to more status. In this way, children are more or less treated as consumer 
goods. In such a political climate, family friendly policies are not well developed.  However, due to 
the high economic growth, it is no substantial financial offer to buy child care on the market. The 
same applies to assisted conception: as having children is seen as a personal choice, the Government 
is not willing to support assisted conception. Again, this is not necessary as couples are capable of 
financing it privately. On the matter of abortion, a rather restrictive point of view is taken: individual 
persons are responsible for using birth contraceptives and ought to plan their fertility career very 
carefully. In this way abortion should not be necessary. The political climate reinforces this point of 
view by making abortion illegal.  
Also with respect to immigration, a restrictive political climate prevails; only migrants who have 
essential assets that can be used in the labour market are welcome. This goes together with strict 
restriction on the duration of the stay of these migrants. For fertility this means that a quite low effect 
is generated by these migrants; they consist mostly of singles who are coming for work reasons for 
only a couple of years without having enough time to find a partner and start a family.  85 
Economic trends tend by nature to reinforce existing national inequalities. In a political climate which 
paves the way for market oriented measures, it is surely the case that difference in wealth between the 
ESPON countries will not diminish. The large existing fertility differences between the eastern and 
southern countries on the one hand and the western and northern countries on the other are not only 
kept intact but are even growing as economic disparities between these groups of countries increase. 
More or less the same applies to regional fertility inequalities. Peripheral region are lagging in welfare 
compared with the central regions. This leads to growing flows of youngsters migrating to  more 
central regions. Here they find jobs and partners, and they wont come back when the phase of family 
formation starts (possibly they migrate to regions adjacent to the central regions). As a result, existing 
regional inequalities are persistent in this scenario. 
In the LSE Scenario, the political climate resembles that of the GSE Scenario, but the economic 
prospects are more gloomy. The challenges of climate change have not been met and due to the „end 
of oil‟, energy prices have  risen. Couples have severe troubles to cope with their daily financial 
obligations.  The  costs  of housing  in  particular  have  risen (due  to  high  energy  costs)  and  so  the 
monthly budget leaves little space for having children. Although several costs of having children have 
become high as more mouths have to be filled, a family friendly policy tries to mitigate this by 
reducing  costs  of  education  (e.g.  school  books  for  free),  public  supported  child  care,  financial 
allowances  for families  with children, etc.  Also  giving  financial  support  to  couples  with fertility 
problems is still possible, although the number of trials for in vitro fertilization is curtailed to a limited 
number. The net effect of this policy intervention for the level of fertility is that negative effects of the 
economic trends are more or less offset by these policy measures. Although the political climate is 
still permissive with respect to the arrival of all kind of migrants, the flows of migrants coming from 
high fertility countries are rather modest. This is due to the meagre economic prospects; the system of 
social security is less abundant for newcomers due to financial cuts in all kinds of provisions. National 
and regional inequalities are reduced to some extent. On a European level, the policy of striving for 
international cohesion is still active, although due to lower economic growth, the financial space for 
all kinds of political is limited. Less economic disparities go together with less fertility differences.  
Also in the CME Scenario, economic growth has slackened and environmental problems have put a 
large  footprint  on  society  and  economy.  The  risks  of  climate  change  have  been  ignored  but  its 
negative  effects  are  becoming  noticeable.  Due  an  awkward  financial  situation,  no  large-scale 
investments have been made in order to mitigate the arising problems. The political climate is rather 
harsh and there is no consideration for couples having to struggle to cope with the costs of daily life. 
There is no policy trying to stimulate couples to have children and, instead, the necessity of preparing 
for the labour market (e.g. following education) is stressed. In combination with the fact that there is 
no  budget  for family  friendly  policies  and  assisted  conception,  all  these  matters  have  a  negative 86 
influence on fertility. The attitude towards abortion law is rather restrictive, because a tolerant climate 
towards sexuality is not approved. It is no wonder that national and regional inequalities in fertility are 
rather persistent and get even larger as the economic weaker nations and regions suffer the most 
economic  setbacks.  In  these  regions,  couples  are  hesitant  to  start  a  family  and  postpone  having 
children and in a lot of cases abstain from parenthood.   
4.3.2  Quantitative assumptions 
The quantitative assumptions of the four policy scenarios refer to trends in a common used key-
indicator of the level of fertility, namely the Total (period) Fertility Rate (TFR). This indicator is 
computed as the sum of age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) over all fertile ages of a women (the age 
bracket 15 up to 50 years is used), measured in a specific calendar year. This indicator gives an 
impression  of  the  average  number  of  children  per  woman.  Although  this  measure  is  usually 
interpreted as an indicator of the level of fertility, also some elements of the timing of fertility are 
present in this measure. This means that changes in the TFR are not only due to changes in the 
average number of children per woman, but also due to changes in the average age at childbirth. This 
tempo effect may be explained as follows. Given a constant average number of children per birth 
cohort of women, the TFR will first decrease during several calendar years in periods when (young) 
women postpone having children (the delay of motherhood). However, the TFR will increase again 
once  the  decline  of  fertility  of  young  women  is  levelling  off  and  older  women,  having  delayed 
motherhood, start having their children (and in this way catch up the loss of fertility at younger ages). 
In  Europe,  this  process  of  delay  of  motherhood  followed  by  a  process  of  catching  up  could  be 
witnessed in the last decades. Nowadays, in several countries, both processes have come to an end and 
as a result the level of fertility is fairly stable. In the Policy Scenarios, it is assumed that no (major) 
trends in the timing of fertility will happen in the future. For this reason the distribution of SFRs is 
assumed to be constant. In the construction of the Policy Scenarios, the assumptions refer to changes 
in the TFRs. In each scenario, specific changes in the TFR are assumed, which are applied to each 
region.  However,  within  each  country,  a  scenario  specific  degree  of  regional  convergence  and 
divergence is assumed, leading to varying changes in the regional TFR. 
In the making of the quantitative scenarios, it is assumed that the level of the TFR will continue to 
change up to 2032. Hereafter, a stable level is assumed. The reason for assuming a levelling off of the 
rate of change, is that society and couples in particular become accustomed to a changed economic 
situation and political climate. So, couples who start their fertility career around 2032 take the new 
economic and political context into account and have „translated‟ this in their desired number of 
children. 87 
In the conversion of qualitative into quantitative assumptions, the results from the expert opinion 
survey  described  in  Chapter  2  play  an  important  role.  The  result  of  this  survey  showed  that 
Governments are somewhat reserved about stimulating fertility in general, considering this as being a 
decision for couples to take themselves. They also thought that the efficiency of political actions on 
this issue was quite low. However, a more active policy consists of giving help to couples with 
fertility problems. This practical kind of policy was visible in almost all the countries of the ESPON 
space. And even more important, the experts thought it was an effective method to raise fertility.  The 
experts also thought that abortion was a very important issue to influence fertility and, moreover, 
abortion law was considered as a very effective policy instrument. Based on the mix of perceived 
political actions in each scenario and the expected effectiveness of political measures, the following 
translation of qualitative assumptions into quantitative assumptions could be made.  
Table 4-2: Linkage of scenarios to fertility: outcomes in levels and regional distributions 
Demographic 
component  Trend or Policy 
GROWING 
SOCIAL 
EUROPE 
EXPANDING 
MARKET 
EUROPE 
LIMITED 
SOCIAL 
EUROPE 
CHALLENG
ED MARKET 
EUROPE 
FERTILITY  Family versus 
Individual Goals 
Target TFR 
+0.1 
Target TFR 
+0.0 
Target TFR 
+0.0 
Target TFR -
0.2 
  Family Friendly 
Policies 
Target TFR 
+0.1 
Target TFR 
+0.0 
Target TFR 
+0.1 
Target TFR 
+0.0 
  Assisted 
Conception 
Target TFR 
+0.2 
Target TFR 
+0.1 
Target TFR 
+0.1 
Target TFR 
+0.0 
  Abortion Law  Target TFR -
0.1 
Target TFR 
+0.1 
Target TFR -
0.2 
Target TFR 
+0.0 
  Extra-Europe Effect  Target TFR 
+0.1 
Target TFR 
+0.0 
Target TFR 
+0.0 
Target TFR 
+0.0 
  National Fertility 
Inequalities 
Reduce by 
25% 
Increase by 
25% 
Reduce by 
15% 
Increase by 
15%e 
  Regional Fertility 
Inequalities 
Reduce by 
25% 
Increase by 
25% 
Reduce by 
15%e 
Increase by 
15% 
 
From Table 4-2 it is clear that in the GSE Scenario the TFR will increase by 0.4 up to 2027. This 
stems from the combination of an active policy to raise fertility, not only by promoting a family 
friendly political climate but also by giving practical help to couples with fertility problems. This has 
a positive effect on fertility, although a permissive point of view on abortion leads to a considerable 
negative effect. National and regional inequalities decrease substantially, namely by 25%. 
In the EME Scenario, the TFR will also rise, but with a smaller increase of 0.2 children. Due to the 
absence of a policy to stimulate fertility in general and only a modest financial contribution to help 
couples with fertility problems, a small positive effect on the TFR is apparent in this scenario. Also a 
modest positive contribution to fertility is generated by the restrictive abortion law. National and 88 
regional inequalities increase substantially, namely by 25%. It is expected that stronger regions profit 
most of the rather favourable economic and political situation. 
In the LSE Scenario, the TFR will not change in the coming half century. This is due to mix of 
positive and negative effects on fertility. Family friendly policies and giving help to couples with 
fertility problems leads to an increase of 0.2 children but this is offset by the liberal abortion law 
leading to a decrease of 0.2 children. National and regional inequalities decrease somewhat, namely 
by 15%. The policy oriented at regional cohesion has effects, but they are not so strong compared 
with the GSE Scenario. 
In the CME Scenario, the negative effect of the harsh economic and political climate leads to a 
decrease in fertility: up to 0.2 children. Especially the orientation on individual goals of couples and 
policy leads to a smaller family size. The other driving forces have neither a positive or negative 
effect on fertility; partly due to the fact that no policies are taken in order to stimulate having children 
in combination with a restrictive abortion law. National and regional inequalities increase slightly, 
namely by 15%. Although the weaker nations and regions suffer the most from the gloomy economic 
situation, also the stronger regions cannot escape from the negative effects on fertility.  
4.4  Results  
Figure 4-1gives an impression of the recent pattern of the fertility in the ESPON space, based on the 
NUTS 2 classification. Fertility levels are rather low in most European regions. In nearly half of the 
regions, the TFR is 1.5 or lower and only about 10% of European regions have a total fertility rate of 
2 or higher. TFRs are relatively high in northern regions, and in most regions of France, Ireland and 
the UK. Low levels of fertility can be observed in most southern, central and eastern regions 89 
 
Figure 4-1: TFRs in the NUTS 2 region in the ESPON space, 2005 
Figure 4-2 (top, left) gives an impression of the level of fertility in the ESPON space, according to the 
GSE Scenario. Fertility levels are much higher compared with 1995; now only 5% of the regions have 
a TFR of 1.5 or lower and about 30% of the European regions have a total fertility rate of 2 or higher. 
TFRs are particular high in northern regions, and in most regions of France, Ireland and the UK. In 
the large majority of the region in the eastern, central and southern countries, fertility has surpassed 
the dramatic low level of 1.5. 90 
 
Figure 4-2: TFRs in the NUTS 2 region in the ESPON space, GSE, EME, LSE, and CME scenarios, 2050 91 
Figure  4-2  (top,  right)  gives  an  impression  of  the  pattern  of  the  fertility  in  the  ESPON  space, 
according to the EME Scenario. Although fertility is generally higher than in 1995, nearly 30% of the 
regions have a low level of 1.5 or lower. This percentage is much higher than in the GSE Scenario. It 
is remarkable that the percentage of regions with a fertility level over 2 is also higher, at nearly 35%. 
Although the general increase of the TFR with 0.2 is half as large at that in the GSE Scenario, the 
divergence assumptions lead to a much higher number of regions with a very high TFR. Fertility is 
especially high in northern regions, and almost all regions of France, Ireland and the UK. Like the 
previous scenario, regions with a low level of fertility can again be found in most southern, central 
and eastern regions although the number of those regions here is now much higher.  
Figure 4-2 (bottom, left) gives an impression of the pattern of the fertility in the ESPON space, 
according to the LSE Scenario. The pattern is more or less the same as the situation in 1995; that is no 
surprise because no increase of decrease in fertility is expected in the future. However, the percentage 
of regions with a TFR of 1.5 or lower (55%) is somewhat higher. In contrast, the percentage of those 
with a TFR 2 or higher (5%) is much lower. These differences with the situation of 1995 are due to 
the convergence assumptions of this scenario. Only a few regions in the northern countries, in France, 
Ireland and the UK now show a level of 2 and over.  
Figure 4-2 (bottom, right) gives an impression of the pattern of the fertility in the ESPON space, 
according to the CME Scenario. Fertility has dropped by 0.2 in general. This leads to two out of three 
regions with a TFR of 1.5 or lower. However, the percentage of regions with a TFR of 2.0 and higher 
is the same as in the previous scenario. This is due to the divergence assumption of this scenario: so 
some isolated regions are capable of maintaining their high fertility levels. These regions can again be 
found in the northern countries of France, Ireland and the UK. In the eastern, central and southern 
countries, almost all regions have a fertility of 1.5 or lower. 
Our maps and projections use the NUTS2 region as a base. However, there will always be variation 
within these relatively large populations (1.7 million on average). Here we illustrate the sub-regional 
variation in fertility within a NUTS2 region, taken from the West Yorkshire Case Study (Rees et al. 
2010b). The increasing contribution of natural increase to population growth in West Yorkshire since 
2001 has been driven by a reversal in the downward trend in fertility rates that were experienced 
throughout the UK to 2000.  The NUTS2 region of West Yorkshire has a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
that has risen from low point of 1.7 in 2001 to 1.9 in 2007. However, when we graph total fertility 
rates at NUTS3 scale, we observe interesting local variation. Despite a rise in fertility for all the 
LAU1 regions there are clear differences between the three curves. The NUTS3 region with the 
highest TFR is Bradford which has kept a TFR above-replacement fertility of 2.07 since the 1990s, 
rising to almost 2.4 in 2007. This is a product of a large ethnic minority community from Pakistan, 92 
who have higher birth rates. Despite the Leeds NUTS3 region having a TFR trend which parallels 
Bradford, the rise in TFR has remained much lower, rising from 1.4 in 2001 to 1.6 in 2007. 
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5.  INTERNAL MIGRATION SCENARIOS 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter details the data and estimation methods used to derive the internal migration assumptions 
for the MULTIPOLES projection model.  The objective has been to derive the following: (1) out-
migration rates for a base period (2005-10) for each combination of origin (O), destination (D), age 
(A) and sex (S) within a single country, and (2) a series of assumptions to modify these base-period 
out-migration rates over the full projection horizon (2005-10 to 2045-50) for each of five alternative 
scenarios.  These  five  scenarios  have  been  defined  as  a  generic  framework  applicable  to  each 
component  of  demographic  change  (fertility,  mortality,  internal  migration  and  international 
migration).  The scenarios are summarized again in Table 5-1. The colour codes refer to the database 
workbook in which the numerical computations are implemented. 
Table 5-1: The five policy scenarios 
Scenario colour code  Definition 
Trend  Continuation of base-period 
GSE  Growing Social Europe 
LSE  Limited Social Europe 
EME  Expanding Market Europe 
CME  Challenged Market Europe 
 
Internal migration is defined as the movement of population between NUTS2 regions within a single 
country.  Of the 31 countries in the DEMIFER study area, eight are „single-region‟ countries (Cyprus, 
Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta) and therefore have no 
internal, inter-NUTS2 migration.  The remaining 23 countries have internal migration for between 2 
and 39 NUTS2 regions. The migration concept used in most European countries is the „movement‟ 
definition in which all residential relocations in a time interval are counted (Courgeau, 1973; Ledent 
and Rees, 1980; Ledent and Rees, 1986; Rees, 1985; Rees and Willekens, 1986). In some countries 
(France,  Greece,  Portugal),  only  „transition‟  data  on  migrants  were  available.  Strictly  speaking, 
migration  rates  based  on  census  data  (transitions)  are  different  from  migration  rates  based  on 
registered relocations (moves). However, in terms of „net‟ relocations between the start and end of 
time intervals, movement and transition migrations yield the same result because „surplus”‟ inter-
regional moves cancel out. 
Section 5.2 provides a summary of the data collected for each of the 23 countries for which internal 
migration is a driver of population change in the MULTIPOLES model. Section 5.3 describes how 
out-migration rates have been derived for the full ODAS array for each country and illustrates the 
variation in the level and rate of internal migration between countries in the study area. Section 5.4 94 
introduces the concept of the „destination attractiveness ratio‟ (DAR) − the relationship between a 
region‟s share of population and its share of the total in-migration flow for a country.  The DAR is 
used as the basis for modelling the impact of the five alternative scenarios. Section 5.5 illustrates how 
these scenario assumptions have been derived.  
5.2  Data development 
To  facilitate  the  derivation  of  the  internal  migration  assumptions,  a  comprehensive  database  of 
statistics for the 23 countries of interest has been produced.  This database has been created from 
EUROSTAT sources (via the  DEMIFER  shared  datasets), from  a  number  of individual  National 
Statistical Offices (NSO) and in some cases through estimation. The availability and quality of the 
data  were  not  consistent  across  the  study  area.    Figure  5-1  summarises  the  content  of  the  final 
database of internal migration data used in the DEMIFER project.  Of the 31 countries, eight have no 
NUTS2 geographical disaggregation.  Of the remaining 23, 16 had OD internal migration matrices for 
each year 2001-2006. Italy had data for 2001-2005, Norway for 2002-2003 and 2005-2006.  Denmark 
and France had OD migration data for 2006 only, whereas Ireland had both 2002 and 2006.  For 
Greece and Portugal data could only be made available for 2001. 
OD Migration data available
Single NUTS2 region
OD migration data not available
Code Country NUTS2 
regions
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
AT  Austria 9 1 1 1 1 1 1
BE   Belgium 11 1 1 1 1 1 1
BG  Bulgaria 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
CY  Cyprus 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
CZ  Czech Republic 8 1 1 1 1 1 1
DK  Denmark 5           1
EE  Estonia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI  Finland 5 1 1 1 1 1 1
FR  France 26           1
DE  Germany 39 1 1 1 1 1 1
GR  Greece 13 1          
HU  Hungary 7 1 1 1 1 1 1
IS  Iceland 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
IE  Ireland 2   1       1
IT  Italy 21 1 1 1 1 1  
LV  Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
LI  Liechtenstein 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
LT  Lithuania 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU  Luxembourg 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT  Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL  Netherlands 12 1 1 1 1 1 1
NO  Norway 7   1 1   1 1
PL  Poland 16 1 1 1 1 1 1
PT  Portugal 7 1          
RO  Romania 8 1 1 1 1 1 1
SK  Slovakia 4 1 1 1 1 1 1
SI  Slovenia 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
ES  Spain 19 1 1 1 1 1 1
SE  Sweden 8 1 1 1 1 1 1
CH   Switzerland 7 1 1 1 1 1 1
UK  United Kingdom 37 1 1 1 1 1 1
 
Figure 5-1: OD Internal Migration data 95 
Wherever possible, migration data by origin, age and sex (OAS) have also been captured to facilitate 
the estimation of a full ODAS array of flows for each country. In addition, population data by age and 
sex has been captured for each NUTS2 region to enable the calculation of out-migration rates for the 
base period 2005-2010 (see next chapter). In the UK, a substantial process of data estimation was 
required to produced a consistent set of inter-NUTS2 flows that aligned data from Scottish NUTS2 
regions with those from and to elsewhere within the UK.  This innovative methodology has produced 
a unique set of migration statistics for the UK which has been provided to the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) and subsequently to Eurostat (Dennett and Rees, 2010). 
5.3  Calculating out-migration rates 
A direct comparison of the level and pattern of internal migration in each country in the DEMIFER 
study area is difficult because of the different number, size and shape of NUTS  regions in each 
country and because of the variety of drivers of migration in each.  The issues in comparing internal 
migration between countries have been reviewed and analyzed in an Australia-Britain project by Bell 
et al., 2000; Bell and Rees, 2006. Internal migration differs between countries because of differences 
in concept, time reference, spatial reference, distances moved, impact and connectivity. However, for 
purposes  of  scenario  development  and  population  projection,  these  issues  are  not  critical.  An 
illustration of the differences is interesting nevertheless. Figure 5-2 presents a comparison of the level 
of internal migration by country.  Data are drawn largely from 2006, with the exception of Greece and 
Portugal (2001) and Italy (2005). Germany and the UK stand out with their 40-zone and 37-zone 
NUTS2 geographical systems producing very high internal migration flows.  The UK is especially 
high, with the importance of „student migration‟ likely to be a dominant factor explaining its position. 
Students entering higher education (HE) in England within the UK have a strong tradition of inter-
regional migration, reflecting a desire to establish adult independence. In other countries, the majority 
of HE students attend their local or nearest institutions. 96 
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Figure 5-2: Internal migration flows by country 
The conversion of these migration levels to migration rates (total internal migration/total population) 
provides a more comparable illustration of the importance of internal migration to NUTS2 population 
change (Figure 5-3). The UK remains dominant with an overall internal migration rate approaching 30 
per  1,000  head  of  population.    Germany‟s  internal  migration  rate  is  exceeded  by  a  number  of 
countries, including Denmark, Greece, Norway and Sweden.  Amongst the larger countries, with a 
relatively large number of NUTS2 regions, Italy stands out as having a relatively low level of internal 
migration rate as does Poland. 
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Figure 5-3: Internal migration rates by country 
Within each country‟s NUTS2 geographical system, there are significant spatial differences between 
the rates of migration being experienced.  This variation and its potential to change over time due to 
social, economic, political and climatic conditions is a key component of the DEMIFER analysis.  
Figure  5-4  disaggregates  the  internal  migration  rates  of  Figure  5-3  into  a  „range‟  of  values 97 
representing the minimum and maximum out-migration rates experienced by NUTS2 regions in each 
country. There are some large differences between the highest and lowest rates of out-migration, in 
some cases reflecting small numbers associated with non-contiguous, NUTS2 regions (e.g. Spain), in 
other cases reflecting the importance of a dominant region (e.g. London in the UK). 
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Figure 5-4: Out-migration rates: NUTS2 average, maximum and minimum by country 
A complete array of ODAS out-migration rates has been produced for each of the 23 countries.  These 
provide the base-period migration rates from which each of the five scenarios is run.  A number of 
stages have been required to derive these rates, as follows: 
(i)  Wherever possible, an origin-destination array of inter-NUTS migration flows for 2006 has 
provided the starting point for out-migration rate estimation.  Where 2006 information has not 
been available, data have been taken from the nearest available year (2005 in the case of Italy, 
2001 in the case of Portugal and Greece). 
(ii)  Using the available time series of OD migration data for each country the most recent trend in 
both migration flows and migration rates has been examined.  This has enabled a weighted 
estimate of the „average‟ migration rate for 2005-2010 to be derived. Figure 5-5, for example, 
illustrates the time series of total internal migration flows and the corresponding rates for 
NUTS2 regions in the Netherlands. The trend for 2004-2006 has been extrapolated to 2007-
20008 and then an average of the migration rate over the 2004-2008 period has been used as a 
„differential‟ to apply to subsequent 2006 estimates  − producing the 2005-2010 base period 
rates. 
(iii)  Migration flow data by origin, age and sex (OAS) has been used in combination with the 
corresponding OD matrix to derive a full ODAS array of internal migration flows. 98 
(iv)  Population data by NUTS2 region, age and sex (OAS) has then been combined with the 
ODAS migration array to produce a corresponding array of ODAS out-migration rates.   With 
population data only available to age 85+, migration rates for older age-groups (85-89, 90-94, 
95-99 and 100+) have been set at the 85+ age-group level. The „differential‟ detailed in (ii) 
above has been applied to these „2006-based‟ rates to produce an estimated equivalent for the 
base-period 2005-2010. 
(v)  The  full  ODAS  array  of  out-migration  rates  has  been  provided  as  direct  input  to  the 
MULTIPOLES model. 
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Figure 5-5: Internal migration flows and rate, Netherlands, 2001-2006 
An illustration of the nature of the data being produced is illustrated below.  In Figure 5-6, the age 
profile of out-migration rates for males in Közép-Magyarország is presented with alternative profiles 
for each of the remaining 6 NUTS2 regions in Hungary.  Similarly, in  Figure 5-7, out-migration 
profiles for Burgenland to all other NUTS2 regions in Austria are presented. 
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Figure 5-6: Out-migration rate profiles, Közép-Magyarország, Hungary 99 
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Figure 5-7: Out-migration rate profiles, Burgenland, Austria 
5.4  NUTS2 destination attractiveness 
In  the  case  of  inter-NUTS2  internal  migration,  the  Policy  Scenarios  implemented  by  the 
MULTIPOLES  model  are  driven  by  adjustments  to  the  relative  attractiveness  of  individual 
destinations  under  varying  assumptions.  The  attractiveness  of  an  individual  NUTS2  region  is 
measured using a destination attractiveness ratio (DAR), which is calculated as: 
DAR = Share of migration inflow/Share of population        (5.1) 
Within each country there is significant variation between the DAR values for NUTS2 regions. Figure 
5-8 illustrates this variation.  Again, outlying values comprise a mixture of relatively small areas plus 
dominant destinations within a country. 100 
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Figure 5-8: Destination Attractiveness Ratios – minimum and maximum by country 
5.5  Scenario development 
The policy framework for the DEMIFER scenarios consists of a Status Quo (STQ) Scenario plus four 
alternative scenarios which replicate different trajectories for the development of Europe‟s market and 
social structure.  Two scenarios, Growing Social Europe (GSE) and Limited Social Europe (LSE) 
assume  greater  cohesion  between  regions  and  a  convergence  in  the  relative  attractiveness  of 
individual NUTS2 regions as migrant destinations.  Different scales of cohesion and convergence are 
reflected in the two scenarios. A further two scenarios assume the opposite, with expanding market 
economies  leading  to  less  cohesion  between  regions  and  greater  divergence  in  the  relative 
attractiveness of NUTS2 regions as migrant destinations.  Figure 5-9 provides an illustration of how 
the  „range‟  of  DAR  values  is  affected  by  the  alternative  scenarios,  converging  in  the  first  two, 
diverging in the second. 101 
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Figure 5-9: Scenario development – internal migration 
For  MULTIPOLES,  the  base  period  DAR  value  for  each  NUTS2  region  is  modified  over  the 
projection period (2005-10 to 2045-50) leading to greater convergence or divergence in country-wide 
DAR values.  These modified DAR values apply appropriate weights to the ODAS migration rate 
arrays to change the pattern and distribution of migration flows between NUTS2 regions in each 
country.  At present, the „level‟ of migration remains unchanged, with scenarios modifying only the 
range of values and not the scale. 
A series of maps show the DAR values for the benchmark period, 2005-10 (Figure 5-10), and for the 
scenarios in 2045-50. Figure 5-11a presents the DARs for the GSE Scenario. Figure 5-11b presents 
the DARs for the EME Scenario. Figure 5-11c presents the DARs for the LSE Scenario. Figure 5-11d 
presents the DARs for the CME Scenario. Detailed inspection of the maps reveals how the DAR 
geography varies across the scenarios in the planned fashion. 102 
 
Figure 5-10: Regional destination attractiveness for 2005-10 103 
 
Figure 5-11: Regional destination attractiveness for 2045-50: GSE, EME, LSE, and CME scenarios 104 
6.  INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION SCENARIOS 
6.1  Introduction 
Since the Schengen agreement of 1985 (which effectively started in 1995) people are allowed to move 
freely inside the container of Schengen countries. Working in Germany, living in Belgium and family 
visits in Luxembourg: it is all possible. With the exception of Romania and Bulgaria, people can 
migrate between the countries of the ESPON space with a minimum of regulations. However, with 
respect to the migration between the ESPON space and the rest of the world legal constraints play an 
important role. Especial in situations of economic recession the European countries are inclined the 
tighten the rules on entrance (notably of asylum seekers), while in times of a booming economy ( 
labour) migrants are given a hearty welcome. Given the fact that these two types of international 
migration happen in a completely differential judicial context, having major consequences on the 
amount and direction of migration flows, the assumptions on these two types of migration has been 
made separately (and in the wake of it also the methodology of modelling).        
The  section  on  international  migration  starts  with  a  brief  overview  of  theories  on  international 
migration. These theories will be used in the formulation of the qualitative assumptions of the policy 
scenarios. In the next paragraph the migration between the countries of ESPON space is presented. 
The last paragraph elaborates on the migration between the ESPON space and the rest of the world. 
The qualitative and quantitative assumptions are to a large part inspired by the results of the expert 
opinion survey.  
6.2  Theoretical aspects of inter-country migration 
Several theories have been adopted to explain migration over time. Some of these theories will be 
briefly discussed in this chapter, but in their book Massey  et al. (1993) provide a more detailed 
description.  
The neoclassical economical theory states that international migration, like its internal counterpart, is 
caused by geographic differences in the supply of and demand for labour. Todaro (1969) explains 
migration in terms  of cost and benefit calculations. Migrants want to maximize their income, so 
differences in income levels between sending and receiving countries are an important explanatory 
variable. This theory is not only applicable for the individual level, but also on the household level, 
according to Stark and Taylor (1991). This theory generally deals with the macro level of countries, 
but similar micro level neoclassical economical theories have been developed where people choose to 
move to sub-country regions where they can be most productive, given their skills; working there 
leads to the highest wages.  105 
According to the new economic theory, migration decisions are primarily made in the context of 
families, households or some other group of related persons, which try to reduce feelings of relative 
deprivation and to diversify risks. By allocating members to a foreign labour market the economic 
position of this group will be strengthened due to the stream of remittances.  
Dual  market  theories  see  migration  flows  as  the  consequence  of  labour  demands  of  low  skilled 
workers  in  market  economies.  Jobs  at  the  bottom  of  the  ladder,  with  the  lowest  payment  and 
unpleasant conditions, are characterised by a structural shortage of workers. The native population in 
countries with a dual labour market refuses to work in such conditions, so immigrants are put in as the 
solution to this problem. According to Chiswick (1978) primary jobs can only be acquired by the 
indigenous workers. Due to a lack of human capital foreigners have to orientate on the secondary jobs 
and to compete with indigenous workers for those lower paid jobs. 
In the  World systems theory  international migration is placed in the context of the structure and 
expansion of a capitalist world market. The intrinsic nature of capitalist market economy leads to 
existence  of  low  paid  jobs  e.g.  in  mining  areas  and  low  level  industries.  This  causes  social 
disintegration and segregation. In such conditions, people consider international migration as a means 
to a better life and future. In the process of the expansion of capitalist markets, cultural / historical 
bounds develop between certain countries leading to migration flows between these countries.   
Migration is not an ending story, it is a perpetual phenomena, supported by networks. These networks 
are a set of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in the sending 
and receiving countries. These connections lower the costs and risks of migration by not only finding 
migrants  new  jobs,  but  also  with  finding  them  new  houses  or  supporting  them  through  the 
psychological impact of migration. Networks provide a framework in which the migrant is able to 
expand a new social circle. Other factors at play in the sending countries are the accustomisation to 
migration  and  appreciation  of  migrants  and  the  depletion  and  social  disintegration  of  the  local 
communities because of loss of human capital. Furthermore, in the receiving countries, employment 
needs in „immigrants jobs‟ in particular can be held responsible for continuing to encourage migrant 
flows. 
Wage differences between countries are not the only motivation for migration. The theory of planned 
behaviour, as founded by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), ascribes high importance to the reasoning and 
intentions of migration. Their model shows that attitudes, norms and perceived behavioural control 
influences behaviour through intention. Attitudes are steered by behavioural beliefs: the „subjective‟ 
probability that behaviour will lead to a certain outcome. Norms are steered by the social pressure to 
engage  (or  not)  in  a  specific  kind  of  behaviour.  The  perceived  behavioural  controls  refer  to  the 
perception of people on their ability to perform a given behaviour. Mainly based on this theory, De 106 
Jong (1981, 2000) constructed a general model of migration decision making (Figure 6-1). The model 
comprises  six  factors  that  determine  the  intention  and  behaviour  of  migration,  namely  migrant 
networks,  family  migration  norms,  gender  roles,  values/expectancies,  residential  satisfactions  and 
behavioural constraints/facilitators. These six factors in turn are influenced by individual, household 
and community characteristics. According to De Jong migration intentions can be seen as a proximate 
determinant of migration. 
 
Figure 6-1: General model of migration decision making (De Jong, 2000) 
Key elements in the migration process are the push and pull factors. Wage differences provide both 
push and pull factors. Although migration flows are invoked by these wage differences, migration 
carries the potential to strengthen those differences. It is possible that migration flows cause a labour 
surplus in the receiving country, which can negatively influence the (high) wages in this country. As a 
result, the gap in wages between the sending and receiving countries can narrow. An important push 
factor is the dissatisfaction of people in the sending country. In this dissatisfaction political, social and 
environmental elements can be identified. Pull factors are mainly of a social or environmental nature, 
pulling migrants to a better life and future.  107 
 
Figure 6-2: A theory of migration (Lee, 1966) 
Lee (1966) points to the fact that between the push and pull factors and between the origin and 
destination, a set of intervening obstacles might occur (Figure 6-2). These obstacles stem from the 
distance constraint. This refers not only to physical distance, but also to distance in the terms of 
financial and psychological costs. A person will only migrate if the revenues from migration are 
enough to overcome the distance constraint. For example, if the profits of migration, i.e. higher 
wages, are large enough, potential migrants will move to other countries. Networks play an important 
role, as they provide valuable information that may shift the balance of revenues and costs.  
Van de Kaa (1996) stated that the process of migration process is influenced by policies. Treaties, 
agreements, and other regulations have an effect on the amount of migrants and their destinations. So, 
the intervention of governments and other institutions, trying to steer international migration, must be 
taken into account when projecting international migration in the future. 
With  respect  to  the  spatial  distribution  of  migration,  Borjas  et  al.  (1992)  state  that  migration  is 
orientated at the larger cities. The reason is that cities offer better job opportunities and higher wages. 
In due time the concentration on cities might become weaker according to Card and Lewis (2005): 
although the arrival of immigrants is spatially very selective, migrants tend to spread across the „new‟ 
country after a few years.  
6.3  Policy Scenarios on migration between the countries of the ESPON space 
In this section the inter-country migration between the 31 ESPON countries is described. It will 
elaborate on the data and methods used to derive the qualitative and quantitative assumptions. 
6.3.1  Qualitative assumptions 
The policy scenarios stem from the combination of two underlying dimensions (namely “Economy-
Environment” and “Distribution-Fairness”), which leads to four scenario‟s. With respect to inter-
country migration four elements of international migration are identified, each leading to different 
assumptions in the four policy scenarios, as shown in Table 6-1. 108 
Table 6-1: Qualitative assumptions for inter-country migration (1) 
Trend or Policy  GSE  EME  LSE  CME 
Total Level of Inter-State Migration  Moderate  High  Low  Moderate 
Origins: Inter-State Out-Migration  Convergent  Divergent  Convergent  Divergent 
Destinations: Inter-State In-Migrations  Convergent  Divergent  Convergent  Divergent 
Explicit Inter-State Migration Policy  Some 
restrictions 
Free migration  Some 
restrictions 
Free migration 
 
The GSE Scenario gives the combination of high economic growth and a political orientation towards 
social and regional cohesion. High economic growth will lead to an increase of the GDP per capita. 
With the increase in household income, one of the major constraints for migration, money, will be 
reduced. Potential migrants have the opportunity to sell their homes, take their possessions and move 
across country borders. They seek new job opportunities or they want to seek a place for retirement. 
There is also a proportion of migrants who are dissatisfied in their home country and seek a new life 
elsewhere.  Therefore,  in GSE,  the  total  amount  of  migration  between the  ESPON  countries  will 
increase. However, the amount of inter-country migrants will not reach the same level as in the EME 
Scenario, due to the social and regional cohesion policies in existence. People are able to benefit from 
the economic prospects in more than a few specific regions or countries.  
The inclination of potential migrants to go to other countries is stimulated by explicit inter-country 
migration policies. In general legal restrictions to settle down in another country will be reduced, 
although some restrictions will remain. For example, the regulations on the type of migrants and the 
duration of stay will remain, for example in order to protect natives working in the lower segment of 
the labour market, the number of labour migrants is curtailed as large flows might lead to lower 
wages.    
The economic  and  political  situation  in  the  EME  scenario is  quite  different. Just as  in  the  GSE 
scenario, the economic prospects for the ESPON space as a whole are very good. However, on a 
regional scale heterogeneity exists in the economic situation. This is not the same across the regions in 
Europe because some regions benefit more from the economic growth than others. Potential migrants 
are aware of better possibilities in some regions compared with other regions. This disparity makes it 
more profitable to migrate to those flourishing regions. In general, the large differentials in regional 
economic prospects in the ESPON territory have a stimulating on the total amount of international 
migration.  
Policies  oriented  at  regional  competitiveness  have  a  strong  influence  on  origin  and  destination 
patterns. In contrast with the GSE scenario there is no convergence on the economic prospects of 
regions. On the one hand, migrants are attracted to regions with the highest economic growth. On the 109 
other hand, regions that are now performing well do it even better in the future. As a result, migration 
between those booming regions will increase in the future, while migration between lagging regions 
will  be  tempered.  This  will  lead  to  a  divergence  in  both  the  origin  and  destination  patterns  of 
international migration. For the UK, for example, the share of international migrants moving to Inner 
London will increase in the future. Migrants will „shop‟ between regions, comparing the opportunities 
offered by each, before decided on the one which suits their needs best. 
In the political field the orientation on competitiveness will promote free movement which is made 
possible by a minimum of regulations. For example, absolutely no restrictions apply for people who 
want to work in different countries. In fact, free movement is already common in the Schengen 
countries and so in this scenario only remnants of regulations will be removed.  
The future according to the LSE scenario is a completely different story. Although the social and 
regional cohesion policy still exists, like in GSE, the economic prospects are strongly tempered. The 
challenges of the climate change have not been met and the „end of oil‟ energy problems arise more 
and more. The regional cohesion policy makes sure that although every region of the ESPON space 
has its share of the problems, policies are developed in order to support the most vulnerable regions 
by  all  kinds  of  measures.  Due  to  the  effectiveness  of  these  policies  on  regional  cohesion,  the 
economic differences between the regions will be smaller than now. All this has a negative effect on 
migration: a lack of economic opportunities in general in combination with the absence of specific 
regions who outperform most other regions. So, people have more trouble selling their houses, do not 
have enough money to start a new life in another country and do not see a better future in other 
regions.  
The patterns of origin and destination of international migration between the countries of the ESPON 
space will show a tendency towards convergence. The policy oriented at cohesion makes the regions 
economically more equal. Therefore, the non-existence of large differentials between regions leads to 
the absence of motives to move to another region over the border. Of course, some regions will still 
attract more migrants, so the economic differences will not disappear completely.   
As  in  the  GSE  scenario  policies  on  international  migration  are,  more-or-less,  restrictive.  These 
restrictions stem from a protection of the national labour market, so the scarce jobs will be allocated 
to the native population. Due to legal barriers, people are no longer free to move across the ESPON 
space. Regulations especially apply to the duration of stay in a foreign country: labour migrants are 
only allowed to work here for a few years.  
In the CME scenario the economic situation is again gloomy, as environmental problems have grown 
and obstruct economic growth. The economy has major trouble coping with climate change and the 110 
lack  of  natural  resources. People  have less  money  and  therefore face financial  constraints  in  the 
migration  process.  Due  to  policies  trying  to  increase  regional  competitiveness,  the  economic 
differences between the regions will increase. In contrast to the LSE scenario, the heterogeneity of 
regions makes it profitable to migrate to those regions with high economic growth and an abundance 
of jobs, therefore, the number of migrants will be somewhat higher than in that scenario. However, 
compared  with  the  other  economic  market  oriented  scenario  (the  EME  scenario),  the  profits  of 
migration are much lower and consequently the flows much smaller. As in that scenario, the origin 
and destination patterns of international migration show signs of divergence over time. Regions with a 
strong  economy  will  attract  more  migrants.  Certain  regions  will  be  more  exposed  to  the  general 
deterioration of the economic situation in the ESPON space, and the decreasing attractiveness of these 
regions lead to a decrease in the number of international migrants. Other regions, with a more stable 
economy, will profit from these developments.  
With the focus of policy on competiveness, explicit inter-country migration policies will be reduced to 
a  minimum.  So,  regions  and  countries  will  have  to  compete  with  each  other  in  order  to  attract 
migrants. The lack of restrictive policies reducing migration flows creates a stimulus for people to live 
in other counties, to work in different regions and move all across Europe.  
6.3.2  Quantitative assumptions 
The qualitative assumptions described above have to be transformed into quantitative assumptions on 
international  migration  for  the  projection  period  (2005  up  to  2050)  for  each  of  the  four  policy 
scenarios. In order to quantify the assumptions, outmigration rates have been computed which equate 
to the „risk‟ of the population living in a specific region within the ESPON space migrating to another 
region in another country within the ESPON space, distinguished by 5-year age group and sex.   
In order to be able to make quantitative assumptions on trends in outmigration rates, it is necessary to 
have these rates for the base period (i.e. 2005). However, migration statistics proved to be one of the 
most  unreliable  and  unstable  statistics.  Two  main  factors  contribute  to  this  situation:  Firstly  the 
definition of migrants is different between countries. Some countries will define a migrant if they stay 
a  couple  of  months  in  another  country,  others  only  mention  migrants  if  they  move  indefinitely. 
Secondly, some national statistical offices proved to be more reliable than others. The differences 
between emigration from (country/region) A to B and immigration from B to A can therefore be large. 
The calculation of a reliable set of migration data is therefore a huge assignment.  
Eurostat has funded a project called Mimosa (modelling migration and migrant populations), carried 
out  by  the  Netherlands  Interdisciplinary  Demographic  Institute,  Central  European  Forum  for 
Migration and Population Research, the Southampton Statistical Sciences Research Institute and the 
Université  Catholique  de  Louvain.  This  project  looked  at  the  available  data  and  definition  of 111 
migration statistics in the 31 ESPON countries. The project created matrices of migration flows and 
population, specified by sex, citizenship, age and country of birth. The DEMIFER team would like to 
thank the Mimosa team for sharing these data. From the Mimosa project, data were received for the 
time period 2002-2008. These data contain migration flows between all the 31 ESPON countries that 
are age and sex specific. For the calculation of the base year, an average of the years 2004, 2005 and 
2006  was  made.  In  such  a  way,  the  ASOD  matrices  (age-sex-origin-destination)  matrices  where 
constructed. Table 6-2 shows the Mimosa total migration data, averaged for 2004, 2005 and 2006.112 
 
Table 6-2: Total migration data, Mimosa 2004 - 2006 
From \ To AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK EU27+4 Rest Total
AT 299 1367 1651 40 568 11303 210 33 580 128 824 481 3001 147 23 963 61 50 53 27 11 568 99 2616 302 4688 276 532 2289 1627 34817 34799 69616
BE 353 88 417 45 126 3431 371 16 2474 229 7938 231 111 270 24 2014 2 75 3964 43 16 5929 164 1250 193 210 400 62 228 4003 34674 21938 56613
BG 1753 223 219 532 1467 7616 85 12 13522 50 981 983 96 97 12 4537 1 76 11 3 17 447 85 496 63 1707 113 5 1179 2722 39106 24118 63223
CH 2088 502 174 64 335 14066 709 22 5792 469 9077 376 199 407 34 13212 26 74 256 48 24 1378 262 1323 456 347 812 592 1071 7522 61716 21629 83345
CY 24 66 1566 65 23 217 14 17 18 24 184 3131 181 75 1 54 0 9 2 4 41 58 12 102 9 1262 57 15 24 2955 10211 24972 35183
CZ 1680 386 4658 603 114 7396 195 18 624 64 1528 320 181 204 21 1041 0 74 25 24 14 597 97 655 106 1837 154 26 10796 4792 38230 150001 188231
DE 19826 3281 6183 18877 322 2493 2759 432 11980 1115 13380 12543 11639 1622 180 19580 57 1367 2568 563 87 9824 1716 72779 5523 14387 3330 1376 4916 22205 266910 176552 443461
DK 259 322 52 543 24 84 2132 89 722 427 952 145 134 192 1018 370 4 174 58 147 17 475 2334 488 92 111 5371 11 234 2186 19165 12592 31757
EE 61 33 10 33 31 16 607 133 94 2627 108 11 19 43 20 158 0 54 16 294 5 117 165 29 11 19 437 0 20 1315 6486 4165 10651
ES 855 3546 1921 7369 43 130 11488 1278 30 770 11222 279 260 2101 50 2883 60 701 122 46 19 3161 637 1729 4346 7623 1296 46 393 17005 81411 130171 211582
FI 339 243 17 410 21 70 1720 290 772 632 405 76 99 204 34 316 1 76 22 149 6 371 493 89 38 12 3136 5 68 798 10916 3469 14385
FR 1155 7507 584 6254 115 603 15109 1198 87 9113 421 1038 613 1587 43 5861 12 166 5399 95 150 3218 451 4364 4224 1471 1082 140 1140 22050 95251 101431 196682
GR 473 199 432 200 3902 91 7959 176 13 395 102 889 89 85 2 836 1 35 33 10 35 1067 70 1172 51 640 552 13 158 4430 24109 14222 38331
HU 4206 411 170 492 169 92 15211 205 21 617 122 1972 172 212 9 884 1 9 24 12 11 693 89 254 119 2227 370 29 2418 3474 34695 31013 65708
IE 181 826 114 692 68 95 1329 190 28 1348 132 2133 178 69 6 582 3 990 54 198 26 512 67 2086 168 282 259 8 112 6887 19623 15129 34752
IS 40 16 3 23 0 7 176 1191 11 98 59 46 2 3 6 50 0 24 2 10 4 66 244 164 29 6 451 5 24 487 3247 773 4020
IT 1909 3301 275 18797 48 465 16660 698 26 6986 296 8194 656 373 778 46 35 235 372 100 152 1833 195 4480 419 1915 598 449 1199 6799 78288 45957 124245
LI 61 3 1 35 0 1 47 8 0 14 3 33 2 2 2 0 19 0 0 1 0 3 1 15 2 3 1 0 6 0 264 106 370
LT 265 201 96 173 34 86 4139 822 75 1705 100 443 66 14 3153 154 672 0 5 749 4 396 716 621 154 10 681 0 51 2923 18507 10637 29145
LU 80 2363 9 366 3 4 1887 108 13 92 57 2696 37 19 78 20 281 2 11 7 3 157 16 70 1104 27 88 21 13 795 10429 916 11345
LV 110 91 11 156 101 24 1890 324 451 225 113 408 25 13 582 48 291 4 369 18 4 152 164 92 16 9 279 0 50 1431 7449 11357 18807
MT 14 34 8 20 20 5 92 20 4 16 4 267 10 7 37 1 138 0 1 5 3 54 4 12 10 8 26 3 22 644 1490 2668 4158
NL 1007 11377 110 1646 68 467 11045 604 44 3569 325 3987 638 417 696 43 1303 3 99 151 49 42 629 2364 896 249 1032 67 454 7929 51310 37341 88651
NO 121 136 38 204 13 44 1048 2211 64 1271 948 425 62 41 70 309 194 0 229 15 67 8 469 691 57 75 4563 3 267 1944 15590 5607 21198
PL 8029 3962 213 2518 729 2943 124526 1689 13 6204 196 7310 1769 204 15648 1099 14952 16 277 89 107 22 6946 3317 162 64 4149 13 3041 42872 253079 79997 333076
PT 372 255 58 311 15 39 4709 159 8 9444 64 5080 44 22 91 54 609 2 83 2949 24 11 1498 88 121 114 192 8 83 4953 31459 17321 48781
RO 6064 592 858 546 532 894 19149 229 22 71695 88 4282 1024 2573 405 19 78378 2 12 35 7 47 692 187 184 255 351 11 6095 1682 196910 80503 277413
SE 622 383 33 879 85 123 2682 2450 164 1368 4332 1118 588 198 282 354 536 0 218 76 155 46 720 3826 1637 126 71 60 222 3747 27102 12657 39759
SI 726 179 11 408 8 30 1369 34 0 102 6 126 9 21 30 4 469 9 6 5 2 3 99 10 24 6 2 48 171 0 3918 1845 5763
SK 4275 387 181 4679 418 25734 9437 99 0 591 26 1070 181 1161 535 22 1123 8 11 27 8 0 575 161 259 82 255 122 28 5346 56805 18526 75331
UK 1500 1679 661 4150 3073 926 10303 2432 198 28990 1115 22134 5444 2697 13077 169 6376 0 2344 222 449 565 5522 1298 6011 2031 761 2973 119 1282 128501 175428 303929
EU27+4 58450 42802 19902 72735 10636 37986 308743 20889 2685 180280 14409 109210 30523 24456 42714 3819 158682 309 7851 16578 3402 1391 47596 17598 106176 21053 40394 33200 3649 38026 185521
Rest 60384 50381 12159 49280 6317 79587 252178 16942 2102 283391 10910 202819 34435 19048 14365 908 370686 59 6494 741 2512 1192 53060 15321 55851 32938 37843 40862 3569 23117 379153
Total 118833 93183 32061 122015 16953 117573 560922 37831 4787 463671 25320 312028 64958 43504 57079 4727 529368 368 14345 17319 5914 2583 100656 32919 162027 53990 78237 74062 7219 61143 564675113 
 
Table 6-3 presents the translation of the qualitative assumptions for the four elements of international 
migration into quantitative assumptions. 
Table 6-3: Qualitative assumptions for inter-country migration (2) 
Demographic 
component 
Trend or Policy  GROWING 
SOCIAL 
EUROPE 
EXPANDING 
MARKET 
EUROPE 
LIMITED 
SOCIAL 
EUROPE 
CHALLENG
ED MARKET 
EUROPE 
INTER-
STATE  
MIGRATION 
Total Level of 
Inter-State 
Migration 
Set levels to 
2050 
Set levels to 
2050 
Set levels to 
2050 
Set levels to 
2050 
  Origins: Inter-State 
Out-Migration 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
  Destinations: Inter-
State In-Migrations 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
  Explicit Inter-State 
Migration Policy 
EU policy  EU policy  Some national 
policy 
Some national 
policy 
 
In order to arrive at trends in outmigration rates for the scenario period, for each scenario levels for 
the sets of outmigration rates have been determined for the calendar year 2050. Compared with 2005, 
higher levels have been used for both the Growing Social Europe scenario and the Expanding Market 
Europe  scenario,  where the  last  one  has  been  allocated the  highest levels.  In  the  Limited  Social 
Europe scenario the levels of outmigration rates are somewhat lower than that of 2005, while in the 
Challenged Market Europe scenario the levels are more or less the same as those of 2005.   
Also the destination of the international migrants has to be determined. For this purpose the method of 
regional attractiveness was used. First, based on 2005 for each sending country the share of migrants 
going to destination countries was calculated. For example, with regard to the outmigration flows 
from Norway to other ESPON countries, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom have 
the biggest share. However, those destination countries do not have the same share with regard to the 
population in the ESPON space. Sweden for example contains round 2 percent of the total population 
of the ESPON space, but receives almost 30 percent of the outmigration flows of Norway. Dividing 
the migration share by the population share gives the regional attractiveness factor of Sweden for 
Norway, namely 16. These attraction factors are presented in Table 6-4 for the base year 2005. In 
each policy scenario the attraction factors will change in the period up to 2035. The way they change 
depends on the assumption on convergence or divergence belonging to each scenario. In the Global 
Social Europe scenario and Limited Social Europe scenario, the attraction factors convergence by 
50% while in the Expanding Market Europe scenario and the Challenged Market Europe scenario 
they diverge by 50%. Note, that this does not mean that 50% less or more migrants  will migrate to 
specific destination countries. Combining the adjusted attraction factors for each period (between 114 
 
2005 and 2050) with the population, delivers new figures on migration flows between the countries of 
the ESPON space.  
These  figures  on  migration  flows  between  the  countries  of  the  EPSPON  space  have  to  be 
distinguished into the NUTS2 regions of the sending countries and those of the receiving countries. 
This is done based on observed data from Eurostat and some national statistics institutes (and in some 
cases completed with some estimations). For each sending country the migration flows (to other 
countries) are split into regional numbers by using the latest observed regional division of emigrants. 
These regional migration flows to other countries now have to be split into the regions of the specific 
receiving country. This have been done by using the latest observations on the regional distribution of 
immigrants into that specific country. During the whole scenario period these distributions are kept 
constant, as dynamic distributions are hard to construct and rely on lots of assumptions.  115 
 
Table 6-4: Attraction factors, base year 
From \ To AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
Austria AT 0,4 2,6 3,2 0,8 0,8 2,0 0,6 0,3 0,2 0,4 0,2 0,6 4,3 0,5 1,1 0,2 23,9 0,2 1,7 0,2 0,4 0,5 0,3 1,0 0,4 3,1 0,4 3,7 6,0 0,4
Belgium BE 0,6 0,2 0,8 0,9 0,2 0,6 1,0 0,2 0,8 0,6 1,8 0,3 0,2 0,9 1,2 0,5 0,7 0,3 126,5 0,3 0,6 5,3 0,5 0,5 0,3 0,1 0,6 0,4 0,6 1,0
Bulgaria BG 2,8 0,3 0,4 9,2 1,8 1,2 0,2 0,1 4,0 0,1 0,2 1,1 0,1 0,3 0,5 1,0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,5 0,4 0,2 0,2 0,1 1,0 0,2 0,0 2,8 0,6
Switzerland CH 2,1 0,4 0,2 0,7 0,3 1,4 1,1 0,1 1,1 0,7 1,2 0,3 0,2 0,8 0,9 1,8 6,1 0,2 4,6 0,2 0,5 0,7 0,5 0,3 0,4 0,1 0,7 2,4 1,6 1,0
Cyprus CY 0,1 0,3 9,8 0,4 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,6 0,0 0,2 0,1 13,8 0,9 0,9 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,1 4,9 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0 2,8 0,3 0,4 0,2 2,5
Czech Republic CZ 2,7 0,5 7,9 1,1 2,1 1,2 0,5 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,2 0,7 0,9 0,2 0,0 0,3 0,8 0,1 0,5 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,1 1,1 0,2 0,2 25,8 1,1
Germany DE 4,6 0,6 1,5 4,8 0,8 0,5 1,0 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,4 2,1 2,2 0,7 1,2 0,6 3,1 0,8 10,6 0,5 0,4 1,1 0,7 3,6 1,0 1,3 0,7 1,3 1,7 0,7
Denmark DK 0,8 0,8 0,2 1,9 0,8 0,2 0,7 1,7 0,4 2,1 0,4 0,3 0,3 1,2 90,3 0,2 2,8 1,3 3,3 1,7 1,1 0,8 13,3 0,3 0,2 0,1 15,6 0,1 1,1 1,0
Estonia EE 0,6 0,2 0,1 0,3 3,3 0,1 0,6 1,9 0,2 38,7 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,8 5,2 0,2 0,2 1,2 2,8 9,9 1,1 0,6 2,8 0,1 0,1 0,1 3,8 0,0 0,3 1,7
Spain ES 0,7 2,0 1,5 6,0 0,4 0,1 0,9 1,5 0,1 0,9 1,1 0,1 0,2 3,0 1,1 0,3 10,3 1,3 1,7 0,1 0,3 1,2 0,9 0,3 2,4 2,1 0,9 0,1 0,4 1,8
Finland FI 1,9 1,1 0,1 2,6 1,3 0,3 1,0 2,5 26,3 0,7 0,3 0,3 0,4 2,3 5,4 0,3 1,0 1,0 2,2 3,0 0,7 1,1 4,9 0,1 0,2 0,0 16,1 0,1 0,6 0,6
France FR 0,7 3,8 0,4 4,5 0,8 0,3 1,0 1,2 0,3 1,1 0,4 0,5 0,3 2,0 0,8 0,5 1,9 0,3 62,6 0,2 2,0 1,0 0,5 0,6 2,1 0,4 0,6 0,4 1,1 1,9
Greece GR 1,2 0,4 1,2 0,6 108,6 0,2 2,0 0,7 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,8 0,2 1,5 0,1 1,8 1,4 0,3 0,6 0,1 0,6 1,3 0,1 0,6 1,5
Hungary HU 7,4 0,6 0,3 1,0 3,3 0,1 2,7 0,5 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,5 0,2 0,7 0,4 0,2 0,4 0,0 0,8 0,1 0,4 0,6 0,3 0,1 0,2 1,5 0,6 0,2 6,4 0,8
Ireland IE 0,6 2,0 0,4 2,4 2,4 0,2 0,4 0,9 0,5 0,8 0,6 0,9 0,4 0,2 0,6 0,3 2,1 7,2 3,0 2,1 1,7 0,8 0,4 1,4 0,4 0,3 0,7 0,1 0,5 3,0
Iceland IS 0,8 0,2 0,1 0,5 0,0 0,1 0,3 34,1 1,3 0,4 1,7 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,0 1,1 0,6 0,7 1,6 0,6 8,2 0,7 0,4 0,0 7,8 0,4 0,7 1,3
Italy IT 1,5 2,0 0,2 16,3 0,4 0,3 1,3 0,8 0,1 1,0 0,4 0,8 0,4 0,2 1,2 1,0 6,5 0,4 5,2 0,3 2,4 0,7 0,3 0,8 0,3 0,6 0,4 1,4 1,4 0,7
Liechtenstein LI 14,0 0,6 0,4 9,0 0,0 0,2 1,1 2,7 0,2 0,6 1,0 1,0 0,4 0,4 1,1 0,0 0,6 0,0 0,0 0,8 1,3 0,4 0,6 0,7 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,0 2,0 0,0
Lithuania LT 0,9 0,5 0,3 0,7 1,2 0,2 1,4 4,1 1,5 1,1 0,5 0,2 0,2 0,0 20,5 14,2 0,3 0,0 0,4 8,8 0,3 0,7 4,2 0,4 0,4 0,0 2,0 0,0 0,3 1,3
Luxembourg LU 0,5 10,9 0,1 2,4 0,2 0,0 1,1 1,0 0,5 0,1 0,5 2,1 0,2 0,1 0,9 3,2 0,2 2,9 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,5 0,2 0,1 5,1 0,1 0,5 0,5 0,1 0,6
Latvia LV 0,9 0,6 0,1 1,4 9,4 0,2 1,6 4,0 22,5 0,4 1,5 0,4 0,2 0,1 9,1 10,9 0,3 6,2 7,3 2,7 0,5 0,6 2,3 0,2 0,1 0,0 2,1 0,0 0,6 1,6
Malta MT 0,6 1,1 0,4 0,9 9,3 0,2 0,4 1,2 0,9 0,1 0,3 1,4 0,3 0,2 3,0 1,0 0,8 0,6 0,1 4,2 0,4 1,1 0,3 0,1 0,3 0,1 1,0 0,5 1,4 3,6
Netherlands NL 1,2 10,7 0,1 2,2 0,9 0,4 1,3 1,1 0,3 0,8 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,4 1,7 1,4 0,2 0,9 0,3 3,2 0,2 1,0 1,3 0,6 0,8 0,1 1,1 0,3 0,8 1,3
Norway NO 0,5 0,4 0,2 0,9 0,6 0,1 0,4 13,2 1,5 1,0 5,8 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,5 33,9 0,1 0,4 2,2 1,1 0,9 0,7 0,9 0,6 0,2 0,1 16,3 0,1 1,6 1,0
Poland PL 2,0 0,7 0,1 0,7 2,0 0,6 3,0 0,6 0,0 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,0 7,3 7,4 0,5 0,9 0,2 0,4 0,1 0,1 0,8 1,4 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,0 1,1 1,4
Portugal PT 0,7 0,4 0,1 0,7 0,3 0,1 0,9 0,5 0,1 3,5 0,2 1,3 0,1 0,0 0,4 2,9 0,2 0,8 0,4 103,3 0,2 0,4 1,5 0,3 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,2 1,3
Romania RO 1,9 0,1 0,3 0,2 1,8 0,2 0,6 0,1 0,0 4,3 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,7 0,3 0,2 3,4 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 2,9 0,1
Sweden SE 1,4 0,7 0,1 2,2 2,1 0,2 0,6 8,4 2,3 0,6 15,4 0,3 1,0 0,4 1,3 22,2 0,2 0,2 1,2 3,1 1,2 2,1 0,8 15,4 0,8 0,2 0,1 0,6 0,8 1,2
Slovenia SI 11,4 2,2 0,2 7,1 1,4 0,4 2,1 0,8 0,0 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,3 0,9 1,8 1,0 31,7 0,2 1,5 0,1 1,0 0,8 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,7 4,2 0,0
Slovakia SK 4,6 0,3 0,2 5,5 5,0 22,3 1,0 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 1,0 1,1 0,7 0,2 2,1 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,8
United Kingdom UK 0,7 0,6 0,3 2,2 16,3 0,4 0,5 1,8 0,6 2,6 0,8 1,4 1,9 1,0 12,4 2,2 0,4 0,0 2,6 1,9 0,7 5,5 1,3 1,1 0,6 0,8 0,1 1,3 0,2 0,9  116 
 
6.4  Policy scenarios on migration between the ESPON  space and the rest of the world 
In this paragraph the Extra-Europe migration between the 31 ESPON countries and the rest of the 
world  is  described.  It  will  elaborate  on  the  data  and  methods  used  to  derive  the  qualitative  and 
quantitative assumptions.  
6.4.1  Qualitative assumptions 
As  in  the  other  assumptions,  the  scenarios  are  based  on  two  underlying  dimensions  (namely 
„Economy-Environment‟  and  „Distribution-Fairness‟),  which  leads  to  the  four  scenarios.  For  the 
extra-Europe migration, four driving forces are identified, as shown in Table 6-5. 
Table 6-5: Qualitative assumptions for extra-Europe migration 
Trend or Policy  GSE  EME  LSE  CME 
Total Level of Extra-Europe Migration  Moderate  High  Low  Moderate 
Origins: Emigration  Stable 
origins 
Divergent 
Origins 
Stable origins  Divergent 
Origins 
Destinations: Immigrations  Stable 
Destinations 
Divergent 
Destinations 
Stable 
Destinations 
Divergent 
Destinations 
Explicit Extra-Europe Migration Policy  Selective 
entry 
Free entry  Restricted 
entry 
Moderate entry 
 
The Growing Social Europe scenario is the one with high economic growth and a focus on social and 
regional  cohesion.  The  significant  increase  of  the  GDP  per  capita  in  the  countries  belonging  to 
ESPON space works as a strong attraction factor to potential immigrants from all over the world. A 
future of good economic prospects by living in the ESPON space, is an important goal to achieve. The 
focus of policy on the social and region cohesion also provides a social security system, which is 
rarely present in the sending countries. The pull factors are even becoming stronger over time. This is 
partly caused by a growing demand for labourers, as extra Europe migrants are seen as a solution to 
the higher demand for care in view of the ageing of the population of the ESPON area. A tolerant 
political  climate  induces  more  migrants  coming  to  the  ESPON  space  for  reasons  of  family 
reunification (with relatives who have come earlier to Europe). However, too much immigrants with 
no specific skills might make the social security system too expensive, so some selectiveness is used 
in order to prevent the arrival of migrants that are not able to make a profitable contribution to the 
economy.  The  patterns  of  origin  of  the  emigrants  coming  from  the  rest  of  the  world  and  the 
destination  of  them  inside  the  ESPON  territory  will  be  more  or  less  stable.  Current  patterns  of 
migrations  flow  between  specific  countries  inside  ESPON  space  on  the  one  hand  and  specific 
countries in the rest of the world on the other hand are already well established and have the tendency 
to prolong into the future. Especially the historic bounds of several European countries with their 117 
 
former colonies tend to influence the migration flows also in the future. For example, the former 
colonies in North-West Africa keep their existing migration linkages with France.  
 In  the  Expanding  Market  Europe  scenario  also  a  booming  economy  is  assumed.  The  economic 
prospects are good  and the majority of the population receives a good income. But the political 
orientation  is  different  as  the  market  philosophy  causes  differences  in  the  speed  of  economic 
improvements across Europe. Some countries and regions benefit more than others. Also in the rest of 
the world stronger countries and regions profit more from a global economic growth than others. 
These strong economic differentials between the ESPON space and the rest of the world have a 
stimulating effect on the size of migration flows. Moreover, migrants will have a strong tendency to 
„shop‟ between countries and regions. As they can earn a much higher wage in a some specific 
countries and regions within them, they become quite be selective in their choice of destination. With 
the lack of social and regional cohesion in this scenario, every region within the ESPON space will try 
to benefit the most from the economic situation. The regions will compete with each other in order to 
attract the „best‟ migrants for their situation. Labour migrants, with a high education, are favoured 
above the less desired migrants, like refugees. This will lead to a divergence in the patterns of origins 
and  destinations  of  international  migrants.  The  policy  in  general  has  a  positive  attitude  towards 
immigration as it is good for the economic growth. So this leads to a destruction of nearly  all legal 
constraints, so potential migrants are able to enter the ESPON space freely.  
The  Limited  Social  Europe  scenario  shows  a  completely  other  situation  with  gloomy  economic 
prospects and detrimental effects of environmental issues. The climate change, the shortage of natural 
resources and the rising prices will have negative influences on the economy and the social well 
being. The economy will not collapse but it will attract less migrants from other parts of the world. 
Potential migrants don‟t have the money to move to Europe and the economic differences between 
ESPON and the rest of the world will be smaller than they used to be. The natural inertia, that needs 
to be overcome with migration, will be bigger, compared to the benefits of migration.  
With the gloomy economic situation, the need to protect Europe and its weaker regions becomes 
stronger. The  cohesion  policy  will  try  to  protect the  regions, leading  to  a  much  more  restrictive 
immigration policies. Only migrants that can make a large contribution to the economy are allowed to 
enter 'fortress Europe'. Illegal migration will be controlled and immigrants face much more rules and 
regulation on entry than before. Current patterns of migration flows between countries inside and 
outside the ESPON space are kept intact, as these migrants are familiar with specific countries and 
know the ways to enter them.   118 
 
In the Challenged Market Europe scenario the economic prospects are not much better. This scenario 
is characterised by policies trying to increase regional competitiveness. This leads to greater regional 
differentials in economic prospects than in the previous scenario. So for potential migrants living in 
other parts of the world, migration to specific countries of the EPSON territory (and specific regions 
within them) may lead to a significant better financial situation. This has a stimulating effect on 
migration flows, compared with the Limited Social Europe scenario. In order to promote regional 
competitiveness, legal constraints on entry of the countries of the ESPON space are minimal and 
existing restrictive rules are withdrawn. So regions compete with each other in order to attract the 
'best' migrants. As a result of this intense competition, origin and destination patterns will change and 
become more specific: more oriented on the strong economic regions, both within the ESPON space 
as outside it.  
6.4.2  Quantitative assumptions 
Two kinds of migration flows have to be computed: the immigration coming from the rest of the 
world and the emigration towards the rest of the world. The immigration has been compiled based on 
assumptions on immigration numbers while the emigration has been derived from the assumptions on 
emigration rates.  
Again, the qualitative assumptions must be translated into quantitative assumptions. 
Table 6-6: Quantitative assumptions for extra-Europe migration 
Trend or Policy  GSE  EME  LSE  CME 
Total Level of Extra-
Europe Migration 
Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050  Set levels to 2050 
Origins: Emigrations  Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
Set origin 
attraction 
Destinations: 
Immigrations 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
Set destination 
attraction 
Explicit Extra-Europe 
Migration Policy 
Restrictive policy   Permissive policy  Restrictive policy   Permissive policy 
 
Assumptions on Immigration 
From the Mimosa data the number of extra-Europe immigration for the base year 2005 could be 
calculated. In order to eliminate random fluctuations, 2005 was computed as an average of the years 
2004-2006. This led to a total number of 2.3 million immigrants. For the scenario period, this total 
amount is assumed to increase or decrease up to year 2035 (the same year as used in the part on inter-
country migration). In the Growing Social Europe scenario, with a moderate level of immigrants, the 
number of immigrants is assumed to rise to about 3.5 million. According to the Expanding Market 119 
 
Europe scenario the rise is even higher, namely:4.5 million. In the Limited Social Europe scenario a 
fall in immigration is foreseen to 1.5. At last, in the Challenged Market Europe scenario a slight rise 
to 2.5 million immigrants is assumed. The number of  4.5 million immigrants in the Expanding 
Market Europe scenario seems quite large, but also the number of emigrants (as shown  below) will 
increase,  so  the  rise  in net  migration is less impressive.  In  the  period after  2035  the  number  of 
immigrants are kept constant. The method to split the immigrants coming to certain countries into 
immigration to the specific NUTS2 regions of those countries is similar to the method used for the 
regional splitting of interstate migrants (see previous paragraph).   
Assumptions on Emigration 
The construction of emigration is, in contrast to immigration, not in terms of absolute numbers, but 
based on the calculation of emigration rates. Again, the Mimosa project proved to be a very good help 
with providing the required extra-Europe migration statistics. From this source,  the total number of 
emigrations could be calculated for each country. These numbers could be split into regional numbers, 
based on observations on the regional distribution of all emigrants in a country). These (sex and age 
specific) numbers on emigration for each NUTS2 could be related to the population stock in the base 
year 2005, in order to compute emigration rates for extra-Europe migration.  
According to the policy scenarios the set of emigration rates have a different development during the 
scenario period. In the two market oriented scenarios, the Growing Social Europe scenario and the 
Expanding Market Scenario a rise in the emigration rates is assumed, with the latter having a steeper 
rise. In the other two scenarios a fall is assumed, with the Limited Social Europe scenario having a 
larger decrease than the Challenged Market Europe scenario.  
6.5  Results 
6.5.1  Migration between the countries of the ESPON  space 
Using the quantitative assumptions lots of data on international migration flows between the regions 
of the ESPON space have been compiled. Unfortunately, it is impossible to show all tables, graphs 
and maps. So, only a selection will be shown. 
The outmigration rates for males and females aged 30-34 year in the base year 2005 are presented in 
Figure 6-3.  It is clear that the Eastern countries show a higher outmigration rates. In most regions of 
the Southern part of Europe the outmigration rates are quite low. In general, the outmigration rates for 
men are higher than those for women. This is due to the fact that more males tend to migrate for 
reasons as demand for labour. It can also be observed that regions near the country border tend to 120 
 
show higher outmigration rates. This seems logical, as the distance to the neighbouring countries is 
much shorter. 
   
Figure  6-3:  Emigration  rates  (per  1000),  30-34 
years, males and females 
 
In order to give an idea of the effect of convergence and divergence assumptions in the policy 
scenario, two graphs are shown on the percentage distribution of male migrants from Germany to 
other countries of the ESPON space (Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5). It is assumed that the distribution of 
migrants  will  converge  in  the  Growing  Social  Europe  and  Limited  Social  Europe scenarios  and 
diverge in the Expanding Market Europe and Challenged Market Europe scenario. It is obvious that 
the  majority  of  migrants  from  Germany  migrate  to  Poland    Austria  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
However, the shares of these countries in the specific scenarios are quite different according to the 
two graphs.  121 
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Figure 6-4: Destination Pattern German Migrants (GSE and LSE) 
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Figure 6-5: Destination Pattern German Migrants (EME and CME) 
6.5.2  Migration between the ESPON  space and the rest of the world 
Based on the qualitative assumptions immigration flows into the ESPON space and emigration flows 
to the rest of the world have been compiled. It is impossible to show all tables, graphs and maps, so a 
selection of these migration flows will be shown.  
In order to illustrate the distribution and amount of immigrants in the regions of the ESPON space, 
five maps have been drawn (Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7), in which each black dot represents 100 
migrants. Figure 6-6 shows the immigration from outside Europe to the 287 NUTS2 regions in the 122 
 
ESPON areas in the calendar year 2005. In the map the major cities in Europe , such as Madrid, Paris 
and London come up. Also the coastal areas of Spain receive a large amount of immigrants; surely the 
proximity of Africa plays an important role. Other regions receiving a lot of immigrants are the north 
Italy, the United Kingdom, western Netherlands and some parts in Germany. 
 
Figure 6-6: Extra-Europe Immigration, 2005 
Note: the dots are random placed in the NUTS2 regions. Dots do not represent placement in NUTS3, LAU1 or 
LAU2. 123 
 
 
Figure 6-7: Extra-Europe Immigration, 2050, GSE, EME, LSE, and CME 
Note: the dots are random placed in the NUTS2 regions. Dots do not represent placement in NUTS3, LAU1 or 
LAU2. 124 
 
The future according to the four policy scenarios are depicted in Figure 6-7. Immediately, it becomes 
clear that the immigration assumptions have a great influence on the distribution and size of migration 
flows  into  the  ESPON  space.  Especially  in  the  Expanding  Market  scenario,  with  the  highest 
immigration numbers, several NUTS2 regions stand out as one great black area.  
As was mentioned earlier in connection with fertility, the NUTS2 region scale hides considerable 
variety  in  sub-regional  experience  of  migration  at  all  scales.  Here  we  illustrate  the  interesting 
migration dynamics visible in London, drawing on our case study (Figure 6-8). London comprises 
four NUTS2 regions but it makes more sense to study the whole of Greater London using the lowest 
tier unit of local government, the London Borough. The first map in Figure 6-8 shows the pattern of 
net  migration  exchanges  within  London.  Inner  London  boroughs  lose  migrants  to  Outer  London 
boroughs. For migration between London and the Rest of the UK shown in the second map in Figure 
6-8 the pattern of net exchanges is partially reversed. About half of Inner London‟s boroughs, housing 
the country‟s business, government and cultural elite, gain from the rest of the country, attracting, for 
example,  graduates  from  UK  universities  outside  London.  The  other  Inner  and  Outer    London 
boroughs experience net migration losses as families move outwards to better and cheaper housing in 
the rest of South East England and to neighbouring regions of the South West and East of England. 
The third map shows the migration exchanges between London boroughs and the rest of the world. 
Most boroughs show gains, particularly parts of Inner and West London. Some boroughs on the 
southern  edge,  however,  are  estimated  to  experience  net  emigration.  International  migration  thus 
replaces losses from internal migration in London. 125 
 
 
 
Figure 6-8: Net migration exchanges for London Boroughs within London, between London and the Rest 
of the UK and between London and the rest of the world 126 
 
7.  LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION SCENARIOS  
7.1  Introduction 
In the second half of the twentieth century, impressive changes in labour force participation have been 
witnessed. Since 1960, all over Europe, male labour force participation has been decreasing while 
female participation has been on the increase. Up to 1980, the decrease of male participation was 
much larger than the increase in female participation, while after 1980, female increase surpassed 
male decrease. How labour force participation will develop in the future, depends on trends in the 
determinants of labour force participation. This chapter describes the assumptions on labour force 
participation underlying the four policy scenarios  
The  labour  force  comprises  both  persons  in  employment  and  unemployed  persons.  In  general, 
fluctuations in the participation rate (the sum of employment and unemployment rate) are caused by 
changes in participation in three broad categories of inactive persons. First, young people in education 
and initial training; second, older retired or disabled persons; and third, women who have left the 
labour  market  after  becoming  mother.  The  assumptions  of  the  policy  scenario  on  labour  force 
participation are predominantly formulated in terms of developments in these three categories.  
This part of the report will start with a overview of determinants of labour force participation. These 
determinants will be used in the formulation of the qualitative assumptions of the policy scenarios. In 
the  formulation  of  the  quantitative  assumptions  the  results  of  the  expert  opinion  survey  play  an 
important role. To conclude this part, the results for labour force participation in the regions of the 
ESPON space will be presented. 
7.2  Theoretical aspects of labour force participation 
The trend in labour force participation is the outcome of developments in several determinants of 
labour force participation. They can be grouped into four main categories: economic, demographic, 
socio-cultural and institutional determinants. The importance and effects of the determinants may 
differ by sex, age group and country. 
7.2.1  Economy 
Macro-economic factors are of predominant importance in the analysis of employment trends. The 
performance of the labour market is related to the extent that economic growth leads to the creation of 
jobs  (or  in  case  of  a  negative  development  to  the  destruction  of  employment).  Based  on  the 
relationship between economic growth and the process of job creation, it is possible to assess how 
many  jobs  will  be  created  as  economic  recovery  takes  place  and  what  rate  of  growth  might  be 127 
 
required to achieve a given rate of job creation. It should be noted that this relationship might not 
necessarily  be  stable  over  time  or  be  the  same  across  countries.  Fluctuations  in  the  numbers  in 
employment in the EU coincided with variations in the rate of growth of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) over the past thirty years (European Commission, 1994). Upturns in output growth have on 
every occasion been followed by an increase in employment growth while downturns have led to a 
reduction of growth or in some cases to an absolute decline of numbers in employment. 
Since the second oil-crisis in 1979-1980, productivity growth has slackened. This slowdown might be 
related to shifts in the structure of the economy. There has been a long-term shift of employment 
away from agriculture to industry and then from industry to services. The service sector especially has 
less scope for the introduction of mechanisation and other labour saving techniques. In several more 
prosperous  countries  of  Europe,  especially  the  northern  and  western  countries,  the  share  of 
employment in services is significantly higher than in the somewhat poorer countries, such as the 
southern and eastern countries. However, in Germany the rather low share of employment in services 
is somewhat out of line, while by contrast, employment in industry is considerable higher than in the 
other more prosperous countries. 
In  the  last  decade,  employment  growth  in  the  service  sector  has  accelerated  at  the  expense  of 
manufacturing, and to a lesser extent agriculture. Recently, the kinds of service activity in which most 
jobs were created were personal and communal services (such as health care, social services and 
education as well as public administration), banking, insurance and business services and distribution, 
hotels and catering. The numbers employed in manufacturing and agriculture are still declining in 
Europe. This structural  change  in  employment  has strong  effect  on  the sex  specific labour force 
participation rates, as males are more often employed in manufacturing and industry and female are 
overrepresented  in  the  service  sector.  Although  the  broad  pattern  of  sector  change  was  similar 
between the European countries, also some differences are visible. The southern countries suffered 
more from job losses in agriculture, mainly due to a high proportion of people working in this sector. 
The sector shift from agriculture and manufacturing towards services is coupled with a simultaneous 
change  in  the  contents  of  jobs,  i.e.  the  manual  aspect  diminished  and  other  skills  became  more 
important,  requiring  a  more  educated  work  force.  New  products,  processes  and  methods  of 
organisation  made  it  necessary  for  workers  to acquire new  skills and, in  many  cases, to  learn  a 
completely  different  job.  The  economies  have  become  more  open  and  European  firms  have  to 
compete  on  global  scale  that  causes  that  success  depends  largely  on  the  ability  to  adapt  to 
continuously changing market and technological pressures. The competence of the existing workforce 
and the possibilities of hiring new people with the requisite skills has become a critical factor. An 
inflexible  labour  market  may  damage  the  competitiveness  of  European  economy.  Flexibility  of 128 
 
working  arrangements  is  an  important  form  of  labour  market  flexibility:  the  possibility  to  work 
outside standard hours (evening, Saturday and Sunday working), flexi-time arrangements in which 
starting  and  stopping  times  can  be  varied  within  limits  and  part-time  working  which  especially 
provides  greater  flexibility  in  the  ordering  of  family  arrangements.  Changes  in  flexible  working 
arrangements  have  been  disparate,  reflecting  the  wide  variation  in  national  circumstances  and 
institutional  structures.  Part-time  working  stands  out  as  the  major  form  of  non-standard  working 
which has shown a considerable increase over recent decades in the majority of the European. A lot of 
Governments have introduced measures to loosen regulations on working time and a number of large 
farms have introduced schemes to reorganize working time. 
7.2.2  Demography 
Changes in the age composition of the population have distinct effects on the development of the 
labour supply. The populations in the European countries are ageing and this process is expected to 
accelerate in the first half of the next century. As a larger proportion of the population becomes 
dependent, this could demand a rise in participation rates in order to sustain the growing numbers of 
inactive people. Especially Italy, Germany and Greece are going to face serious problems, as ageing 
will be probably much stronger than elsewhere. Due to rapidly falling birth figures in the 1970s, the 
number of persons in the younger segment of the working-age population (15-24 years) has been 
declining in most European countries over the last decades. This has had a negative impact on the 
potential labour supply and this effect has even been exacerbated by a steadily rising participation in 
education. This may necessitate a rise in participation rates in order to curtail an unwanted rise in 
dependency ratios. 
The impact of migration on the development of the labour force is not clear-cut. In cases of shortages 
in  the  labour  market,  immigrants  might  fill  the  gap.  However,  in  cases  of  persistent  high 
unemployment rates, immigrants might primarily be seen as competitors for jobs. The entrance of 
certain population categories on the labour market (especially mothers with young children) might 
become more difficult in this way. On the other hand, ethnic minorities have in general a difficult 
position  on the labour  market,  due to  a  low level  of  educational  attainment,  language  problems, 
discrimination, etc. As unemployment rates are higher among migrants than average, it is not justified 
to believe that migration will ease the rise in dependency ratios, going upward due to the ageing of the 
population. To this should be added the fact that migrants – if they do not return to their home country 
– become old and dependent on society one day. Current migration policies try to curtail the arrival of 
many  new  immigrants.  The  tendency  with  respect  to  migration  policies  is  likely  to  be  a  further 
restriction of existing migration regulations and asylum procedures. Growing negative public attitudes 
towards foreigners reinforces this tendency. 129 
 
7.2.3  Socio-cultural determinants 
There has been a continuous increase in the level of educational attainment of the workforce. In all 
European  countries,  the  proportion  of  working-age  population  with  qualifications  beyond  basic 
schooling has risen over the last decades, although significant differences remain in average levels 
across Europe. There has been a widespread convergence of the average educational level of women 
towards that of men. In most European countries, the proportion of women with higher educational 
attainment  is  almost  similar  to  that  of  men.  The  increasing  participation  in  education  has  been 
accompanied  by  a  significant  decline  of  rates  of  participation  in  the  labour  force,  although  this 
relationship is unambiguous. In Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, more and more 
students combine work and employment; in Germany and Austria, a dual-training system dominates 
post-compulsory education and many youngsters are involved in apprenticeship-style training while in 
other European countries it is still common to concentrate on education alone rather than to combine 
studying with work (Rubery and Smith, 1997). 
There are several explanations for the increasing educational participation of youngsters. It is partly a 
reflection of structural changes in the economy, which demands a highly educated work force. In 
general the sectors where job losses have occurred over the past decades are the ones where the 
educational attainment of the employees is relatively low. The sectors where job gains have been 
achieved and which are expected to expand in the future too are ones where the required level of 
education is generally high. Also the expansion of the welfare state and rising standards of living 
made it possible for young people to extent the period of education without high pressures to become 
an earner, stimulated through financial support by the family or the state. 
The average education level of women and men has come closer together and is also reflected in their 
labour  participation  rates.  Although  labour  participation  among  men  is  still  higher,  the  gap  with 
women is narrowing. Notwithstanding a general rise in educational attainment in Europe, the labour 
participation among young people remained high in most countries. The rise in educational attainment 
may not only lead to a higher qualified work force in the future but also to a larger availability of 
labour supply as higher levels of education tends to go hand in hand with higher labour participation. 
In  general,  activity  rates  of  women  (aged  25  to  49)  are  higher  for  those  who  have  completed 
university education or the equivalent than for other women. The disparities in activity rates between 
women with different levels of education reflect that more highly educated women have more job 
opportunities open to them than other women, cost involved in the arrangement of suitable childcare 
represent less of a problem due to their greater earning capacities and that opportunity cost of not 
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the effect on their future careers. As a result, activity rates for highly educated women of prime 
working age are not much lower than those for men. 
Male and female labour force participation rates among people aged 25-49 have been diverging over 
the last decades. As yet, only a small proportion (around 5%) of the men between 25 and 49 is not 
active  on  the  labour  market.  Over  time  the  percentages  show  little  fluctuations,  in  times  of  an 
economic  recession  participation  is  falling  somewhat  due  to  a  discouraged  worker  effect.  The 
international differences in male participation are almost negligible, although falling participation 
during the prime working ages seems to be slightly more virulent in the southern countries. Over the 
last  three  decades  the  participation  of  women  has  been  rising.  The  changes  in  labour  market 
participation concerned primarily women in the childbearing and child-caring ages. The effects of 
these changes can be seen in the movement of activity curves. While the male age pattern has an 
inverted U-shape, in several countries the female age pattern is more or less M-shaped, reflecting a 
traditional pattern of labour force participation. In the seventies the activity curves of most European 
countries were characterised by a left-handed peak, a result of comparatively high activity rates for 
unmarried women between 20 and 25, and falling activity rates at later ages when most women 
withdrew from the labour market after marriage or childbirth. The rise in the participation rate of 
women over the last decades led to the emergence of a M-shaped age pattern: a first peak indicating 
that the presence of children reduces activity rates and a second peak that women re-enter the labour 
market once the children are older. In the Scandinavian countries the female age curve resembles that 
of males with a plateau in the age-group 30-50. These countries seem to have reached the phase in 
which having children no longer affects women's economic activity. 
The increasing involvement of women in the labour market has been underpinned by their increasing 
acquisition of educational qualifications and is reinforced by drastic changes in the socio-cultural 
environment. As compared with three decades ago, women are entering marriage later, more are 
remaining single and they have fewer children nowadays. These changes in the family formation 
reflect changes in social values. In several southern countries and Ireland, the traditional marriage and 
childbearing patterns are still dominant while in most other countries, and especially the Scandinavian 
countries, the traditional lifecycle model is giving way to more complex patterns. Cohabitation has 
become  more  popular  while  marriages  have  become  less  stable,  indicated  by  high  divorce  and 
remarriage  rates.  A  growing  incidence  of  single  motherhood  may  have  an  impact  on  economic 
activity.  Related  to  welfare  benefit  system  the  incentives  for  lone  parents  to  work  may  vary  by 
country. Financial pressures of divorce and widowhood generally draw women back into the labour 
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Motherhood in particular is used to exert a strong downward pressure on women's activity rates. Apart 
from the Nordic countries and Portugal, activity rates of mothers used to be well below that of non-
mothers. Country variations persist when educational level is taken into account, although country 
differences  in  female  activity  rates  are  largest  among  women  with  low  qualifications  and  much 
smaller among graduate women (Bulletin on Women and Employment in the EU, 1995). The highest 
maternal activity rates are found among graduate women, so high qualifications provide a labour 
market resource, which helps to offset the negative impact of motherhood on activity rates. While the 
arrival of children may have an impact on the probability of paid work of women, on the other hand 
labour market participation may influence childbearing decisions. A strong career orientation may 
lead to lower family size aspirations.  
Activity rates among women aged 25-49 year have shown a marked growth over the last decades. The 
growing  participation  of  women  in  the  labour  market  has  been  underpinned  by  their  increasing 
educational qualifications and is reinforced by drastic changes in the social and cultural environment. 
Compared  with  some  decades  ago,  women  are  marrying  later,  more  women  remain  single  and 
childless, and those who became mother have got on average fewer children. Especially married 
women  and  mothers  with  young  children  have  entered  the  labour  market.  The  increase  was 
particularly pronounced in countries that facilitated the combination of motherhood and paid work. 
The Scandinavian countries may be considered forerunners in this respect with their active policy of 
encouraging the combination of work and parenthood through subsidised day care, flexible working 
hours and a progressive structure of taxes in combination with separate taxation of spouses. In the 
Netherlands female participation used to be very low. However, a sustained rise has brought the 
Netherlands up to the average. Low female participation rates are found in the southern countries 
nowadays, with the exception of Portugal, where participation has always been rather high due to a 
relatively large primary sector.  
Labour force participation does not only refer to full-time jobs but also to part-time jobs. Over the last 
decades there has been a gradual decline in Europe of working in full-time jobs, although almost all 
men still work full-time during their prime working ages. This gradual change from full-time to part-
time employment is partly the result of the shift away from employment in agriculture and industry 
and towards services. Since part-time jobs are rare in agriculture and industry, while in the service 
sector flexibility in working arrangements is more common, this has stimulated part-time employment 
at the cost of full-time employment. Also an ongoing trend towards a more flexible organisation of 
work, has made it easier to employ part-time workers or people on fixed-term contracts. This creates 
job opportunities especially for mothers with young children. So, the growth of female employment 
has gone along with a rise in part-time working. The possibility to combine professional work with 132 
 
the raising of children has driven the demand for part-time jobs. Relatively more women than men are 
working in the service sector, where part-time jobs are more common than in agriculture or industry.  
7.2.4  Institutional factors 
State  family  policy  can  be  regarded  as  having  a  fundamental  influence  on  the  labour  supply  of 
women. In case of the Nordic countries, the family and labour market policies are largely organised to 
facilitate the reconciliation of women's employment and parental responsibilities. In Sweden, tax and 
family  policies stimulated  both  fertility  and  women's  paid  work  by  reducing the costs of having 
children while requiring parents to be employed to collect the full benefits (Sundstróm and Stafford, 
1992; Hoem, 1993). Important policy elements which encourage the combination of work and family 
responsibilities  are  the  right  for  paid  leave,  subsidised  day  care,  flexible  working  hours  and  a 
progressive structure of taxes in combination with separate taxation of spouses. As a result, women in 
the  Nordic  countries  have  to  a  large  extent  developed  a  dual  strategy  towards  employment  and 
motherhood: most couples have at least two children and women continue to work after and between 
births (Ellings et al., 1996). According to Rubery and Smith (1997), this Nordic model can be labelled 
as „everyone a breadwinner‟, as all fit adults of working age are likely to be in work or looking for 
work. Several other European countries, such as Austria and Germany, are considered as a strong 
male breadwinner model, designed around the presumption of a male breadwinner and a dependent 
wife. The taxation system tends to be household based, so that the total tax take is usually lower on 
married couples than on two single adults. This model is further characterized by limited state support 
with childcare and limited development of state services reducing overall demand for female wage 
labour. The diversity in welfare and family systems may account for the uneven development towards 
a more gender equal society.  
The differences in state policy may have repercussions along a number of dimensions. With respect to 
public sector employment, in most European countries it accounts for a much higher share of female 
than male employment. The high level of female employment found in the Nordic countries can be 
linked to their well-developed welfare state. Cutbacks in public sector employment are thus likely to 
be more damaging to women's employment prospect than to men's. State policies with respect to 
facilitating child care influences the extent to which they promote the employment of women. Most 
countries provide parental leave systems (paid or unpaid leave. Also the policy on childcare provision 
determines for an important part the participation of mothers. The Nordic countries, together with 
France and Belgium are well known for the provision of publicly funded childcare places. 
The pension system is of paramount importance for the participation of elder people. The income 
security system is a popular system in Europe. The state ensures high earning related benefit for those 
with adequate employment record. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, older people have 133 
 
to rely heavily on private pension systems because the state plays a minimal role. The statutory 
retirement  age  for  men  is  65  in  most  European  countries.  In  most  countries  state  funded  early 
retirement is possible, though eligibility conditions vary. There has been a consistent trend towards 
early retirement among men in Europe over the last three decades. The labour participation rate of 
women aged 50 and over has risen, in line with the general increase in female participation.  
The trend towards early retirement is stimulated by the need to reduce the size of the workforce, 
especially in times of economic recessions. At the political level early retirement is considered more 
socially acceptable than making younger employees redundant. This rationale behind early retirement 
may change in the (near) future as the ageing of the population presents a threat to the sustainability 
of the public pension systems. Moreover, early retirement will lead to a further deterioration in the 
ratio between the number of people in productive employment (who pay taxes, etc.) and the number 
of benefit recipients. European governments are already taking or preparing measures to contain the 
costs of future pension commitments. Hence, measures such as stricter eligibility rules and raising 
statutory retirement age, might reverse the current trend of the falling participation rate of men over 
50.  In most Member States a shift in focus is already discernible in the instruments of labour market 
policy: from passive measures of income support for people out of work to active measures designed 
to help people to find or keep jobs (European Commission, 1996b).  
7.3  Policy Scenarios on labour force participation 
The  key  assumptions  of  the  Policy  Scenarios  will  be  formulated  both  in  a  qualitative  and  a 
quantitative  sense.  The  qualitative  assumptions  of  the  labour  force  scenarios  concern  the 
demographic,  economic,  socio-cultural  and  institutional  determinants/drivers  of  labour  force 
participation on the one hand and the political context on the other hand. 
7.3.1  Qualitative assumptions 
The policy scenarios of the DEMIFER project are based on two underlying dimensions („Economy-
Environment‟  and  „Distribution-Fairness‟)  which  in combination leads  to  four  scenarios.  Each  of 
these scenarios is associated with a set of policies which are assumed to impact, to a greater or lesser 
degree on the labour force participation rates. However, this impact is not direct but indirect, as it 
leads to specific effects on the driving forces behind each demographic component. In Table 7-1 the 
assumed impact of each scenario on the distinguished driving forces of labour force participation are 
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Table  7-1:  Linkage  of  scenarios  to  labour  force  participation:  outcomes  in  levels  and  regional 
distributions 
Trend or Policy  GSE  EME  LSE  CME 
Trends in Participation  Increasing  Increasing  Decreasing  Decreasing 
Participation of young persons  Increasing  Increasing  Decreasing  Decreasing 
Female Participation   Friendly policies  Unfriendly 
policies 
Friendly policies  Unfriendly 
policies 
Participation of elderly persons  Favourable  Stressful  Favourable  Stressful 
Fart Time/Full time/ Self 
Employed  
High 
participation 
High 
participation 
Moderate 
participation 
Low 
participation 
National participation 
Inequalities 
Reduced  Increased  Persistent  Increased 
Regional participation 
Inequalities 
Reduced  Increased  Persistent  Increased 
In the GSE Scenario, the political setting refers to the combination of high economic growth with 
policies oriented on social and regional cohesion. This leads to a rise in activity rates over the whole 
range of working ages. However, the rate of change is not the same for all age groups.  It is assumed 
that the educational level of the population will increase, especially that of women. More and more 
youngsters will combine education and work. Part-time jobs will strongly increase, making it easier 
for young people to combine education and paid work. Nowadays high activity rates of young people 
can be witnessed in Denmark and Sweden. In the other countries a convergence to level of these 
countries will take place. Participation of both men and notably women will rise, for women towards 
levels seen in Sweden and Denmark.  The flourishing economy will stimulate employers to create 
opportunities for mothers to combine work and raising children. In the wake of the high economic 
growth, flexible forms of employment will spread all across the economy. A growing service sector 
offers opportunities for women to combine motherhood with the pursuit of a career. So, the entrance 
of mothers in the labour force is stimulated trough measures such as extended childcare facilities and 
flexible  jobs  in  the  service  sector.  Jobs  in  the  service  sector  are  predominantly  created  in  the 
governmental service sector.  
Due to the process of ageing a raise in the old age dependency is inevitable. Political pressures 
towards an easing of the financial pressures from an ageing population will lead to measures to 
postpone retirement. More flexible working arrangements enable elderly males to keep on working at 
elderly ages. This will lead to considerable rise of the participation of men aged 50 and over. There 
will also be a fierce increase in the participation of women aged 50 and over. This scenario is further 
characterized by policies stimulating regional cohesion. In the long run this will lead to quite similar 
patterns  in  labour  force  participation  rates  and  more  or  less  corresponding  levels  between  the 135 
 
European  countries.  Denmark  and  Sweden  are  considered  as  forerunners  and  labour  force 
participation of lagging countries move in the direction of these countries. 
In the EME Scenario, the economic circumstances are also good, and even better than in the GSE 
Scenario, and a market philosophy colours the political climate. In this scenario, economic growth is 
even higher than in the previous scenario. Increasing economic activities in combination with milder 
labour  taxation  will  lead  to  a  strong  increase  in  the  demand  for  labour.  Also  in  this  scenario 
educational levels of the European citizens will increase. However, education is seen as a private 
investment in one's own career and for this reason it not publicly financed. So, in order to follow 
education youngsters have to combine it with (part time) working. There is an abundance of part time 
jobs, specifically being created for students in order to meet the high demand for labour. Also for 
other groups entry into the labour market will increasingly become easier. Employers try to attract 
women by creating flexible jobs, enabling to combine motherhood with working outside. Also a 
growing service sector offers opportunities for women to find employment, but in this scenario this 
sector is less stimulated by governments and instead the financial service sector is growing fast. All 
this stimulates for women to work outside, and to combine childrearing and with economic activity. 
For a part this is also due to high opportunity costs (of being only a housewife).  In this scenario, the 
market philosophy leads to a divergence in regional economic performance. In the stronger economic 
regions economic growth will be higher than in the weaker regions. This unequal development is also 
reflected in the regional trends in labour force participation, as the rise will be much stronger in the 
stronger regions. 
In the LSE Scenario policies strive to attain social and regional cohesion, like the policies in the GSE 
Scenario,  the  economic  prospect  are  more  gloomy.  As  the  (financial)  effects  of  climate  change 
become visible and energy prices have risen, households have troubles to cope with rising costs of all 
kinds. The demand for labour is falling, causing a severe drop in labour force participation due to a 
discouraged  worker  effect.    The  opportunities  for  young  people  to  combine  work  and  school 
attendance will decrease due to fierce competition on a tight labour market. Youngsters tend to stay 
longer in (full-time) education in order to enhance career opportunities. The possibilities to combine 
this with a (part-time) job are very limited. 
For mothers the perspectives to get a paid work are getting worse, although norms and values toward 
the combination of paid labour with having young children will be more permissive than they used tó 
be,  partly  due  to  policies  stimulating  male  and  female  equity  in  labour  force  participation. 
Nevertheless, this will not result in a higher female participation due to the scarcity of (part-time) 136 
 
jobs. Financial troubles have led to dramatic cut-backs in the service sector and a reorganisation of the 
labour markets in the sense of more flexibility in working-time arrangements stagnates.   
In the political debate a preference towards early retirement prevails. This can be explained by the fact 
the  governments  give  priority  to  the  absorption  of  young  people  in  the  labour  market.  Also  the 
conditions for elderly workers are not favourable, because the focus of employers is on full time jobs, 
which are too demanding for elderly people. Although economic stagnation is the general drift in 
European  regions,  poorer  regions  are  more  confronted  with  it  than  richer  regions.  In  those 
economically weak regions demand for labour is especially low, unemployment is high, and in the 
wake  of  it  labour  force  participation  is  declining.  However,  due  to  policies  striving  for  regional 
cohesion the negative effects for especially weaker regions can be softened by the creation of specific 
jobs for long lasting unemployed persons by the Government. As a result, disparities between the 
regions of the ESPON space will largely remain intact. 
Also in the CME Scenario economic growth has plummeted and severe environmental problems have 
arisen. This has lead to a restructuring of the economy: weaker firms could not manage to survive, 
while larger and stronger firms dominate the economic landscape.  The economic stagnation causes a 
lack of jobs and induces young people to stay in education longer. This causes a decline in labour 
force participation of youngsters, but the more talented ones succeed in finding (part-time) jobs in 
(international) firms, always trying to raise their competitiveness. Policies are not directed at creating 
facilities for mothers to combine work with care for children. Also the introduction of more flexible 
forms of employment contracts stagnates. Confronted with increasing unemployment and worsening 
conditions in the labour market men and women are discouraged to acquire a job. However, new job 
opportunities are created by the large firms. As a result, male participation at prime working ages will 
more or less stay the same while female participation will drop slightly.  
Although in this scenario no policies exists promoting early retirement continues, labour participation 
amongst elderly persons drop somewhat. Employers try to encourage elderly persons to stop working 
because their productivity is perceived to be smaller than that of younger persons. The elderly persons 
who remain in employment are full-time working, because of fears of losing their job altogether if 
they switch to working part-time. In this scenario the low performing regions are expected to suffer 
the most from the low economic growth. Here labour force participation will drop somewhat, and thus 
a trend toward divergence will be seen in the future. In contrast, not much change will take place in 
the regions with high activity rates.  137 
 
7.3.2  Quantitative assumptions 
The quantitative assumptions of the four Policy Scenarios refer to trends in labour force participation 
rates. The labour force consists of persons who during a specified period are (i) either paid employed 
or self-employed or (ii) unemployed. The unemployed persons are all persons who during a reference 
period  are  (i)  without  work,  (ii)  currently  available  for  work,  (iii)  and  seeking  employment.  All 
persons who are not classified as employed or unemployed are defined as inactive and do not belong 
to the labour force. The labour force participation rate represents the labour force as a percentage of 
the population of working age (>= 15 years). The data on labour force participation rates are derived 
from the Labour Force Surveys of the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) and 
consist of age and gender specific participation rates. 
In the actual making of the scenarios, an age pattern for 5-year age groups for the target year, i.e. 
2050, has been generated. For the intermediate years between 2005 and the target year a linear path is 
supposed between the rates of 2005 and those of 2050.  
In the conversion of qualitative into quantitative assumptions, the results from the expert opinion 
survey play an important role. The result of this survey showed that governments are more or less 
intense trying to influence labour force participation. Moreover, they also expect that it will have a 
positive  effect  on  the  activity  rates.  Especially  the  issue  of  raising  female  participation  rates  is 
considered to be important. The general expectation of the experts was that these policies can be quite 
effective. Also raising participation of youngsters was evaluated as being an important political issue. 
However, the opinion on the effect of policies on this group was less optimistic as many experts 
though it had no effect. To the opinion of the expert fewer policies were undertaken in order to raise 
participation of elderly persons and above this it was considered not to be effective or even having a 
negative effect. The political interference goes even further and extents to issues such as the discourse 
on working fulltime or part-time or being self employed, increasing labour productivity and the level 
of investments in the education system. All kind of political measures on these topics might have a 
positive effect on labour force participation.  138 
 
Table 7-2: Linkage of scenarios to demographic components: outcomes in levels and distributions 
Trend or Policy  Growing 
Social Europe 
Expanding 
Market 
Europe 
Limited Social 
Europe 
Challenged 
Market 
Europe 
Trends in Participation  Raise rates  Raise rates  Lower rates  Lower rates 
Participation of young 
persons 
Raise rates 
 
Raise rates 
 
Lower rates 
 
Lower rates 
Female Participation   Raise rates  Raise rates  Lower rates  Lower rates 
Participation of elderly 
persons 
Raise rates  Raise rates  Lower rates  Lower rates 
Fart Time/Full time/ Self 
Employed  
Raise rates  Raise rates  Lower rates  Lower rates 
From Table 7-2, it is clear that in the GSE Scenario labour force participation rates will increase in all 
age groups. In this scenario a lot of political measures are taken in order to raise participation of 
youngsters, females and elderly persons. These measures are rather successful, but this is enhanced by 
the  fact  that  the  economic  circumstances  are  also  favourable,  leading  to  a  large  demand  for 
employees. Participation rates of males in the prime working ages only shows a small increase, due to 
the fact that participation rates are already very high.  
In the EME Scenario, also, the labour force participation rates will also increase in all age groups, but 
this  time  the  increases  are  considerable  higher.  As  the  market  dominates  in  this  scenario,  the 
economic performance is generally higher in this scenario compared with the previous scenario. In 
this case policies are not so concentrated at stimulating participation rates, but that is not necessary 
due to a significant rise in the demand for labour.  
In  the  LSE  Scenario,  the  participation  rates  are  declining  as  a  result  of  the  negative  economic 
developments. Although policies try to enhance labour participation of weak groups in the labour 
market it is not very successful, as economic „laws‟ are decisive for the demand for labour. Again the 
effects are noticeable in all age groups. The males in the prime working ages will only experience a 
small decrease in labour force participation, while female participation will be confronted with a 
serious  fall  back.  Also  amongst  youngsters  and  elderly  persons  labour  participation  will  drop 
substantially.    
In the CME Scenario, the economic prospects are again gloomy. Due to the free market system large 
companies are still making (large) profits, while small companies perish. Although the demand labour 
force participation is declining, the demand for labour is higher than in the LSE Scenario. For males 
in  the  prime  working  ages  labour  force  participation  does  not  change,  while  among  youngsters, 
elderly persons and female the drop in labour force participation is much smaller than in the previous 
scenario.    139 
 
7.4  Results  
7.4.1  Age group 15-24 years 
In order to give an impression of the current regional variation in the participation rates of young 
persons, Figure 7-1 presents the labour force participation rate of males of the age group 20-24 years 
in the calendar year 2005. This pattern is characterized by high rates in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
most regions of the United Kingdom and Switzerland. Many young people in these countries combine 
education  with  part-time  jobs.  Very  low  participation  rates  can  be  found  in  parts  of  several 
Mediterranean and East European countries. 
 
Figure 7-1: Labour force participation rate of males aged 20-24 years, 2005 
Figure 7-2 gives the outcomes of the four policy scenarios with respect to the male participation rate 
of age group 20-24 for the calendar year 2050.  In the GSE Scenario, we clearly see that the areas 140 
 
with high labour force participation rates in 2005 have enlarged to the bordering regions. The regional 
differences in labour force participation rates have diminished somewhat, due to policies trying to 
attain regional cohesion.  
In the EME Scenario, the participation rate amongst youngsters has risen even more, leading to a 
further enlargement of areas with high participation rates. The contrast between regions with high and 
low participation rate is sharper than in the previous scenario. Especially the economic strong regions 
attract more youngsters while the demand for young people more or less stays the same in the weaker 
regions.  
In the LSE Scenario a falling course of labour force participation rate is envisaged. The result is a 
striking shrinkage of the areas with high rates, compared with the situation in 2005. In large parts of 
the ESPON space, the activity rates have become very low and especially in the several Southern and 
most Eastern countries. Notwithstanding a severe drop in participation of young persons in every 
region,  regional  inequalities  are  not  becoming  much  larger,  due  to  policies  trying  to  enhance 
participation of youngsters in the weaker regions.    
In the CME Scenario, also, a fall in the participation rate of young people is assumed, but in this case 
the contrast between regions with a high rate and those with a low rate is more or less kept intact. In a 
market oriented economic system strong regions will still flourish and provide jobs for youngsters, 
while in the weak regions the supply of these jobs will fall short. 141 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Labour force participation rate of males aged 20-24 years, GSE, EME, LSE, and CME, 2050 142 
 
7.4.2  Female participation  
In order to give an impression of the current regional variation in the labour force participation of 
females, Figure 7-3 presents the labour force participation rate for females aged 40-44 in 2005. In 
general high female activity rates can be found in almost all regions of the  northern and western 
countries of the ESPON space. In most southern and eastern countries female participation is much 
lower, with the exception of Portugal (where many females are working in the agricultural sector) and 
Rumania. Germany shows a clear divide between former West and East Germany, with the latter 
having much higher rates as an inherence of the communist past. In Italy a North-South divide is 
visible  with  low  female  activity  rates  in  the  Southern  part  and  high  female  activity  rates  in  the 
northern part. 
 
Figure 7-3: Labour force participation rate of females aged 40-44 years, 2005 
Figure 7-4 gives the outcomes of the four policy scenarios with respect to the female participation rate 
of age group 40-44 for the calendar year 2050.  143 
 
 
Figure 7-4: Labour force participation rate of females aged 40-44 years, GSE, EME, LSE, and CME, 
2050 144 
 
In the GSE Scenario a tremendous rise in female activity is visible everywhere in the ESPON space. 
Although Sweden and Denmark are still forerunners the gap with the other countries has been reduced 
to a large extent. Policies trying to erase regional equalities in female participation have been quite 
successful: no large regional differentials are visible anymore. 
Driven by the flourishing economy, in the EME Scenario the growing demand for labour has lead to a 
strong  increase  in  the  participation  of  females.  However,  not  all  regions  has  profited  from  this 
situation. In several weaker regions the rise in female participation has much lower. As a result the 
regional differential in female participation is significantly larger than in the previous scenario. 
In the LSE Scenario bleak economic perspectives have led to a general fall in female participation. 
Every region in the ESPON space was confronted with falling activity rates among females and even 
the two forerunners Sweden and Denmark had to face declining rates. 
Also in the CME Scenario, the gloomy economic perspectives have led to a falling participation of 
females. There is no room for policies trying to attract mothers to the labour market. In the stronger 
regions there is still an abundance of jobs for mothers and employers are capable to finance child care 
facilities. So, in these stronger regions only a small drop in female activity is apparent. In the weaker 
region there is no need to attract women to the labour market and as a result the participation rates of 
females remain at a low level.   
7.4.3  The age group 50 years and older 
In order to give an impression of the current regional variation in the labour force participation of 
older persons, Figure 7-5 presents the labour force participation rate for males in the age group 55-59 
years in the calendar year 2005. Large regional differentials are visible with high participation rates in 
the Nordic and Baltic States, several western countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom and 
some southern countries as Spain and Portugal. In France, Italy and several east European countries 
participation  of  elderly  males  is  very  low.  The  large  national  differences  are  mainly  due  to 
characteristics of the pension systems. The statutory retirement age for men is 65 in most Member 
States, Denmark has the highest retirement age with 67 and France the lowest with 60. Another 
explanation for the large regional inequalities is economic background. In regions where agriculture is 
dominant, many people continue to work in order to escape poverty. Elsewhere, Governments are 
taking measures to increase participation at higher ages in order to contain the cost of future pension 
commitments. Figure 7-6 gives the outcomes of the four Policy Scenarios with respect to the male 
participation rate of age group 55-59 for the calendar year 2050.  145 
 
In the GSE Scenario a general rise in elderly activity is foreseen. This leads to rising participation 
rates in all regions, but especially in region with low rates nowadays. In particular, in France, Italy 
and several eastern European countries a considerable rise in activity is assumed.  
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Figure 7-6: Labour force participation rate of males aged 55-59 years, GSE, EME, LSE, and CME, 2050  147 
 
Also in the EME Scenario, a boost is foreseen for elderly participation, but now regions which already 
had high rates in 2005 profit the most. In large parts of the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Switzerland and Austria labour force rates are very high in 2050.    
In the LSE Scenario, the participation of elderly persons is falling. In an economic context with a 
shortage of jobs, policies promote early retirement in order to make jobs for young persons.  
Also in the CME Scenario, falling activity rates are assumed for elderly persons, but in this case it is 
due to companies trying to stimulate their elderly employees to leave. However, this tendency is less 
outspoken in the economic stronger countries. As a result regional differentials in elderly participation 
are stronger in this scenario compared with the previous scenario.   148 
 
8.  SCENARIO DATABASES 
The  four  scenarios  for  five  demographic  components  plus  labour  force  participation  have  been 
prepared  by  the  DEMIFER  team  at  the  University  of  Leeds  and  the  Netherlands  Environmental 
Assessment Agency. These scenarios have been implemented in a set of workbooks in Microsoft 
Excel (2003 format, „.xls‟ file extensions). The workbooks have been deposited on the DEMIFER 
Sharepoint facility and will be made available for use by other researchers at the conclusion of the 
project.. 
The set of workbooks that are available are listed in Table 8-1.  In general, there is one workbook 
containing the benchmark data or historical series of data and one workbook in which the scenarios 
are  developed.  For  some  components  (e.g.  Mortality)  one  large  workbook  combines  these  two 
functions, with there being a separate workbook with raw deaths and population data and a separate 
workbook containing the life table computations.  All of these workbooks are large and need a good 
PC for implementation. They can all be easily loaded into the 2007 version of MS Excel, which was 
in fact used for most of the development. The conversion back to an earlier version was effected to 
make use of the workbooks easier across the DEMIFER team and by external users. We can supply 
2007 versions of the workbooks if required. 
Table 8-1: Scenario databases (workbooks) 
Workbook file   Contents 
MORTALITY   
European_Mortality_Data  Population 1991-2006: time series of country populations by sex and age 
to 100+ (raw data) 
  Population 1991-2006: time series of NUTS2 regional populations by sex 
and age to 100+ (raw data) 
  Mortality: 1991-2006 time series of counts, rates and indicators, country 
deaths by sex and age to 100+ (raw data) 
  Mortality: 1991-2006 time series of counts, rates and indicators, regional 
deaths by sex and age to 100+ (raw data) 
DEMIFER Mortality Scenarios 
Final 
Population 1991-2006: time series of country populations by sex and age 
to 100+ (estimates and modelled data) 
  Population 1991-2006: time series of NUTS2 regional populations by sex 
and age to 100+ (estimates and modelled data) 
  Mortality: 1991-2006 time series of counts, rates and indicators, country 
deaths by sex and age to 100+ (estimates and modelled data)  
  Mortality: 1991-2006 time series of counts, rates and indicators, regional 
deaths by sex and age to 100+ (estimates and modelled data)  
  Mortality: 2005-10 to 2045-50 time series of rates and rolling indices for 
regions for each scenario 
DEMIFER Life Table Scenarios  Life tables 2005-10 to 2045-50 for each scenario for regions 149 
 
FERTILITY   
  Fertility: 1991-2006 time series of counts, rates and indicators 
  Fertility: 2005-10 to 2045-50 time series of rates and rolling indices 
INTERNAL MIGRATION   
Irm – Benchmark – Multipoles – 
v3 – Apr 2010.xls 
Internal migration: 2001-6 time series of counts, rates and indicators 
Irm – Scenario – Multipoles – v4 
– Apr 2010.xls 
Internal migration: 2005-10 to 2045-50 time series of rates and rolling 
indices 
INTER-COUNTRY 
MIGRATION 
 
  Inter-country migration: 2002-06 time series of counts, rates and 
indicators 
  Inter-country migration: 2005-10 to 2045-50 time series of rates and 
rolling indicators 
EXTRA-EUROPE MIGRATION   
  Extra-Europe migration: 2002-06 time series of counts, rates and 
indicators 
  Extra-Europe migration: 2005-10 to 2045-50 time series of counts and 
rolling indicators 
LABOUR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION 
 
  Labour force scenarios: 2002-6 time series of participation rates 
  Labour force scenarios: 2005-10 to 2045-50 times series of rates and 
rolling indicators 
Notes: The database work books are in zip archives (.zip) containing the information in MS Excel 2003 (.xls) 
and 2007 (.xlsx) formats 
The status of the workbooks is first or alpha release only. Please report any computational errors to 
the authors of the workbooks. Each workbook should begin with a meta data sheet identifying the 
author and contact email. The authors provide no guarantees for the accuracy or completeness of the 
computations. 150 
 
9.  SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This report presents the results of research into alternative demographic futures for Europe. Our basic 
hypothesis was that a number of policies relating directly to health, to families and to migration 
incentives and barriers along with more general social policies linked to the degree of adoption of the 
welfare  state  and  economic  policies  that  affect  regional  economies  will,  taken  together,  have 
significant impacts on demographic behaviour. There is substantial evidence that adoption of specific 
policies can have short-term impacts on particular components of demographic change. Examples 
include  investment  in  medical  and  health  research  which  yields  over  time  better  treatments  and 
preventive  therapies  and  hence  continuing  increases  in  longevity.  However,  the  impact  of  such 
advances is modified by socio-economic variables such as degree of poverty and degree of inequality. 
Poorer people benefit later than richer people from health policies and differences between countries 
and within countries between regions persist. 
There  is  no  way  of  being  precise  about  the  impacts  of  a  given  set  of  policies  on  demographic 
behaviour. History provides a number of natural experiments in the impact of policies but these are 
specific to time and place. Nevertheless it is useful to put in place thought experiments that reveal the 
choices that European societies face. What we do in this report is to explore the determinants of 
change for the demographic components, relate those determinants to policies and bundle together 
policies (or the strength of those policies) in Scenarios. Scenarios are, in effect, coalitions of policies 
affecting  different  demographic  components  in  similar  ways.  We  propose  four  scenarios  (linked 
policy  bundles-demographic  effects)  using  two  axes  of  policy  variation:  a  „Distribution-Fairness‟ 
dichotomous  axis  and  an  „Economy-Environment‟  dichotomous  axis.  Crossing  these  two  axes 
produces four Policy Scenarios, which we call Growing Social Europe (GSE), Expanding Market 
Europe (EME), Limited Social Europe (LSE) and Challenged Market Europe (CME).  
We then develop models of likely change in the key drivers of each demographic component and vary 
the parameters in those models. The models have a variable that drives change across Europe or the 
member states and a distribution function that translates change to regional scale. For example, in the 
Mortality Policy Scenario we use the average annual percentage change in age-specific mortality rates 
for Europe measured in 2001-2006 as the overall driver (-2.8% for men, -2.6% for women), which 
result in life expectancy increasing from 76 (men) and 82 (women) in 2005-10 to 89 (men) and 92 
(women) by 2045-50.  In the GSE and EME Sscenarios we assume higher percentages and in the LSE 
and CME Scenarios we assume lower percentage changes. The regional death rates are modelled 
using scenarios for regional SMRs (using Europe as a standard): in the GSE and LSE Scenarios we 
assume convergence in regional SMRs and in the EME and CME Scenarios we assume divergence. 151 
 
The impacts of the Mortality Policy Scenarios on regional Competitiveness are to decrease it because 
the improvements in mortality increase the old age dependency ratio, assuming no other changes in 
the social and economic system. The Social scenarios (GSE, LSE) increase regional Cohesion by 
reducing the spread of mortality experiences across regions, while the Market scenarios decrease 
regional Cohesion because the variation across regions in mortality experience increases. However, 
much larger than these regional changes in Cohesion is the convergence of the mortality experience of 
men and women with the gap in life expectancy at birth for Europe shrinking from six years now to 
three years by mid-century. 
We develop equivalent models for the other components of demographic change. So for fertility we 
use changes in the TFR tailored to each scenario and the range of TFR within countries to reflect 
convergence or divergence in regional fertility. For internal migration, within the 23 countries that 
contain  two  or  more  NUTS2  regions,  we  assume  no  trend in  overall  level of  internal  migration 
because the historical series (2001-2006) suggest no overall trends and fluctuations in response to 
economic conditions. We use destination attractiveness ratios (DARs) to alter the direction of out-
migration. For the GSE and LSE scenarios the range of DARs is shrunk; for the EME and CME 
scenarios it is expanded. A similar method was used to model inter-country migration within the 
ESPON space. Trends in DARs are adopted which depend on scenarios. The Extra-Europe Migration 
is governed by assumptions about the total level of immigration to Europe, which is then distributed 
to countries and regions using the current distribution patterns. Each of the scenarios has a different 
level assumption: 3.5 million per year for the GSE Scenario, 4.5 for the EME Scenario, 1.5 for the 
LSE Scenario and 2.5 for the CME Scenario. The hypothesis is that Europe‟s success in solving the 
economic and environmental challenges will raise or lower the number of immigrants attracted but 
that the attractiveness will be modified by the degree of emphasis on social welfare or market demand 
for labour. 
The body of the report discussed the assumptions and methods used in building the component inputs 
to the DEMIFER Policy Scenario projections (reported on under Deliverable D7). We provide also a 
rich  mix  of  graph  and  map  illustrations  of  selected  input  variables  by  scenario.  The  full  set  of 
variables are contained the DEMIFER Scenario Databases. The four sets of scenario inputs constitute 
a radically innovative investigation of Europe‟s demographic future. We have  developed a set of 
fascinating maps of what the demographic drivers of Europe‟s population in the middle of the twenty-
first century will look like. We don‟t know which of these futures will come to be. We hope that 
either the GSE or EME Scenarios will  be the future, as this will imply that Europe has maintained a 
reasonable path of economic growth combined with environmental stewardship in a sustainable way. 
These  two  successful  scenarios  have  different  implications  for  European  cohesion  and 152 
 
competitiveness. The GSE Scenario will deliver more solidarity and less inequality (though there will 
still be quite large demographic differences across Europe). The EME Scenario will deliver more 
competitiveness but at the cost of greater inequality. We leave it to the reader to choose his or her 
preferred future. 153 
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